Schiller, Hegel, and Marx

STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE AESTHETIC IDEAL OF ANCIENT GREECE

Philip J. Kain

Schiller, Hegel, and Marx looked back to ancient Greek culture, viewing it as the historical embodiment of certain ideals central to aesthetic theory. This volume investigates their viewpoints and how they use Greek culture as an ideal model for remaking the modern world, for overcoming alienation and estrangement.

All three believed that the modern world could be remade according to this model, though none succeeded in his endeavor. At times Schiller seemed to recognize the failure of the model; in his mature writings Hegel dropped the model; and Marx, as he grew older, fundamentally modified the model. Nevertheless, focusing upon their attempts and failures allows an explanation of certain aspects of one of the fundamental concerns of current Marx studies: Marx's humanism and the relationship between his earlier and later thought.

Using this approach, Kain shows that Marx's development cannot be divided into two neat periods—an early humanistic or philosophical period and a later scientific period—as some scholars argue, nor can one argue for an essential unity to his thought as other scholars do. Instead Kain finds Marx continually shifting his views in his attempt to come to grips with the issues that concern him. But Kain also finds a deep-seated humanism in Marx's later writings which grows out of, but differs from, the humanism of his early work.

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Abbreviations

Aesth.	Hegel, *Aesthetics*
Aesth. Ed.	Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*
CHPR	Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*
Civil War	Marx, *The Civil War in France*
CPE	Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*
Enz.	Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*
EPM	Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*
G	Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*
GI	Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*
GKPO	Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*
Gotha	Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*
GPR	Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*
KGS	Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*
Log.	Hegel, *The Logic of Hegel*
MECW	Marx and Engels, *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works*
MEW	Marx and Engels, *Marx Engels Werke*
"Mor. Util."	Schiller, "The Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners"
N & S Poet.	Schiller, *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*
On Subl.	Schiller, *On the Sublime*
PG	Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*
PH	Hegel, *Philosophy of History*
Ph. Mind	Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*
Ph. Rel.	Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*
PM	Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*
PN	Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*

Positivity	Hegel, *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*
PR	Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*
PWG	Hegel, *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*
PWIII	Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction*
Realphilos. 1	Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie* 1
Realphilos. 2	Hegel, *Jenaer Realphilosophie*
Spirit of Christ.	Hegel, *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*
SW	Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*
System der Sitt.	Hegel, *System der Sittlichkeit*
TSV	Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*
"Univ. Hist."	Kant, "Idea for a Universal History"
W	Schiller, *Schillers Werke*
WYMPS	Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*

SCHILLER, HEGEL, AND MARX

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Introduction

THE purpose of this book is to examine two interconnected themes: Marx's humanism and the relationship between the earlier and the later Marx.

The scholars who concern themselves with these issues can be divided into two groups: those who argue for an essential unity to Marx's thought and those who argue for a fundamental difference between the early and the late Marx.

At the first pole, the weakest sort of argument for the essential unity of Marx's thought proceeds in the following, unsound manner. One begins by identifying an important concept, say, in the later writings. One examines, for example, alienation or fetishism, some aspect of political economy, and so on. Next, one returns to the early writings in order to discover that similar concepts are employed or discussed there also. Then one argues that the earlier discussion leads to, prepares for, or perhaps even fleshes out—by adding a philosophical or humanist dimension to—the treatment found in the later writings.[1] In this way essential unity is supposed to have been proved. This is not an acceptable procedure. Even if we grant that the similarities discovered in this way are actually present in Marx's thought, it is still quite possible that Marx's aim, his thrust, the way in which related concepts are interconnected—any of these—could in the course of Marx's development have undergone a fundamental change. Or, some basic conceptual element could have been dropped or added. There

1. See, for example, T. Carver's commentary in K. Marx, *Texts on Method*, trans. T. Carver (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975), pp. 38–40.

might well be basic dissimilarity within a general similarity. Simply tracing a theme and finding certain similarities is not enough to prove essential unity.

I. Fetscher, for example, argues that Marx does not change his views on alienation. It is correct that some of the elements that make up this concept do remain unchanged; nevertheless, Marx does drop (it will be argued below) the concepts of species-being and of alienation from the species. Fetscher does not notice this shift, perhaps because he did not examine the original concept of species-being in enough detail. Not recognizing all that it implied, he does not recognize the conceptual elements that are dropped by the later Marx.[2]

Each theme must be carefully traced throughout its entire development, all of the related elements must be grasped, and connections to other concepts must be examined. The question of shifts must be studied against this whole background.

At the other end of the spectrum stands someone like L. Althusser, who argues not simply for a basic shift between the early and the later writings but for a *coupure epistémologique,* a leap from one whole pattern or frame of reference to a totally new one. For Althusser, this break occurs in the *German Ideology,* of 1845–46, although he considers the period until 1857–58 as one of transition. Althusser attempts to distinguish the true, scientific later Marx from the idealist, pre-Marxist humanism of the early Marx.[3] For Althusser the concepts of the early Marx have either no meaning or a totally altered meaning for the later Marx. This I cannot agree with either. I particularly disagree with Althusser's understanding of the development of Marx's concept of alienation. I will argue that some of the elements of this concept simply remain unaltered for the later Marx while other elements are modified, but in a very ordinary way that does not amount to a *coupure epistémologique.*

Althusser's error is the reverse of Fetscher's. Althusser correctly

2. *Marx and Marxism,* trans. J. Hargreaves (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), pp. 9, 13, 15.

3. *For Marx,* trans. B. Brewster (New York: Pantheon, 1969), p. 199. Also, Althusser and E. Balibar, *Reading Capital,* trans B. Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970), pp. 148–57. In a later book, Althusser argues that the mature Marx can be found only in "Critique of the Gotha Program" and "Notes on Adolph Wagner" (see his *Lenin and Philosophy,* trans. B. Brewster [New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1971], pp. 93–94). This is to exclude most of Marx in order to fit him into one's own categories.

recognizes that one of the basic changes in the later Marx's concept of alienation (for example, in the discussion of fetishism in Volume 1 of *Capital)* is that the earlier concept of alienation from the species is missing.[4] But what Althusser seems to assume is that for the early Marx alienation from the species was the only form that alienation took. Thus he thinks that when Marx drops this earlier notion, alienation takes on a totally altered meaning. Instead, I will argue that the notion of alienation from the species as well as the sort of alienation described in the later section on the fetishism of commodities—both—can be found in the writings of 1844. The later Marx in a very ordinary way drops the first element and retains the second. This does not amount to a *coupure epistémologique.*

There are other writers who do not hold to a *coupure epistémologique* but who nevertheless claim that Marx's thought can be divided into two neat periods. Some see the break occurring in the *Holy Family* or the *German Ideology;*[5] others see it occurring in the *Grundrisse.*[6] For some of these writers alienation and estrangement are meaningful concepts in the first period but not in the second.[7]

I cannot fully agree with the essential-unity view, with an Althusserian break, or with the view that a break comes all at once in the *German Ideology* or the *Grundrisse.* I do think that there are fundamental shifts in Marx's thought, but that they occur at different times. There are real differences, for example, between what alienation means in *Capital* and what it meant in the works of 1844. But all of the shifts concerning alienation do not come in one text. There are also, on the other hand, basic similarities that run through the different shifts.

What is at stake here? The thrust of many of those who argue for the first position, for the essential unity of Marx's thought, is to save Marx from, or indeed to turn him against, the one-sided approach of the Marxism of the Social Democrats of the Second International

4. *Reading Capital,* p. 17.

5. See, for example, W. Mönke, *Die heilige Familie* (Glashütten im Taunus: Detlev Auvermann, 1972), pp. 105, 118, 123.

6. See for example, M. Nicolaus, "The Proletariat and Middle Class in Marx: Hegelian Choreography and the Capitalist Dialectic," *Studies on the Left* 7 (1967): 262, 266, 274n.

7. See Mönke, pp. 118, 123. Also, D. Bell, "The Meaning of Alienation—II," *Thought* 11 (Sept. 26, 1959): 12. Also, S. Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 5ff.

and of the orthodox Soviet sort, who, it is argued, rely on a separation of the earlier humanist, or philosophical, Marx from the later scientific Marx for their positivistic and mechanistic interpretation of Marxism.[8] The thrust of the essential-unity view, for these writers, is to make Marx's humanism basic to his entire thought. To accept the notion of a fundamental shift or shifts appears, to this view, to sacrifice Marx's humanism. But what this approach gains for humanism it loses, I think, in accurate and critical scholarship.

The argument of this book is that we can treat Marx in a critical way. We can accept and indeed must come to understand fundamental shifts in the development of his thought; and yet we can still find that the later Marx is a humanist, although his humanism, too, has undergone transformation.

That will be my general approach. However, this study will be a very modest one. I do not propose to trace the development of all or even most of the major themes in Marx's thought. I will not, for example, examine in any detail one of the most fundamental issues—historical materialism. This in itself will require another book. I propose to make a simple beginning. I will trace only a few themes, examine shifts, and show how related themes reflect these shifts. I believe, however, that I will accomplish enough to at least make plausible the line of approach I have suggested.

Certain problems arise in attempting to trace the development of themes that are relevant to Marx's humanism and to the intimately related concept of alienation. Many of the relevant passages are fragmentary and appear in works that were never finished. For this reason I propose to start with some of Marx's predecessors. A comparative approach will illuminate Marx's thought as well as its origins and development. Specifically I intend to pay attention to the attempt (and also the ultimate failure) on the part of certain German thinkers to construct a particular humanistic ideal for social and political institutions. This ideal was patterned after the cultural conditions of an-

8. See E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Ungar, 1973), pp. 69ff. Also, Fetscher, pp. 6–7, 148ff., 333–34. Also, G. Petrović, *Marx in the Mid-twentieth Century* (Garden City: Anchor, 1967), pp. 31–33, 35–37. For a discussion of this issue see A. Schaff, *Marxism and the Human Individual*, ed. R. S. Cohen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 13–30.

cient Greece and was based upon modern aesthetic concepts. It was designed to overcome alienation and estrangement in the modern world, brought about by the development of the division of labor.

Many German writers of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century were concerned with one or another of the different concepts that make up this ideal; I do not intend to deal with all of these writers. I will focus on Schiller and Hegel as predecessors of Marx because each of these three thinkers dealt with most of the relevant concepts and organized them in a similar fashion.

To explain this in further detail, I begin with the concern these thinkers had with what we might call the "myth of ancient Greece."[9] For these thinkers, ancient Greece represented a lost ideal, a high point of the human condition. What characterized this ideal period, it was thought, was wholeness of personality, spontaneity of culture, and unity with external objects and institutions. The individual Greek possessed a *wholeness* in the sense of an extraordinarily complete development of his powers and capacities. As Marx says, quoting Lemontey, "We are struck with admiration when we see among the Ancients the same person distinguishing himself to a high degree as philosopher, poet, orator, historian, priest, administrator, general of an army. Our souls are appalled at the sight of such a vast domain."[10] The ancient Greek was able to develop a vast array of his powers, both mental and physical; he did not limit himself to one or a few. Moreover, not only were the faculties and capacities of the individual highly developed, but, even more importantly, his rational and sen-

9. Besides Schiller, Hegel, and Marx there are other German writers concerned with the "myth of ancient Greece." See J. G. Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, trans. F. E. Manuel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 96–99; for the German, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. B. Suphan, 33 vols. (1877–1913; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–68), 14: 25–28. Also, F. Hölderlin, *Hyperion*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York: Signet, 1965); for the German, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. F. Beissner, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Cottasche Buchhandlung, 1958–59), vol. 3. Also, F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967); for the German, *Nietzsches Werke*, 19 vols. (Leipzig: Kröner, 1910–23), vol. 1. And finally, J. J. Winckelmann, *History of Ancient Art*, trans. G. H. Lodge (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1881); for the German, *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (Leipzig: Dürr, 1882).

10. *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International, 1963), p. 144; for the German, *Marx Engels Werke*, ed. Institute für Marxismus-Leninismus, 41 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1971–74), 4:157.

suous capacities were in harmony with each other. This was significant for ethics and politics. Principle and feeling, duty and inclination, were in agreement, thus producing in the individual a *spontaneity* rather than a tension or opposition. Inclination was in spontaneous, natural agreement with duty, unlike the Kantian morality, where inclination and duty are found in opposition. As Hegel says,

> As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by themselves, . . . gave their property, exhausted their passions, and sacrificed their lives by thousands for an end which was their own. They neither learned nor taught a moral system but evinced by their actions the moral maxims which they could call their very own. In public as in private and domestic life, every individual was a free man, one who lived by his own laws. The idea of his country or of the state was the invisible and higher reality for which he strove, which impelled him to effort; it was the final end of *his* world or in his eyes the final end of *the* world, an end which he found manifested in the realities of his daily life or which he himself co-operated in manifesting and maintaining.[11]

Because of the agreement between general and particular interest, between principle and feeling, and between duty and inclination, the activity of the individual Greek—his effort—appeared as an end in itself; it was satisfying and enjoyable. Due to this spontaneity or harmony the Greek was in *unity* with his object. He was at home, in control. His state, as Hegel suggests, appeared as the product of his own energies. It was his highest end, and he felt a part of it.[12] Additionally, the Greek was in unity with nature. Instead of being dominated by it he was in harmony with it. In both his art and his labor the natural environment appeared humanized, and he was at home with it.[13]

For Schiller, Hegel, and Marx the fundamental problem of their own world was precisely the absence of this humanistic wholeness, spontaneity, and unity and instead the presence of alienation and

11. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*, in *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (1948; reprint ed., Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1970), p. 154; for the German, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. H. Nohl (1907; reprint ed., Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966), p. 221.

12. *Positivity*, pp. 154–56; Nohl, pp. 221–23.

13. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1: 79, 256, 261, and 2: 1053; for the German, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. H. Glockner, 26 vols. (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965–68), 12: 118, 345, 261, and 14: 342–43.

estrangement (or more generally, fragmentation).[14] This problem appeared in the political realm, in the social realm, and in art.

In the political realm we find a state that no longer appears as the product of the activities and energies of its citizens. In the modern world the political state is separate and independent. It has an alienated life of its own distant from the citizen. The state turns upon its creators as a hostile, oppressive, and estranged force.[15] The unity of the ancient world has been lost. Spontaneity as well has been lost in that duty and inclination, general and particular interest, are now at odds.

In the social realm we find an individual separated from his object, his product, the world of nature he forms through labor. The individual no longer controls his object; rather, his object, following the mechanical laws of the market, controls him. The individual's activity does not result in unity with the world. His activity instead produces objects that confront him as an independent hostile power. Further, his laboring activity has become limited, one-sided, and mechanical, thus producing a loss of wholeness.

In art, the artist (as well as the ordinary individual) is no longer in touch with nature. He is separated from and opposed to nature. For this reason modern art has declined in comparison with the art of Greece, which for these thinkers was the highest art.

Greek culture, according to this idealized conception, was free from alienation and estrangement (at least in certain ways). What was it, then, that destroyed the ancient world's wholeness, spontaneity, and unity? Schiller, Hegel, and Marx each thought at one time or another that it was the development of the division of labor that was responsible. With this development the individual's activity was restricted to a narrow realm. Specialization required that he develop a single capacity to the exclusion of others, thus destroying his wholeness. With specialization, mental was separated from physical activity; the sensuous and the rational capacities were set at odds, thus destroying spontaneity and harmony. At the same time classes became rigidly

14. Hegel and Marx use the terms "alienation" and "estrangement"; Schiller speaks only of "fragmentation."

15. Here Marx and Hegel use the terms "alienation" and "estrangement." Schiller characterizes the state by the more general term "foreign."

separated. The state became alien, distant from the citizens, out of their control. Unity was lost.

The division of labor did make for progress and development; but at the same time a great price had to be paid.

It was Kant's view in his "Idea for a Universal History" and in "Perpetual Peace" that man's faculties and capacities could be developed historically only through antagonism. But for them to reach their fullest development this antagonism would ultimately have to be overcome in a society of the greatest freedom.[16] Following Kant, our three thinkers also took the view that antagonism (which for them occurred after the breakdown of the ancient world due to the development of the division of labor) was necessary for human development and progress. Their problem was how ultimately to overcome this antagonism, this alienation and estrangement, and to regain wholeness, spontaneity, and unity while at the same time retaining the benefits of the development and progress brought about by the division of labor in the modern world. Their solution was to develop a model for remaking the modern world that derived from their idealized conception of Greek culture and from aesthetic theory.[17]

The first step was to overcome the sort of activity in which the individual develops only single, isolated capacities. Even in the sort of labor found in the modern world the individual must bring all of his powers, fully developed, into play equally and harmoniously; they must work together as a totality.

The next step was to create a harmony between the individual's rational capacities and the sensuous external world (Schiller speaks of a harmony between sense and reason, Hegel of a harmony between spirit and nature, and Marx of a harmony between consciousness and

16. "Idea for a Universal History" and "Perpetual Peace," in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 44–45, 109–14; for the German, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 26 vols. (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900–1956), 8: 20–21, 362–68. For an interesting discussion of Kant, Schiller, Hegel, and Marx, which in some ways is similar to mine but done from the perspective of critical theory, see S. M. Weber, "Aesthetic Experience and Self-Reflection as Emancipatory Processes," in *On Critical Theory*, ed. J. O'Neill (New York: Seabury, 1976), pp. 78–103.

17. This looking back to Greece is very strong in Schiller and Hegel; it permeates a great deal of their thought. In Marx it is present and important, but it does not predominate as much as in the others. In Kant it is totally absent.

sensuous activity). A harmony is required between the self and the external object. The external object may be nature, the product of labor, or the political state. In his relation to the external object it is important that the individual not be dominated or oppressed by the object; nor, on the other hand, can the individual have turned away from the object, withdrawn into himself, and lost touch with the object—as, for example, Hegel thinks man withdrew from the external world into the realm of spirit with the rise of Christianity. The individual must be able to contemplate the object as an end in itself as it freely confronts him.

As Schiller states most clearly, this is an aesthetic ideal. Man, after having satisfied his basic material needs and desires, can take a step back from the world, distance himself from it, so as to be able to contemplate it freely. Because he has made the external object his object, because he forms it and controls it, it can no longer dominate him. Yet at the same time he has not withdrawn into himself, has not turned away from the external object toward something higher or deeper. He is still in close touch with his object. Thus at the same time that he is active he contemplates; he forms and appreciates. Sense and reason, activity and thought, are operating not separately but together in harmony and balance.[18] Schiller expects to realize this aesthetic relationship in the modern world by remaking the subject, by an aesthetic education of the individual. Marx expects to bring about the aesthetic relationship by changing the object, by remaking society and labor. All three agreed that this Greek-aesthetic ideal could be the model for a humanistic wholeness, spontaneity, and unity in the modern world.

By now the reader has no doubt been wondering about the naiveté, perhaps even the ridiculousness, of this ideal. How can the Greek model serve a much more complex modern world? What about Greek slavery? What about the historical accuracy of this model itself? I do not at all wish to suggest that this ideal accurately describes the actual

18. Aesthetic beauty as a synthesis of sense and reason is first developed in Kant's third *Critique*, which Schiller follows closely (see *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard [1892; reprint ed., New York: Hafner, 1966]; for the German, *KGS*, vol. 5). This view is also found in F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Trancendental Idealism*, selections trans. A. Hofstadter in *Philosophies of Art and Beauty*, ed. A. Hofstadter and R. Kuhns (New York: Modern Library, 1964), pp. 347–81; for the German, *Werke*, ed. M. Schröter, 8 vols. (Munich: Beck, 1927–56), 2: 327–635.

Greek *polis*. And indeed our three thinkers at least seem to sense this. For none of them did this model provide an adequate solution; in each, not surprisingly, we find a definite shift (or at least a certain tension) away from the original model in the direction of some alternate model. Schiller, while never actually dropping the original model, does seem at certain points to recognize its failure; its place in the system becomes merely that of an ideal that even Schiller himself never really expects to realize. The young Hegel, following Schiller, takes up this model for a time. But in his mature writings Hegel has not only dropped this model, totally at the level of labor and partially at the level of the state, but his shift from the original to an alternate model produces a peculiar tension in his thought. The original model is no longer a goal that can be achieved, yet it still has an attraction as an ideal of the past. Marx too, in his youth, takes up this ideal model. Labor, for example, is to become an end enjoyable in itself, the most worthwhile of human activities. But as he grows older and learns more about economics Marx decides that this model is ultimately incompatible with the real possibilities for labor in a future society. Why, then, it might be asked, should we spend time researching the concern with an ideal that not only is naive but was eventually abandoned? The beginning of an answer to this is that the later Marx does not so much abandon as transform the ideal model. He decides that the Greek-aesthetic model could be realized only in leisure time and that the role of labor time, material production, will be to provide the material conditions for humanized leisure time. The ideal is not totally dropped but rather is transferred to the realm of leisure.

Despite the fact that the original Greek-aesthetic model is never realized by any of these thinkers and despite the fact that it may well be impossible to do so and rather naive to try, nevertheless, it remains as one of the highest expressions of humanist aspiration, and it played a very important role in guiding the development of thought concerning the overcoming of alienation and estrangement and the realization of a humanized form for labor and political institutions. It is my view that by focusing upon this model, and by understanding the attempts and failures to realize it, we can gain the perspective that will enable us to explain certain important aspects of some of the basic concerns of current Marx studies—the development of Marx's humanism and the relationship between his earlier and his later thought.

I

Schiller

I

SCHILLER ASSERTS that modern man is fragmented. This fragmentation takes the general form of a separation and opposition of sense and reason, of man's intellectual and sensuous capacities.[1] The solution to this problem constitutes the most pressing and fundamental need of modern man. Schiller begins his search for this solution by turning for guidance to the culture of ancient Greece. There fragmentation had not yet occurred. "At that first fair awakening of the powers of the mind, sense and intellect did not as yet rule over strictly separate domains; for no dissension had as yet provoked them into hostile partition and mutual demarcation of their frontiers."[2] The age had not arrived wherein we find "whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentialities."[3] The ancient world was still a world of unity; the citizen was still at home with, in control of, his state. It had not yet become alien. Yet to come was that time when the "governed cannot but receive with indifference the laws which are scarcely, if at all, directed to them as persons."[4]

1. A view similar to this can be found in Hölderlin, *Hyperion*, p. 164; *Sämtliche Werke*, 3: 160–61.

2. F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 31; reference in all cases will also be made to *Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe*, ed. J. Peterson and G. Fricke, 43 vols. (Weimar: Böhlaus, 1943–76), 20: 321.

3. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 33; *W*, 20: 322.

4. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 37; *W*, 20: 324–25.

What was it that ended this ideal harmony? According to Schiller it was the development of the division of labor. As culture required more precision and specialization the individual was sacrificed to the abstract life of the whole. The individual was limited to one fragment of reality as entire classes of men developed only a part of their capacities.[5] The most important results of the development of the division of labor were (*a*) that enjoyment was separated from labor,[6] (*b*) that in his occupation the individual no longer developed himself humanly but merely became the imprint of his occupation,[7] (*c*) that ranks and occupations were rigorously separated,[8] and (*d*) that the state became alien (*fremd*) to its citizens.[9] In general, man's intellectual and sensuous capacities were separated, each beginning to develop on its own.

Schiller does recognize certain advantages that result from this separation: "I do not underrate the advantages which the human race today, considered as a whole and weighed in the balance of intellect, can boast in the face of what is best in the ancient world. But it has to take up the challenge in serried ranks, and let whole measure itself against whole. What individual Modern could sally forth and engage, man against man, with an individual Athenian for the prize of humanity?"[10] An antagonism between faculties was necessary, according to Schiller, for progress in the development of man's capacities to come about.[11] This was the only way for the species to progress—but the individual had to suffer. Eventually, however, this antagonism will bring a development that will return, Schiller hopes, to unity and harmony on a higher level.[12] His goal is to maintain the advantages of progress and division of labor but at the same time to regain the unity, spontaneity, and wholeness of the ancient world.[13]

5. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 33; *W*, 20: 322.
6. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 35; *W*, 20: 323.
7. Ibid.
8. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 33; *W*, 20: 322–23.
9. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 37; *W*, 20: 324.
10. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 33; *W*, 20: 322.
11. Schiller here follows Kant's "Idea for a Universal History." On the influence of Kant's philosophy of history on Schiller see J. Taminiaux, *La nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme Allemand* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 25–32.
12. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 41; *W*, 20: 326–27.
13. Wilkinson and Willoughby make this point in the introduction to their edition of the *Aesth. Ed.*, p. xiv.

Fragmentation must be overcome at the cultural, the social, and the political level. The question we must ask is how well Schiller succeeds in this project.

II

Schiller's concern at the culural level is with art as an expression of the individual's condition. He contrasts the naive with the sentimental artist. The naive artist is of the ancient world; he is in actual possession of the ideal. In him and in his art we find a harmony between sense and reason.[14] He is still in unity with nature.[15] On the other hand we have the sentimental artist, who belongs to the modern world. Unity with nature, not actually possessed by this artist, becomes an ideal to be realized. In the modern world man "can now express himself only as a moral *unity*, i.e., as striving after unity. The correspondence between his feeling and thought which in his first condition [the naive] actually took place, exists now only ideally; it is no longer within him, but outside of him, as an idea still to be realized, no longer as a fact in his life."[16] The unity of the ancient world is now but an ideal. Man either possesses nature as in the ancient world or he seeks lost nature as in the modern.[17] The naive attains only a *finite* goal; the sentimental strives for an *infinite* one. Thus the sentimental fosters progress, which Schiller says is preferable.[18]

Schiller's goal is actual possession of the unity and harmony of the naive together with the greatness of the ideal and the progress of the

14. *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* and *On the Sublime,* trans. J. A. Elias (New York: Ungar, 1966), p. 111; *W,* 20: 436–37. Nietzsche's concept of the "Apollonian" is patterned after Schiller's "naive" (see F. Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy,* trans. W. Kaufmann [New York: Vintage, 1967], pp. 43–45; for the German, *Nietzsches Werke,* 1: 32–33). But Nietzsche opposes the view that Greece can be summed up under just one category like the naive; a tension already exists between two principles—the Apollonian and the Dionysian.

15. *N & S Poet.*, p. 104; *W,* 20: 431.

16. *N & S Poet.*, p. 111; *W,* 20: 437. The contrast between the ideal and the actual in sentimental and naive art prefigures Hegel's categories of romantic and classical art. Further, for Schiller, much as for Hegel, the Greeks excelled in the plastic arts based on the imagination, whereas the moderns excel in the poetic arts that deal with ideals or spirit (see *N & S Poet.*, p. 115; *W,* 20: 440).

17. *N & S Poet.*, p. 106; *W,* 20: 432.

18. *N & S Poet.*, p. 113; *W,* 20: 438.

sentimental.[19] This synthesis would be the solution at the cultural level to the problem of the modern world.

In *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* Schiller attempted to work out such a synthesis. Aesthetic education, beauty, and the fine arts will reconcile the developed but opposed faculties of the individual. After the breakdown of the ancient world there arose two opposed drives. This opposition must be overcome. Material and formal impulses,[20] sense and reason, must be transformed into a third condition. If both impulses are in full operation at the same time, then the exclusiveness of each will be cancelled. The formal impulse is characterized as an active, autonomous, unlimited, and determining drive; the material impulse, as a passive, receptive, limited, and determinate condition. When both are in full operation simultaneously the result is a pure unlimited determinability,[21] the ground of the possibility for exercising any or all of our faculties without exclusion.[22] This is a free disposition, the aesthetic condition.[23]

Schiller wants a "reciprocal action between the two drives . . . of such a kind that the activity of each both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each achieves its highest manifestation precisely by the other being active."[24] We are to have a reciprocal subordination and coordination.[25] One of the clearest examples of this is given at the end of Letter 14. Schiller says that if we embrace with passion someone who deserves our contempt, we feel painfully the compulsion of our nature. When we are ill disposed toward someone who commands our respect, we feel painfully the compulsion of our reason. But when someone has enlisted our affection and gained our respect, all constraint disappears, and we love him.[26] Each drive achieves its highest manifestation by the aid of the other. Each is in harmony with the other; it does not interfere but helps the other to develop fully. Each is both an end and a means.

19. *N & S Poet.*, pp. 113, 175; *W*, 20: 439, 491.
20. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 79–81; *W*, 20: 344–46.
21. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 139–41; *W*, 20: 373–75.
22. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 153; *W*, 20: 380.
23. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 141; *W*, 20: 375.
24. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 95; *W*, 20: 352.
25. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 85n.; *W*, 20: 347–48n.
26. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 97; *W*, 20: 354.

Here the tension between actual possession of the ideal and striving after it appears to be reconciled. As long as we confine ourselves to faculties or drives within the individual, we can say that if both strivings—the material and the formal—are in full operation simultaneously, then the individual is in possession of beauty, aesthetic unity, a synthesis. Since neither drive is excluded, a balance or harmony is achieved—made actual—within the individual.

> Each of these two primary drives, from the time it is developed, strives inevitably, and according to its nature, towards satisfaction; but just because both are necessary, and yet strive towards opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and the will maintains perfect freedom between them. . . . That is to say, as soon as two opposing fundamental drives are active within him, both lose their compulsion, and the opposition of the two necessities gives rise to freedom.[27]

This tension appears to be reconciled in the *Aesthetic Education*. But as soon as we consider Schiller's treatment of the sublime (which he does not deal with in much detail in the *Aesthetic Education*),[28] we again find a tension.

In his essay "On the Sublime" Schiller compares the beautiful with the sublime. Beauty implies the unity of sense and reason, of inclination and duty, and of spirit and nature. The sublime is the opposition—the contradiction—of sense and reason.[29] It is the superiority of reason over nature, reason's independence from the sensuous world, and the assertion of the individual's freedom in the face of external force. The sublime, Schiller says, must disappear before the ideal of

27. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 135–37; *W*, 20: 371–73.

28. R. D. Miller, in his *Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 115, feels (he is not sure) that "energizing beauty" in Letters 16 and 17 may be a disguised form of the sublime. See also W. Rosalewski, *Schillers Ästhetik im Verhältnis zur Kantischen* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1912), p. 74. W. Böhm, in his *Schillers Briefe über ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1927), pp. 115–17, 189, argues that energizing beauty is not the sublime. Even if energizing beauty were related to the sublime, Schiller does not deal with it in sufficient detail in the *Aesthetic Education*. To explore the tension between the beautiful and the sublime we must turn to the essay "On the Sublime."

29. *On Subl.*, p. 199; *W*, 21: 43.

beauty.[30] But with beauty alone we would never discover our higher destiny.[31] Beauty is freedom within nature; the sublime is freedom above nature. Beauty is valuable for the human being; the sublime is valuable for the pure *daemon* in man.[32] Beauty is associated with childhood, our first and earliest development. But when we are more mature, we must develop and apprehend the sublime by means of reason.[33] The aesthetic is the human ideal, but the rational is higher and nobler. However, Schiller does try, if not to reconcile, at least to make compatible, both ideals for the modern world. The whole man must be guided by both ideals.[34] Aesthetic unity leads to and aides the rational, and the rational takes place within a condition of aesthetic unity. But this is not to reconcile the two; it is to leave them as two ideals.[35]

Although Schiller does not say much about the sublime in the *Aesthetic Education*, there is one relevant passage in which he just mentions it. He remarks that man must "learn to desire nobly, so that he may not need to will sublimely."[36] "Noble" is another term that denotes the aesthetic condition. Here Schiller appears to favor aesthetic morality over the morality of the sublime, even though in a footnote he observes that we rate the sublime "incomparably higher."[37] This treatment of the tension between the beautiful and the sublime, though very brief, is much like that just noted from the essay "On the Sublime," except that in the *Aesthetic Education* Schiller says nothing of trying to make these two ideals compatible; rather, he seems to choose the aesthetic (or the noble) *over* the sublime.

30. Ibid. There exists a similar tension between grace and dignity. Grace requires a harmony between the moral and physical natures. This is incompatible with dignity, which requires opposition and struggle between the two. Grace has to do with acts in the sphere of human nature, dignity with a higher, nobler sphere (see Schiller, "On Grace and Dignity," in *Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical* [London: Bell, 1879], pp. 220–21; *W*, 20: 297–99).

31. *On Subl.*, p. 199; *W*, 21: 43.

32. *On Subl.*, p. 210; *W*, 21: 52.

33. *On Subl.*, pp. 202–3; *W*, 21: 46.

34. *On Subl.*, pp. 210–11; *W*, 21: 52–53.

35. Even Wilkinson and Willoughby, strong proponents of the unity of the *Aesthetic Education*, admit that the beautiful and the sublime are two different ideals (see *Aesth. Ed.*, p. lix).

36. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 169; *W*, 20: 388.

37. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 167n.; *W*, 20: 387n.

Only beauty is an aesthetic synthesis of sense and reason, of inclination and duty, and only by pushing aside the sublime do we securely preserve the aesthetic condition that brings wholeness, spontaneity, and unity. The sublime is the very opposite—a striving away from the sensuous or natural toward a rational and moral ideal. There is a wavering in Schiller's thought at this level. As soon as the sublime is considered, we find a tension between it and beauty; and then Schiller wavers between trying to make the two compatible or choosing beauty over the sublime

III

At the social level Schiller pays some attention to labor and classes. He points out that the effect of the division of labor is to separate enjoyment from labor, rigorously to separate ranks and occupations, and to make the individual's occupation such that he does not develop his humanity in it.[38] Reconciliation will never occur in the modern world if man continues to be confined by this sort of fragmenting activity.

Schiller says that an animal works when the stimulus to its activity is some need, but that it plays when its stimulus is sheer plenitude, the superabundance of life.[39] Schiller's goal is to transform labor and to make it more like play.[40] "Man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being," declares Schiller, "and he is only fully a human being when he plays."[41] Although this is a goal intended for all men, Schiller nevertheless fails to explain how it could be realized by all.

Schiller's concept of labor is most clearly presented in the discussion of recreation and ennoblement found in *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*. Recreation is understood as a transition from an intense state to a

38. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 33–35; *W*, 20: 321–22.

39. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 207; *W*, 20: 406.

40. Schiller generally follows Kant's aesthetics, but not when considering labor. For Kant art and play are directly opposed to work (see *Critique of Judgment*, p. 146; *KGS*, 5: 305). Kant also thinks that the development of the division of labor in general is beneficial. He does not seem to appreciate its drawbacks (see his *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. T. K. Abbott [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949], p. 4; *KGS*, 4: 388).

41. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 107; *W*, 20: 359.

state that is natural for man.[42] The ideal of recreation is wholeness. Man's ideal condition is one in which there would be "an unlimited capacity for every human utterance, . . . the ability to experience all our powers with equal freedom. . . . any separation and isolation of these powers is an intense condition, and the ideal of recreation is the restoration of our whole nature after one-sided tensions."[43] The result of this is that "beauty is the product of accord between the mind and the senses; it addresses itself at once to all the faculties of man and can, therefore, be perceived and appreciated only under the condition that he employ all his powers fully and freely."[44] It is important to notice that the goal of recreation is not rest or cessation of activity.

The goal of ennoblement is the development of the moral individual—but not abstractly, not removed from activity. Ennoblement must occur through activity.

These are the goals. But the existing conditions are different. "The state of mind of most men is on the one hand intensive and exhausting labor, on the other enervating indulgence."[45] Just as intense labor makes the goal impossible, so does the enervating indulgence of ennoblement isolated from activity. Thus Schiller's view is that the man of action, the laborer, is in no position to formulate the goal of recreation, for he would make it too physical.[46] He would formulate it to suit his own needs, namely, rest, calm, cessation of activity.[47] Nor are the contemplative classes in a position to formulate the goal of ennoblement, for they would make it too abstract, such that the man of action would never be able to realize it in the course of daily life.[48] Since men as they exist are unfit to formulate these goals, men and their conditions must be qualitatively changed. What is needed are men who are in full and harmonious possession of all their powers, powers that are not separated or isolated. We need

42. *N & S Poet.*, p. 169; *W*, 20: 486.
43. *N & S Poet.*, p. 170; *W*, 20: 486.
44. *N & S Poet.*, p. 171; *W*, 20: 487.
45. *N & S Poet.*, p. 170; *W*, 20: 487.
46. *N & S Poet.*, p. 174; *W*, 20: 490.
47. *N & S Poet.*, p. 170; *W*, 20: 486–87.
48. *N & S Poet.*, p. 174; *W*, 20: 490.

a new class of men which, without toiling [*arbeiten*] are active [*thätig*] and capable of formulating ideals witout fanaticism; a class that unites within itself all the realities of life with its least possible limitations and is borne by the current of events without becoming its victim. Only such a class can preserve the beautiful unity of human nature that is destroyed for the moment by any particular task [*Arbeit*], and continuously by a life of such toil [*arbeitendes*].[49]

Arbeit is a negative term here. Work, toil, exhausting labor—this is a condition to be overcome, an undesirable condition. The desirable condition is expressed by the term "activity" (*Tätigkeit*). What does activity mean? Is activity opposed to labor in the sense that it means the exclusion or avoidance of labor; or is it to be understood as the ideal form of labor, labor remade, qualitatively transformed into something enjoyable and developing? There is also another important question involved here: Is the "new class of men" to be understood as a synthesis of the other two classes, as including all men; or is it a small elite that merely combines certain characteristics of the other two classes but excludes most men? If all men are to be included in the new class, then in order to include the laboring class, all labor will have to be transformed, qualitatively improved. On the other hand, if the new class is only a small elite, then it will not be necessary that they labor; labor will be dropped, left to the laboring class, and the new class will be active in some oher sense. My view is that Schiller's ideal, his desire, is to include all men and to remake labor into activity. Nevertheless, he is unable to explain how this can be accomplished and thus ends up, in fact, with a small elite.[50]

Let us consider first the ideal. Schiller makes it clear that the goal for *both* classes is to be active. The goal of the laboring class is not rest or cessation of activity: toil, exhausting labor, is not to be overcome simply by ceasing to labor. Since the goal must fit both classes, neither class can be permitted to formulate the goal to suit itself, because each would make it one-sided. The contemplative class especially cannot be permitted to formulate the goal, the reason being that the laboring

49. Ibid.

50. I differ here from Lukács, who holds that for Schiller it is not a regrettable fact but rather his very ideal that the "new class" be an elite that avoids labor (see G. Lukács, *Goethe and His Age*, trans. R. Anchor [London: Merlin, 1968], pp. 134–35. On the other hand, see H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* [New York: Vintage, 1955], pp. 172–78).

class would not be able to realize it in the course of daily life.[51] In order to include the laboring class it is necessary that Schiller be able to explain how labor is to be remade into activity. There are passages in his works suggesting that this is his wish but none that satisfactorily explain how it is to be done. Labor in the ancient world was a satisfying and developing form of activity; but after the development of the division of labor,

> enjoyment was divorced from labour, the means from the end, the effort from the reward. Everlastingly chained to a little fragment of the whole, man develops into nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his own nature, he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his specialized knowledge.[52]

This is the fundamental problem of the modern world, the problem to be overcome. Labor must be made enjoyable again. But how is this to be done? "In general," says Schiller,

> we call noble any nature which possesses the gift of transforming purely by its manner of handling it, even the most trifling occupation, or the most petty of objects into something infinite. We call that form noble which impresses the stamp of autonomy upon anything which by its nature merely serves some purpose (is a mere means). A noble nature is not content to be itself free; it must set free everything around it, even the lifeless.[53]

The emphasis here is on transformation, qualitative improvement,

51. *N & S Poet.*, p. 174; *W*, 20: 490.

52. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 35; *W*, 20: 323. There is a passage that seems to exclude work from the ideal: "They [the Greeks] transferred to Olympus what was meant to be realized on earth; . . . they banished from the brow of the blessed Gods all the earnestness and effort [*Arbeit*] which furrow the cheeks of mortals, . . . freed those ever contented beings from the bonds inseparable from any purpose, every duty, every care, and made idleness and indifferency the enviable portion of divinity—merely a more sublime name for the freest, most sublime state of being" (*Aesth. Ed.*, p. 109; *W*, 20: 359–60). But Schiller is not suggesting the exclusion of activity or effort. The condition of the gods is achieved not by excluding anything but by including everything. Their appearance is a synthesis of repose and activity (ibid.). Thus if labor could be transformed into activity for men, the condition of the gods could be realized on earth.

53. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 167n.; *W*, 20: 386n.

and not on the exclusion or avoidance of the sorts of activities that are means.

But how successful is this explanation? The noble nature makes "everything" around it free; it can transform "anything." Would this include factory work? That is rather doubtful. At any rate, Schiller would have to go into the problem in much greater detail. For him the qualitative transformation of work stems entirely from the character of the individual—due to his aesthetic education, his wholeness, spontaneity, and unity. Nothing is said of transforming the actual conditions of work. If the individual has nothing to rely upon but his own character, he could hardly expect to make the factory situation satisfying or enjoyable.

Thus the ideal breaks down. It will not work for the laboring class. If Schiller cannot give a better explanation, then the ideal in which "activity alone leads to enjoyment, and enjoyment alone to activity,"[54] will belong only to a few—and they will have to avoid labor. Schiller does not realistically expect anything more for his new class of men: "In such a class of society (which, however, I offer here only as an ideal and by no means wish to have taken as a fact. . . ."[55] This is to admit that the aesthetic ideal has failed to become actual; it remains an ideal. Since it cannot actually be possessed, it is reduced to a goal to be striven after; it becomes, as Schiller himself said, a moral ideal.[56] Striving for the ideal and actual possession of it have not been reconciled here as they seemed for a moment to be at the level of individual faculties in the *Aesthetic Education*.[57] Thus Schiller slips away from an aesthetic to a moral, or rational, model.

Schiller is unable to reconcile the laboring and the contemplative classes, to provide for all men the sort of activity that would be compatible with contemplation. Not for all men but only for an elite is it to be the case that there will be no contemplation, no ennoblement or development divorced from activity, and no activity separated from contemplation, ennoblement, and development.

Man's freedom comes only when he is able to distance himself from the world so that he is free to contemplate it. To distance himself, he

54. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 191; *W*, 20: 398.
55. *N & S Poet.*, p. 175; *W*, 20: 491. See also *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 219; *W*, 20: 412.
56. *N & S Poet.*, p. 111; *W*, 20: 437.
57. See Sec. 2 of this chapter.

must see to it that nature no longer dominates him. Man must make nature his object; he must form it. He must act on matter. If he gives it form, it can no longer rule him as a force.[58] Man must be active, but in such a way that at the same time he is free to contemplate his object as well as his own activity. Here sense and reason (activity and contemplation) would be in harmony.

The ideal is to overcome the split between mental and physical activity. Had Schiller been able, moreover, to transform labor into activity, he would have been able to overcome the split between labor and leisure. He objects to this split strongly:

> True, we know that the outstanding individual will never let the limits of his occupation dictate the limits of his activity. But a mediocre talent will consume in the office assigned to him the whole of his meagre sum of powers, and a man has to have a mind above the ordinary if, without detriment to his calling, he is still to have time for the chosen pursuits of his leisure. Moreover, it is rarely a recommendation in the eyes of the state if a man's powers exceed the tasks he is set, or if the higher needs of man constitute a rival to the duties of his office.[59]

Schiller's objection to the rigid separation of labor and leisure is, it is important to note, in the interest not just of a small talented class; it especially concerns the vast numbers who are not so talented. But until labor is transformed into activity this split will not be overcome.

What would be required to transform labor (*Arbeit*) into activity (*Tätigkeit*)? As Schiller himself says, it would in the first place require

58. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 185; *W*, 20: 395.

59. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 37; *W*, 20: 324. See also *Aesth. Ed.* p. 191; *W*, 20: 398, where Schiller says, "The germ of beauty is as little likely to develop where nature in her niggardliness deprives man of any quickening refreshment, as where in her bounty she relieves him of any exertion." Both total lack of exertion (total leisure) and total lack of refreshment (total toil) are rejected. In another respect, there is a certain problem here. Schiller's concept of a noble man, even in the ideal, implies a separation between labor and leisure. The noble man would be developed—given an aesthetic education—in his leisure time. Later, he returns to work. Once this education had progressed to some extent, work, too, would become an end in itself, and the radical split between labor and leisure would no longer exist. The activity of both realms would be both enjoyable and developing. The difference between the two realms would disappear. But if it is impossible to transform all labor into activity, into an end in itself, then one must return to a split between labor and leisure.

overcoming the division of labor and the resulting fragmenting effects. There are two important forms of the division of labor. The first is a hierarchical division, a division according to classes or strata, which usually includes a division between mental and physical activity. It was Schiller's wish to overcome this sort of division of labor when he called for a synthesis between the contemplative and the laboring classes. But he only ends up with a nonlaboring elite. The second form of division of labor takes place within the work that any class or strata might perform. There is a division of jobs, tasks, occupations, functions, and so on. All of these functions might be equal, no one standing over the other. With regard to this form of division of labor, Schiller never suggests doing away with the difference between functions, occupations, and so forth. His ideal, as far as it can be discerned, seems to be much like Marx's: it is to leave the different functions as they stand, but to see to it that the individual is not "everlastingly chained to a single little fragment of the whole,"[60] that is, to merely one function. One overcomes specialization, one permits the individual to perform a variety of different functions. How could this be accomplished? Schiller's only answer is that the individual must be given an aesthetic education, that he must learn to develop all of his powers and capacities harmoniously—something the individual is unable to do when his activity is limited to one narrow occupation. The aesthetic condition, for Schiller, is the ground of the possibility of all human functions and activities;[61] it leaves us open, free to develop to the fullest all of our powers and capacities, and it leaves us equally disposed to all of them because they are all in harmony. It reconciles thought and activity and frees us for both. Schiller thinks that this subjective change on the part of the individual would be enough to overcome the fragmenting effects of specialization. But again, this will work only for a few who are not involved in labor.

IV

In the *Aesthetic Education*, Schiller's political goal is to overcome the alien (*fremd*) character of the modern state,[62] to make it more like the

60. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 35; *W*, 20: 323.
61. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 151–53; *W*, 20: 379–80.
62. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 37; *W*, 20: 324.

ancient Greek state before the development of the division of labor. In the ancient state, according to Schiller, the spontaneous free participation of individuals determined the form of the whole.[63] In the modern world, on the other hand, the state dominates and excludes the individual.[64] The goal is to overcome this split between the state and the individual, or between state and society.[65]

To accomplish this, says Schiller, the individual must harmonize himself with the ideal man. By the ideal man, Schiller means the species. The species is represented by the state. In the state the diversity of individuals is represented as a unity.[66] In other words, after the development of the division of labor and specialization in the modern world, universality, wholeness, the harmonious sum of all powers and capacities, is to be found not in any individual but only collectively in the aggregate of individuals—in the state. Schiller says that if we compare the modern state as a whole to the ancient Greek state, the modern rivals the ancient. But if we compare the modern individual to the individual Greek, the modern is a fragment.[67]

The problem here (just as in the last section, on labor) is with the individual, his lack of inner wholeness and harmony; and the solution offered (also as in the last section) is to remake the individual. Aesthetic education, the development of all the powers and capacities of the individual, the spontaneity and harmony of sense and reason, will being about reconciliation between man and state. The individual will become one with the state[68] because the individual will no longer be a fragment, restricted in his capacities and outlooks, incapable of dealing with the general, universal, and varied concerns of the whole, of the state. Given this new individual, wholeness—the capacity of determining general and universal concerns—will now also belong to individuals. It is Schiller's view that with these developed conditions

63. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 35; *W*, 20: 323.

64. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 37; *W*, 20: 324.

65. This is also the view of R. Leroux, "Schiller théoricien de l'état," *Revue Germanique* 28 (1938): 23. Leroux compares Schiller to W. von Humboldt. Both argue for the greatest possible freedom for the individual. But Humboldt maintains the duality between state and society, whereas for Schiller the state is to be reabsorbed within society.

66. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 17–19; *W*, 20: 316.

67. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 33; *W*, 20: 322.

68. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 19; *W*, 20: 316.

the state can simply be the interpreter or representative of the citizen. The state will only provide a clearer formulation of the individual's sense of what is right.[69] Duty and inclination, general and particular interest, will be in harmony, in agreement. Subjective man will be ennobled to objectivity.[70] Man will be honored as an end in himself.[71] The suggestion is very clear here that there will be agreement between the individual and the state because the state will do what the whole individual determines. The state is to be a reflection, a formulator, of what is decided by the individual.

It is also important to note that the state cannot bring this harmony about on its own. Inner harmony must first be created in men. This in turn will be reflected in the ideal state. No reform will work in politics until the division in the inner man is healed. Sense and reason, duty and inclination, must first be reconciled through aesthetic education.[72]

In Letter 27 of the *Aesthetic Education* Schiller speaks of three types of states. In the natural, or dynamic, state each man encounters other men as a force. Only in this way is activity restricted and order kept. Nature curbs nature. In the ethical, or rational, state men have duties; men are opposed by rational laws that fetter their will. The individual is subjected to the general will. In the aesthetic state men confront each other as objects of free play. The will of the whole is carried out through the nature of the individual.[73] In the natural state *need* drives man to society. In the rational state reason implants *social principles* in him. In the aesthetic state, the ideal, beauty gives him a *social character*.[74]

Perhaps the relationship between these three sorts of states can be explained further in the following manner. We might say that Kant described a historical development from the natural state to the rational state and that Schiller now wants society to move beyond the rational to the aesthetic state. In his "Idea for a Universal History" Kant attempted to reconcile nature and reason and to make reason the end or goal of nature. For Kant, we must assume that nature as

69. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 21; *W*, 20: 318.
70. Ibid.
71. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 25; *W*, 20: 319.
72. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 45; *W*, 20: 328.
73. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 215; *W*, 20: 410.
74. Ibid.

a whole is purposive, that reason is its goal. Society is developed through natural antagonism (what Kant called man's unsocial sociability). This natural antagonism raises man from his slumber and causes him to develop all of his powers and capacities. Man is propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice, but in time he might come to be determined by practical principles, by reason. Threat of conflict will eventually produce compromise. Conflict between men will lead them toward what reason would have commanded in the beginning. A society of men driven together by natural feeling (need) is to be transformed into a moral whole, into a society based on practical principles.[75] Society moves toward this end, toward a society of the greatest freedom, the greatest morality, and the fullest development of all human capacities. Can society reach this end for Kant? He says that man must produce for himself anything that goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence. Man must create for himself his own perfection through his own reason.[76] Kant argues that we must assume a purposiveness in the whole of nature, that is, that its goal is reason. We must view history as if it were purposive. And with this assumption our intelligent activity can hasten us toward the end.[77]

Thus, as Schiller would express it, in the course of history social principle (reason) can replace natural impulse (need) as the basis of society. But Schiller's view of the goal of history goes a step beyond Kant's. Social principle, the rule of reason over nature, is not enough. History for Schiller must move on to social character, the aesthetic state.[78] Inclination and duty, feeling and the moral law, nature and reason—these must be in equal balance, in harmony. Social character means that the whole man, not just his rational part, has been reconciled with the general concerns of the whole. Man's relation to man must not be coerced, either by nature or by law. In the aesthetic state the individual is coerced neither by other men nor by the state. There

75. Kant, "Univ. Hist.," pp. 44–45, 47–48; *KGS*, 8: 20–21, 24.

76. "Univ. Hist.," p. 43; *KGS*, 8: 19–20.

77. "Univ. Hist.," p. 50; *KGS*, 8: 27.

78. Schiller's connecting of Kant's notion of the development of human powers through antagonism (and the ultimate rational direction of this development) with an aesthetic condition like that of ancient Greece as the goal of this development is already prefigured by Herder, *Reflections*, pp. 82–87, 96–99; *Sämtliche Werke*, 14: 207–14, 225–28.

is no longer an opposition between duty and inclination, between man and the state, between state and society.

However, we must notice that in Schiller's writings there is to be found another political model. In his earlier essay "On Grace and Dignity" Schiller presents a political model that is different from the one we have just considered. In that essay the ideal state is a monarchy where all goes according to the (rational) will of one man, but where each citizen could persuade himself that he governs and obeys his own inclination.[79] Here there is indeed harmony and agreement between sense (inclination of the citizens) and reason or duty (state), but not of the same sort as in the *Aesthetic Education*, where the state merely reflects, is merely the interpreter, of the individual's will; where the individual is the source of the determination. In "On Grace and Dignity" the source of the determination is the state; inclination and duty are not equals. Inclination has been brought to agree with duty, but the former is nevertheless still subordinate to the latter. There is no true synthesis here. This can still be called a rational state: reason is primary, even though it does not forcibly suppress inclination. Schiller here is still much closer to the Kantian morality than he was in the later *Aesthetic Education*.[80] Here the difference between man and state and between state and society has not been overcome.

Which, then, is the goal? We can safely say that Schiller's mature thought is to be found in the *Aesthetic Education*, where the goal is the aesthetic state. However, there is still a problem here. We might ask what will move us on from the rational to the aesthetic state. Schiller's only answer is that it will be the aesthetic education of the individual. It is true that such individuals would bring about the possibility of an agreement between inclination and duty, the individual and the state. But this would give us only the rational state of "On Grace and Dignity." What would drive the state on to allow itself to be determined by the individual? Schiller does not deal with this. His solution is

79. "Grace and Dignity," pp. 200–201; *W*, 20; 278–79.

80. Schiller's position here is rather close to Kant's later view (at least implied in his earlier essay "What is Enlightenment") that political rule must be autocratic but that laws must be republican (they must be the sort of laws which people would give themselves) (see Kant, "What is Enlightenment" and "The Contest of Faculties," in *Kant's Political Writings*, pp. 57, 184; *KGS*, 7: 87, and 8: 39).

merely to change the subjective character of the individual;[81] he does not speak of how to change the objective institutional character of the state except to say that with these new individuals the change will follow through historical development. Further, Schiller is even pessimistic about changing the character of the individual. Where is the aesthetic state to be found? Schiller answers that it is to be found only in a few chosen circles, in the hearts of a *few rare* individuals: "But does a State of such Aesthetic Semblance really exist? And if so, where is it to be found? As a need, it exists in every finely tuned soul; as a realized fact, we are likely to find it, like the pure Church and the pure Republic, only in some few chosen circles. . . ."[82] Thus the aesthetic state, too, becomes merely an ideal to be striven after, a moral ideal, as Schiller himself put it. We will have to wait until the end of history. It is a wish, an impossibility in the modern world. This is a moral, or rational, model. And if the aesthetic state cannot be made actual, then we slip back to the rational state as our goal.

V

Some scholars maintain that the tensions described above reappear at all levels of Schiller's thought. Hans Lutz argues that Schiller throughout his writings has two ideals—aesthetic and moral—which he continually wavers between and confuses. The moral, or rational, model (influenced by the Kantian opposition of sense and reason) Lutz characterizes as a three-stage view, a progression through three stages: nature–taste–reason. The aesthetic model Lutz characterizes as a synthesis model: nature–reason–synthesis (beauty).[83]

The clearest example of the three-stage view can be found in Schiller's essay "On the Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners," where he is still very close to the Kantian morality. Normally, Schiller says, morality appears greater, or at least more in relief, when in the face of powerful instincts to the contrary the individual obeys reason. In such a case it is clear that the individual does the act because it is moral,

81. See K. Tomaschek, *Schiller in seinem Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft* (Vienna: Gerold, 1862), p. 286.

82. *Aesth. Ed.*, p. 219; *W*, 20: 412.

83. *Schillers Anschauungen von Kultur und Natur*, Germanische Studien, no. 60 (Berlin, 1928), pp. 170–72, 187, 197, 205.

not because it is agreeable.[84] But here there is a conflict between sense and reason, between inclination and duty. The rational man and the sensuous man are at odds. Thus, says Schiller, whatever could moderate this opposition would help morality.[85] And it is precisely beauty, or taste, that can moderate inclination and bring it into accord with reason. The feelings place themselves on the same side as the moral law.[86] The individual has an inclination to duty. But taste alone can never suffice to make an action moral. Morality can never have any foundation other than its own.[87] Taste is only a means of removing obstacles to the commands of reason. Reason is the goal or end here as it was for Kant. This is nature–taste–reason.

In Schiller's essay "On Grace and Dignity" we can find an example of the aesthetic model. Here the goal is to go even further in overcoming the harshness of the Kantian morality. Here the noble soul can with a certain security abandon itself to inclination.[88] In other words, taste can to a certain extent make an action moral. Sense and reason are in harmony here in the sense that they are equals. Morality means that the entire character is moral. Here beauty is not merely a means to make nature conform to reason. Nature and reason are equals, and thus the synthesis of the two—beauty—is the end. Reason is no longer primary and nature secondary. This is nature–reason–synthesis.

But the synthesis model is not held to throughout the essay "On Grace and Dignity." The monarchical political model previously discussed is much closer to nature–taste–reason than it is to the synthesis model. The political model in the *Aesthetic Education* is clearly the synthesis model. There there was equality between inclination (individuals) and reason (state). The first does not play a subordinate role, and the synthesis of the two is higher than either, thus overcoming the opposition between state and society.

The conflict between Lutz's two models will also illuminate the tension noticed earlier between the beautiful and the sublime (although

84. "The Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners," in *Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical*, pp. 126-27; *W*, 21: 28–29.

85. "Mor. Util.," p. 129; *W*, 21: 30.

86. "Mor. Util.," p. 132; *W*, 21: 34.

87. "Mor. Util.," p. 126; *W*, 21: 28.

88. "Grace and Dignity," p. 209; *W*, 20: 287. On the development of Schiller's ethical views see Leroux, pp. 5–6.

Lutz himself does not discuss the sublime in much detail). In the sublime, reason predominates over sense; in the beautiful, they are synthesized. The sublime and the beautiful are opposed. Schiller at one point attempts to make these two ideals compatible and at another point chooses the latter over the former.[89]

Lutz argues that even in the *Aesthetic Education* traces of the rational, or three-stage, view persist. He points out that in Letter 3 the model is natural state–third character (or beauty)–rational state. This is very different from the final conclusion, in Letter 27, of natural state–rational state–aesthetic state. Indeed, although Letter 3 is by far the clearest example of the three-stage model, Lutz claims to see it running throughout the *Aesthetic Education*: nature–taste–reason is found in Letters 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16; and nature–reason–synthesis is found in Letters 4, 6, 7, 9, 11–15, 17–27.[90]

While we can find traces of the three-stage view in the *Aesthetic Education*, the tension that appears there cannot be explained simply as a wavering or confusion between Lutz's two models.[91] The tension in Schiller's mature thought occurs when he considers the possibility of realizing his ideal political institutions and, as we have seen, when he considers the issue of labor and classes and of the beautiful and the sublime. The last two of these issues are for the most part avoided in the *Aesthetic Education* itself. At the level of the individual (leaving out any consideration of the sublime) the synthesis, as I argued, ap-

89. See Sec. 2 of this chapter.

90. Lutz, pp. 221ff. Lutz's view is simplified and repeated by R. Snell in the introduction to his translation of the *Aesthetic Education* (Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. R. Snell [New York: Ungar, 1965], p. 15). Lutz's view is also repeated by W. H. Bruford, *Culture and Society in Classical Weimar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 278. J. Taminiaux also holds the view that there is a tension in Schiller's thought between two concepts of beauty (Taminiaux, chaps. 2 and 3, esp. pp. 111–12). See also Rosalewski, pp. 48–91. Also R.-P. Janz, *Autonomie und soziale Funktion der Kunst: Studien zur Ästhetik von Schiller und Novalis* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1973), pp. 65ff.

91. Wilkinson and Willoughby argue strongly for the unity of the *Aesthetic Education*. Consequently they see Lutz as one of their main opponents. They accuse Lutz of committing the genetic fallacy, i.e., of using Schiller's earlier writings as a reliable guide to explaining the *Aesthetic Education* (*Aesth. Ed.*, pp. xliii–iv). However, they do not discuss whether Lutz's view of a tension between two models is correct with respect to Schiller's writings other than the *Aesthetic Education* and especially with respect to his earlier writings. It seems to me that here Lutz is correct.

pears rather successful in the *Aesthetic Education*.[92] Lutz's thesis of a wavering between two models illuminates Schiller's early development and the tension between the beautiful and the sublime (which develops in the essay "On the Sublime" itself and in the contrast between this essay and the *Aesthetic Education*). However, at the social and political level what we finally have is not a wavering but an actual failure to achieve the clearly desired aesthetic model. Schiller's failure to achieve a synthesis, his failure to restore the ancient world's wholeness, spontaneity, and unity to the modern world, is due, first, to the fact that he limits his goal to a subjective transformation of the individual without discussing an objective transformation of the conditions of labor and political institutions, and, second, to his pessimism and inability to explain how to transform more than a few individuals.

Schiller, we might say, sees the problem and sets it up nicely. His solution, however, cannot handle the difficult issues and thus turns into a hope for the future, for the end of history. Thus we no longer properly have a solution but only a hope, something to strive after.[93] Yet this is what characterizes the moral, the rational, the sentimental. It is not an aesthetic synthesis, as Schiller himself said.

92. See Sec. 2 of this chapter.

93. See B. von Wiese, *Friedrich Schiller* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1963), pp. 476–77, 493–502. Also K. Hamburger, "Schillers Fragment 'Der Menschenfeind' und die Idee der Kalokagathie," in *Philosophie der Dichter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966), pp. 114–22. Also Rosalewski, pp. 56–91; and Tomaschek, pp. 290–317, 338–56.

II

Hegel

FOR HEGEL, the culture of ancient Greece constituted an ideal, a high point of the human condition. Hegel's concern with this ideal permeated all levels of his social, cultural, and political thought. In his earliest writings, as with Schiller, ancient Greece provided the model after which the modern world was to be remade. In his later writings, to a great extent, Hegel gave up on this hope. Instead, the highest principles came to be represented by Christianity and the development of subjectivity. But even though the Greek principle was transcended in the course of spirit's development, it continued to appear at least as an ideal belonging to the past. This shift, in which the Greek ideal is displaced but not totally dropped, produces, I will argue, a peculiar tension that runs through Hegel's later thought—especially in his views on art and on alienation and estrangement. Finally, I will argue that for the modern world the Greek model has totally disappeared at the level of civil society, and that only a small part of it is attained again at the level of the political state. Let us begin our discussion with the early Hegel.

I

In the young Hegel's opinion the modern world needs to be transformed according to the Greek model. In his earliest writings the goal for the modern world is folk religion, and folk religion is modelled after the Greek condition.[1] Two years later Hegel says of the ancient

1. See "Tübingen Essay of 1793," in the appendix to H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 499; for the German, *Hegels theologische Jugend-*

Greeks, "In everything great, beautiful, noble, and free they are so far our superiors that we can hardly make them our examples but must rather look up to them as a different species at whose achievements we can only marvel."[2]

Ancient Greece was the model both for the state and for labor. The ancient world was marked by a close and ideal interrelationship between labor and the state. The state was the higher reality for which the citizen worked. The state not only impelled its citizens to effort, but it also appeared as their final end. Yet the state was not distant; it appeared as a product of the citizen's own energies.[3] Unlike the subjects under a modern social contract, the Greek citizen did not have to subject his private will to a general will. These two wills were not yet distinguished: they were in spontaneous accord.[4]

This was a free and ideal condition because the state was both produced and kept under control by the citizen's own work while also appearing as the end that gave meaning to this work.[5] Moreover, the citizen's labor was satisfying. Hegel says that the republican is guided by an ideal and that all of his noblest powers find their satisfaction in labor for this ideal.[6] In this connection Hegel contrasts the Greeks with the Jews. For the Jews, work was not satisfying; it was not done for the whole or for an ideal. It was done merely for the maintenance

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schriften, p. 20. Folk religion must be grounded in reason, include the heart, and must also be tied in with the needs of life and affairs of the state. Harris argues that Hegel is trying to reconcile Greek life with Kantian practical reason (see Harris, pp. 229–31. See also the earlier essay of 1787, "Über die Religion der Griechen und Römer," and the essay of 1788, "Über einige Vorteile," in *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung,* ed J. Hoffmeister [1936; reprint, ed., Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1974], pp. 43–48, 169–72).

2. *Positivity,* p. 153; Nohl, p. 221. On ancient Greece as an ideal, see Harris, pp. 119–22.

3. *Positivity,* pp. 154–56; Nohl, pp. 221–23. The same view of labor can be found as late as the *Phenomenology* (see Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J. B. Baillie, 2nd ed. [1931; reprint ed., New York: Harper & Row, 1967], p. 377; for the German, *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* ed. J. Hoffmeister [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952], pp. 257–58).

4. *Positivity,* pp. 100–101, 104–5, 119, 154; Nohl, pp. 177, 181, 192, 221–22.

5. In these early writings Hegel makes little reference to Greek slavery; certainly he makes no criticism of it.

6. Nohl, pp. 366–67. Also, "Fragmente historischer Studien," in *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung,* p. 267.

of physical existence. Moreover, on the seventh day, the day dedicated to God, work was shunned; this was a time of empty inactive leisure. For Hegel, both labor and leisure were stunted.[7]

For both Hegel and Schiller, the ideal harmony and unity of ancient Greece was eventually destroyed.[8] Specialization—the limitation and isolation of functions—arose, and wholeness was lost. There also arose a rigid division of classes and their functions, bringing a loss of unity. In the *Positivity of the Christian Religion* Hegel describes the downfall of the ancient world. He says that due to fortunate campaigns and increased wealth and luxury the aristocracy and the military gain power over the masses. As the masses cede their power, the state becomes something that is no longer the product of the citizen's energies.

> The picture of the state as a product of his own energies disappears from the citizen's soul. The care and oversight of the whole rested on the soul of one man or a few. Each individual had his own allotted place more or less restricted and different from his neighbor's. The administration of the state-machine was entrusted to a small number of citizens, and these served only as cogs deriving their worth solely from their connection with others. Each man's part in the congeries which formed the whole was so inconsiderable in relation to the whole that the individual did not need to realize this relation or keep it in view. . . . All activity and every purpose now had a bearing on something individual; activity was no longer for the sake of a whole or an ideal. Either everyone worked [*arbeitete*] for himself or else he was compelled to work for some other individual. Freedom to obey self-given laws, to follow self-chosen leaders in peacetime and self-chosen generals in war, to carry out plans in whose formulation one had had one's share—all this vanished.[9]

7. *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*, in *On Christianity*, pp. 193–94; Nohl, p. 252.

8. On the relationship of Hegel to Schiller, see W. Kaufmann, *Hegel* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 46–60; also G. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel* (Zürich/Vienna: Europa, 1948), pp. 43–44. See also Hegel's letter to Schelling of April 16, 1795, in *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 4 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952–60), 1: 25 (trans. in Kaufmann, p. 303). Concerning differences between Hegel and Schiller on Greece, ethics, and politics see F. G. Nauen, *Revolution, Idealism, and Human Freedom* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 4–6, 13–14.

9. *Positivity*, pp. 155–56; Nohl, pp. 222–23. Also "Fragmente historischer Studien," pp. 273–74. In the essay *Natural Law*, Hegel discusses an inequalitarian division into classes that occurs within the ideal period. The breakdown of the ancient world comes only with their further development (*Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975], pp. 100ff.; for the German, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968–], 4: 456ff.).

For Hegel, just as for Schiller, the gulf between classes widens, the state comes to stand above the citizens, removed from their control, and the individual becomes a fragment—he loses sight of the whole.[10]

The issue of fragmentation, of specialization and the development of a division of labor, originally arose for Hegel in his attempt to explain how Christianity had been able to supplant paganism. He argued that this must have been preceded by a revolution in the spirit of the age.[11] Hegel at this point in his development considered Christianity a positive religion, one based on obedience to external command rather than on inner subjectivity.[12] He judged Christianity to be worse than Judaism in this respect. In Judaism, only actions were commanded; in Christianity, even feelings (e.g., love thy neighbor).[13] Christianity was a religion for men who were unfree. Thus the breakdown of the ancient world, resulting in a loss of harmony and freedom, made possible the acceptance of a religion like Christianity.[14]

In the *Spirit of Christianity,* completed about three years after the *Positivity of the Christian Religion,* Hegel has changed his views to some extent. Now only Judaism is contrasted with the Greek model. No longer is Christianity a religion that commands feelings: in Judaism alone is man a slave to God's command. Hegel now disagrees with Kant, who at certain points interpreted Christianity as commanding man to love. Jesus, says Hegel, set subjectivity against all objective commands; the "ought" of a command is alien to Jesus. Love fulfills the law, but at the same time annuls the law as law; it is higher than law. In love, all thought of duty vanishes. Jesus unifies inclination with law. This is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective in which the two lose their form of opposition[15] This is what Schiller had said of Greece and of aesthetic morality. But Hegel now finds the synthesis in Christianity. He is moving away from Schiller and the Greek model.

But even though Christianity unified subject and object, spirit and nature, in this one way, it still did not equal the Greek ideal. There

10. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 1.

11. *Positivity,* p. 152; Nohl, p. 220.

12. *Positivity,* p. 71; Nohl, p. 155.

13. *Positivity,* p. 140; Nohl, p. 209.

14. In *Natural Law,* the breakdown of the ancient world occurs a bit differently. Under the Roman Empire class structure breaks down, freedom disappears in general, and slavery becomes impossible (*Natural Law,* pp. 100ff.; *Gesammelte Werke,* 4: 456ff.).

15. *Spirit of Christ.*, pp. 209–14; Nohl, pp. 264–68.

was one element still lacking. The Christian was forced to abandon the state; he found it hostile and excluded himself from it. The kingdom of God was found only in the heart or in heaven. The Christian severed himself from the world.[16] This was not, says Hegel, the middle course of beauty or reconciliation. Christianity remained almost as poor as the Jewish spirit.[17] It was still below the Greek ideal.

What Hegel laments in these early writings is the fact that man severed himself from nature and found himself in opposition to it. This especially characterized the Jewish religion,[18] but it was also true in certain respects of Christianity. The Christian cut himself off from other men, his world, and the state. He lacked the unity and wholeness of the Greek.

In this period Hegel rarely describes the above situation as one of alienation or estrangement. He does not use these terms very often in his earliest writings. When he does, they do not yet carry a fixed philosophical meaning.[19]

After the *Spirit of Christianity* Hegel moves further away from the Greek model.[20] In "The German Constitution" he contrasts the modern bourgeois state based on individualism to an older state, like the Greek state, in which general and particular interest, citizen and state, were not opposed. But this earlier state is no longer the Greek state; the reference is to the early German condition. Hegel's purpose here

16. *Spirit of Christ.*, pp. 284–85; Nohl, pp. 327–28.

17. *Spirit of Christ.*, p. 288; Nohl, p. 330.

18. *Spirit of Christ.*, pp. 182ff.; Nohl, pp. 243ff.

19. See *Spirit of Christ.*, p. 184; Nohl, p. 245. Hegel does use "estrangement" to mean sin, separation from God (see *Spirit of Christ.*, p. 239; Nohl, p. 289). In one place Hegel comes close to using "alienation" to mean separation from nature (*Spirit of Christ.*, p. 240; Nohl, p. 290). A. Prior mistakenly assumes that Hegel is employing these concepts in their later philosophical sense all through this period (Prior, *Revolution and Philosophy* [Cape Town: David Philip, 1972], pp. 28ff., 63).

20. Lukács argues that Hegel shifts away from the Greek ideal as he comes to examine Christianity as a historical and social development (see *Der junge Hegel*, pp. 180, 219, 400. See also J. Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974], p. 332). Lukács also suggests that Hegel's study of political economy aided in the shift (Lukács, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik*, in *Georg Lukács Werke*, 17 vols. [Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962–74], 10: 112).

is to design a model for the modern state, but the pattern for it is no longer ancient Greece.[21]

Nevertheless, while considering modern society Hegel remains critical of the division of labor and the resulting inhuman form of work.

> The particularization of labor increases the quantity of production; in an English manufacture, 18 people work at the production of a pin; each has a particular and only this particular side of the work to do. . . . But as the quantity of production increases, the value of labor falls in the same proportion. The work becomes absolutely more and more dead, it becomes machine-labor, the individual's skill becomes infinitely limited, the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the lowest level of dullness. The connection of a particular kind of labor to the whole infinite mass of needs becomes wholly imperceptible and a blind dependence, such that a distant operation, suddenly stopped, often makes superfluous and useless the work of a whole class of men who satisfy their needs with it.[22]

In this sort of labor, far from finding satisfaction in working for an ideal, the laborer is barely able to satisfy his needs.[23] Hegel also speaks of a polarization between wealth and poverty.[24] The Greek model is no longer the ideal for the modern world; instead, the only solution is that the state must keep this inhuman situation from going to extremes. "Government has the most important job of working against this inequality and the general destruction consequent upon it. This can be done immediately through making it difficult to achieve high profits; when the government sacrifices a part of this class to mechanical labor and factory work and leaves it in its crude state, it must preserve this whole class in some kind of viable condition."[25] In another passage Hegel actually rejects the Greek model. He says that individuality is the higher principle of the modern world; the unity

21. "The German Constitution," in *Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 189–90; for the German, *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, ed G. Lasson (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923), pp. 73–74.

22. *Jenenser Realphilosophie* 1, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1932), p. 239 (my trans.). See also, Hegel, *System der Sittlichkeit*, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1967), p. 25.

23. *System der Sitt.*, p. 80.

24. *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), p. 232.

25. *System der Sitt.*, p. 84 (my trans.). See also *Realphilos.* 2, pp. 232–33.

of the general and the individual belongs to the past, to the ancient world.[26]

II

If as early as the *Spirit of Christianity* we could sense the beginnings of a shift in Hegel's view of Christianity (even if only in Jesus' view of morality), the shift has certainly been made by the time of the *Phenomenology of Mind*. Here Christianity (revealed religion) stands higher than Greece. Christianity represents a higher development, a fuller realization, of subjectivity and spirit.[27]

In the *Spirit of Christianity*, the Christian religion stood lower than the Greek principle because the Christian was not in unity with nature, his world, or the state. The Christian lacked the wholeness and unity of the Greek. What is peculiar is that in the *Phenomenology* Hegel *still* thinks that Christianity is lacking in this wholeness and unity; in fact, he now speaks of Christianity as marked by alienation. The term "alienation" first appears in the section "Unhappy Consciousness."

> Through these moments—the negative abandonment first of its own right and the power of decision, then of its property and enjoyment, and finally the positive moment of carrying on what it does not understand—it deprives itself, completely and in truth, of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of reality in the sense of its own existence for itself. It has the certainty of having in truth stripped itself [*entäussert*] of its Ego, and of having turned its immediate self-consciousness into a "thing," into an objective external existence.[28]

26. *Realphilos.* 2, pp. 248–51. See also Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 92; for the German, *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1962), pp. 14–15. See also K. Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1844), pp. 135–41.

27. *PM*, pp. 725, 761; *PG*, pp. 502, 523.

28. *PM*, p. 266; *PG*, p. 170. "Alienation" will always be the translation of *Entäusserung* and "estrangement" the translation of *Entfremdung*. The word *fremd* will be translated as "alien." The word *Veräusserung* will be translated as "alienation," and I will give the German word in parenthesis. Concerning the connection of Christianity and alienation, I might point out here that alienation first appears in the *Phenomenology* in Hegel's discussion of medieval Catholicism ("Unhappy Consciousness"), whereas alienation that overcomes estrangement (which will be discussed below) is connected with Protestantism.

If Christianity is marked by alienation, how can it represent a higher principle? It can do so because Hegel has changed his mind. He has come to see that an immediate unity with the world and with nature, while perhaps the most beautiful condition, is not the highest.[29] The higher condition is subjective spiritual development, and this requires being cut off, alienated, from the natural condition.

> The estrangement on the part of the spirit from its natural existence is here the individual's true and original nature, his very substance. The relinquishment [*Entäusserung*] of this natural state is, therefore, both his purpose and his mode of existence; it is at the same time the mediating process, the transition of the thought-constituted substance to concrete actuality, as well as, conversely, the transition of determinate individuality to its essential constitution.[30]

Alienation is necessary for the development of culture. Development involves opposition; it requires that man's unity with nature be broken. Schiller, too, thought that there could be no advancement beyond Greece without the separation and antagonism of faculties, but his goal was to return to a Greek-like aesthetic unity at a higher level.[31] For Hegel, there will be no return to this same sort of unity.

Alienation from the natural condition is also necessary for another reason. It makes the overcoming of slavery possible. Slavery exists when men are regarded as things, as natural entities. At this level individual self-consciousness has not yet separated itself from determinate natural existence. For slavery to be overcome, man must break this attachment to the natural, spirit must turn inward, and man must be understood as mind and thus as free.[32]

29. Lukács argues that Hegel's concept of alienation develops out of his earlier concept of positivity (see *Der junge Hegel,* pp. 402, 680ff. See also Prior, p. 30). Thus the view that Christianity is marked by alienation would not be a totally new position. What is new is that this sort of alienation is now accepted as necessary.

30. *PM,* p. 515; *PG,* p. 351.

31. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 1. Concerning alienation and the development of culture, see Hyppolite, pp. 376ff. Also *Der junge Hegel,* p. 405.

32. *PM,* pp. 231–32, 234–35, 238; *PG,* pp. 143–44, 146–47, 148–49. See also Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 48; for the German, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,* ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), pp. 65–67. See also Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* trans J. Sibree (1857; reprint ed., New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 254–55; for the German, *Philosophie der*

Much has been written recently about alienation and estrangement in the thought of Hegel and Marx. But there has been little attempt to examine carefully the way the terms are used, what they mean, and how they are related to each other.[33] When the attempt is made, important issues, I think, are overlooked.[34] An understanding of these concepts, of their meaning, use, and relationship, is not at all obvious from a general reading of the texts. What is required is a careful and basic examination.

To start with a working definition of the terms, we can say that for Hegel alienation means a surrender by a subject, a giving up of essential being. What is given up may take the form of an external, independent object—but it need not always do so. When it does, it may result in estrangement. Here the object turns against the subject as a hostile, objective power with an independent life of its own. Any case of estrangement presupposes alienation. But, for Hegel, by no means do all cases of alienation result in estrangement.

Alienation and estrangement, for Hegel, can be either positive or negative and can be so in several different ways. At one level both alienation and estrangement play a positive role. They are necessary for the development of culture.[35] In the *Phenomenology* the develop-

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Weltgeschichte, vols. 2–4 (in 1 vol.), ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968), p. 610.

33. See, for example, I. Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London: Merlin, 1970). See also B. Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). See also C. Taylor, *Hegel* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 177–88.

34. See, for example, R. Schacht, *Alienation* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971); see also n. 42 of this chapter. A very valuable article for sorting out the uses of the terms "alienation" and "estrangement" is that of J. Gauvin, "Entfremdung et Entäusserung dans la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* de Hegel," *Archives de Philosophie* 25 (1962): 555–71. Gauvin provides a list of every use of the words *Entfremdung, enfremden, Entäusserung,* and *entäussern* in the *Phenomenology*. This list shows that almost every use of "estrangement" either occurs in or refers to the section "Spirit in Self-Estrangement." Thus we must look there to understand the term and not, for example, to the section "Lordship and Bondage," where none of the above terms appear. The term "alienation" is used most frequently in the sections "Revealed Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge." It is also used frequently in "Spirit in Self-Estrangement." Thus we must look at these sections for the meaning of the term "alienation."

35. On the concept of *Bildung* (or culture) see H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. G. Barden and J. Cummings (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 10–15.

ment of culture occurs through dialectical interaction between individual self-consciousness and the objective, substantial world. This objective world stands over against and confronts, but yet at the same time derives from, individual self-consciousness. The very existence and development of this substantial world, as well as the actualization and development of individual self-consciousness, depend upon the fact that self-consciousness alienates itself. Both sides here, which have become split and self-opposed, are in reality sides of one consciousness. This fact, however, is not recognized by either side.[36] Implicit in this alienation is a movement toward universality:[37] "Self-consciousness is only something definite, it only has real existence, so far as it alienates itself from itself. By doing so, it puts itself in the position of something universal, and thus its universality is its validity, establishes it, and is its actuality." Self-consciousness must first alienate itself from its immediate unity with natural, particular existence. The natural self must be cancelled and transcended. Through this alienation self-consciousness can come on the scene as universal. Self-consciousness can assume definite, acknowledged, and objective existence only through setting itself up as universal spiritual substance. But at the same time, this universality, the result of self-consciousness' own alienation, appears outside the self as an objective estranged world in which the self no longer recognizes itself. Several things then occur: in the first place, individual self-consciousness continues to develop, through struggle. It must mould and conform itself to this universal. This is to say, it must actually become what it essentially is. At the same time, the objective realm must develop. This also occurs through the struggle of self-consciousness. The act of molding and conforming itself to the objective substance—its own self-alienated universality—not only develops self-consciousness, but also actualizes the substance by making it acknowledged and objective; "for the power of the individual consists in conforming itself to that substance, i.e., in emptying [*entäussert*] itself of its own self, and thus establishing itself as the objectively existing substance. Its culture and its own reality are, there-

36. *PM*, pp. 506, 509–10, 513; *PG*, pp. 315–16, 347–48, 350.

37. In the *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, where Hegel for the first time clearly begins to use the term "alienation" as a philosophical concept, it in most instances implied a development to universality (see *Realphilos.* 2, pp. 217–18, 239, 242–48, 250, 252, 261, 268).

fore, the process of making the substance itself actual and concete."[38] Finally, self-consciousness must eventually come to recognize itself in this substance.

This description is both very abstract and quite sketchy. At this point we must take careful note that several things occur, so that as we proceed to examine these movements in more detail, we will be able to explain them further. In the first place, alienation implies a development from particularity to universality; secondly, in the course of this development estrangement is produced and recognition lost; and finally, recognition is achieved and, as we shall come to see, estrangement overcome. Let us begin with a more careful examination of estrangement.

As a means to the development of culture, estrangement is necessary and temporarily plays a positive role, but ultimately it is negative, undesirable, and must be overcome. In the *Phenomenology*, "estrangement" first appears in the section "The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit," where the term is used only twice.[39] It does not appear again until the section "Spirit in Self-Estrangement," and it is finally overcome in "Revealed Religion" and in "Absolute Knowledge." In "Legal Status," which refers to the historical period of Imperial Rome, we find a single center distinct from the persons surrounding it; it possesses all power and reality, while the atomic persons are empty and powerless. The single center is the universal power, the lord and master of the world (the Roman Emperor). The lord and master becomes conscious of itself by the power of destruction it exercises against its subjects. The relationship is one of opposition and hostility. This objectivity confronting self-consciousness is "reality estranged from it."[40]

Further on, Hegel says of the estranged state power confronting its subjects that it was a result which originally proceeded from their own alienation; but once state power has become objective and estranged, "the sense of its having been their doing has vanished."[41]

38. *PM*, pp. 514–18; *PG*, pp. 350–53. See also *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction*, trans. H. B. Nisbit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 127; for the German, *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. 1, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), pp. 151–52. See also *PH*, p. 383; *PWG*, 2: 841.

39. *PM*, pp. 395, 397; *PG*, pp. 270, 271.

40. *PM*, pp. 504–6; *PG*, pp. 345–46.

41. *PM*, p. 520; *PG*, p. 355. Also *PM*, p. 267; *PG*, p. 171.

Estrangement thus means that the individual is confronted by an independent and hostile power which has an objective life of its own, that the individual is unaware that this power actually results from its own alienation, and that the individual lacks control over this power.[42]

"Alienation," on the other hand, appears for the first time at the very end of the section "Unhappy Consciousness." The term is used there once.[43] It begins to appear again in the section "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" and continues in various forms *throughout* the *Phenomenology*. As we have already seen, alienation can be negative; it can lead to estrangement. However, it need not always do so. What we have not yet seen is that alienation can also work to overcome estrangement or to prevent its development. Further, and intimately connected with this second form, alienation may also be positive in the sense that there is a surrender without a loss of essential being; it simply does not lead to estrangement. Let us consider each of these most important possibilities.

In the first place, alienation can take the form of a surrender, a relinquishing or emptying, which results in an external, independent

42. Schacht points out that Hegel at times uses *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung* interchangeably in the sense of surrender on the part of the subject (see Schacht, pp. 37–38). This must be qualified. Hegel uses *Entfremdung* in this fashion when the surrender is one that will lead to a hostile opposition, i.e., to estrangement in the usual sense. For example, in discussing how the estrangement of state power occurs, Hegel says, "That alone is pure sacrifice of individuality, therefore, in which it gives itself up as completely as in the case of death, but all the while preserves itself in the renunciation [*Entäusserung*]. It comes thereby to be actually what it is implicitly—the identical unity of self with its opposed self. In this way, by the inner withdrawn and secret spiritual principle, the self as such, coming forward and abrogating itself [*entfremdete*], the state-power becomes *ipso facto* raised into a proper self of its own; without this estrangement of self the. . . " (*PM*, p. 529; *PG*, p. 362). For another example see *PM*, p. 514; *PG*, p. 351. Schacht's discussion of alienation deals almost totally with the term *Entfremdung* and not with *Entäusserung*. He does argue that there are two different senses of *Entfremdung*, the second of which is interchangeable with *Entäusserung* and means a surrender. But he does not point out that the terms are interchangeable only in certain instances, and he does not point out that *Entäusserung*, in far and away the most cases, is used to express this second form (see Schacht, pp. 35ff.). Schacht's book is quite valuable as an analysis of estrangement, but his treatment lacks a thorough analysis of *Entäusserung*, which is the broader and more fundamental concept—any case of *Entfremdung* is a case of *Entäusserung*, but many cases of *Entäusserung* do not lead to *Entfremdung* but, as we shall see, play a most important role.

43. *PM*, pp. 265–66; *PG*, p. 170.

object.[44] This, while it leads to universality, may also lead to estrangement. In the section "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" Hegel explains how the lord and master of the world took control of reality, that is, he explains how estrangement occurred at this stage. "It is [the lord and master's] work," he says, "but not in a positive sense, rather negatively so." It happened "by self-consciousness of its own accord relinquishing [*Entäusserung*] itself and giving up its essentiality."[45] Again we see this same point made in Hegel's description of the "Heroism of Service," that is, his description of the rise of the modern state. Here the noble renders service to state power. The estranged state becomes actual only in getting obedience, only due to alienation on the part of the noble. In this way the objective realm becomes acknowledged and recognized. The state requires that the self be sacrificed to it. For the state to attain complete actuality, service to the point of death is required—a total alienation of individuality.[46] This alienation produces the development of the modern state to universality, but it implies the estrangement of state power.

Secondly, we must notice that alienation can lead to the overcoming of estrangement. In the section "Revealed Religion" Hegel describes how estrangement is overcome as one side of the opposition empties and abandons itself, alienates itself, and thus reconciles the estranged Absolute Being with itself.[47] Another example of this is to be found in the section "Absolute Knowledge":

> The emptying [*Entaüsserung*] of self-consciousness itself establishes thinghood, and . . . this externalization [*Entäusserung*] of self-consciousness has not merely negative, but positive significance. . . . on the one hand self-consciousness itself externalizes [*Entäusserung*] itself; for in doing so it establishes itself as

44. Ibid.

45. *PM*, pp. 509–10; *PG*, pp. 347–48.

46. *PM*, pp. 527–29; *PG*, pp. 360–62.

47. *PM*, pp. 774–75; *PG*, pp. 539–40. In "Revealed Religion," alienation that overcomes estrangement is involved in Christ's death, and it reconciles mankind with the Divine. For this reconciliation to be possible, a prior alienation in the form of the incarnation was necessary: "The Divine Being empties [*Entäusserung*] Itself of Itself and is made flesh" (*PM*, p. 776; *PG*, p. 541). This is one of the major examples of positive alienation (the third form, which we will discuss further on). Both of these alienations are necessary here: "The Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through . . . God's emptying [*Entäusserung*] Himself of His Divine Being, through His factual Incarnation and His Death" (*PM*, p. 780; *PG*, p. 545. Also, *PM*, p. 755; *PG*, p. 525).

object, or, by reason of the indivisible unity characterizing its self-existence, sets up the object as itself. On the other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness has just as really cancelled and superceded this self-relinquishment [*Entäusserung*] and objectification, and has resumed them into itself, and is thus at home with itself in its otherness as such. . . . The trained and cultivated self-consciousness, which has traversed the region of spirit in self-alienation [*Entfremdeten*], has, by giving up itself [*Entäusserung*], produced the thing as its self; it retains itself, therefore, still in the thing, and knows the thing to have no independence.[48]

Thus when self-consciousness realizes that the object has no independence, that it is the result of its own alienation, self-consciousness knows the object as itself and is no longer estranged. We are at the heart of Hegel's idealism. Consciousness and the external object are unified within consciousness because both are ultimately thought-constituted.[49] Estrangement, from the very beginning, meant that the subject and the object were two sides of the same consciousness. They had become split and self-opposed such that their essential unity went unrecognized. At a high enough level of development this unity is again recognized and estrangement is overcome.

Reconciliation can occur because of the development to universality that has taken place. As alienation led to estrangement, two dialectically interconnected forms of development came about. On the one hand, the objective world—institutions and culture—developed. This was due to the alienation of individual self-consciousness (to individual service and recognition). As culture and institutions developed they came more and more to be conditioned, transformed, and even con-

48. *PM*, pp. 789–92; *PG*, pp. 549–51.

49. Later, in the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel says that the external object is not a "distinct form of existence"; it is not alien to consciousness, because the external object's substantial basis is reason. Thus it is one with consciousness (see *PH*, pp. 438–39; *PWG*, 2: 914–15). Hegel will also say that the external natural world is itself the alienation and embodiment of spirit (see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson, 3 vols. [1895; reprint ed., New York: Humanities, 1962], 3: 36, 403; for the German, *Sämtliche Werke*, 16: 249, 253–55. See also *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. W. Wallace [1873; reprint ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1968], p. 29; for the German, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, ed. F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969], pp. 50–51. See also *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. M. J. Petry, 3 vols. [New York: Humanities, 1970], 1: 205–6; *Enz.*, p. 200. On this issue see A. Hofstadter, *Agony and Epitaph* [New York: Braziller, 1970], pp. 231ff.).

stituted by this alienation of individual self-consciousness. On the other hand, individual self-consciousness also developed. This was due to the development of the objective world. Culture and institutions were the things that individual consciousness related to and reacted against. These institutions formed and developed individual self-consciousness. This process then continued into the religious sphere. This dialectical development finally reached a certain level of universality in "Revealed Religion," where the object which self-consciousness confronted was in essence self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness was able to recognize both that the estranged object was the result of its own alienation and that it itself was the result of this object's alienation.[50] When spirit reached this level, consciousness, as it confronted the external object, was able to see that it essentially confronted itself and thus was at home with itself. Estrangement was overcome.

However, according to the passages from the *Phenomenology* just quoted, it is not only estrangement that has been overcome, but also alienation. More accurately, Hegel said that the effect of alienation is twofold: that alienation occurs and that it is cancelled. Alienation has both a negative and a positive significance: on the one hand, self-consciousness alienates itself, establishes itself as object; on the other, self-consciousness has cancelled the alienation. What does this mean? The negative effect of alienation is that self-consciousness establishes itself as object; but at this point the object is not external, independent of the self (which could lead to estrangement), because the second, positive, effect of this alienation is that self-relinquishment and objectification have been cancelled. This is so because self-consciousness recognizes the object as itself, as the result of its own alienation. The form of alienation that leads to externalization and objectification, the same form that can lead to estrangement, is cancelled. The result instead, the positive significance of this alienation, is that it has established an object which is no longer outside the self.

This brings us to our third, positive, form of alienation. In the section "Revealed Religion," where most examples of this form are found, Hegel tells us that "spirit is knowledge of self in a state of alienation of self."[51] In referring to Christ's death, he says, "Since this latter *consciously* gives itself up, it is preserved and maintained in thus

50. *PM*, pp. 755–57; *PG*, pp. 525–27. Also see above, n. 47 of this chapter.
51. *PM*, p. 758; *PG*, p. 528.

relinquishing [*Entäusserung*] itself."[52] The two sides are separate, but they both fall within a spiritual unity; there is a giving up, but its result is not destructive or harmful. There is no loss and no lack of self-recognition. "The power of spirit lies rather in remaining one with itself when giving up [*Entäusserung*] itself."[53] There is alienation but it does not fall outside the self, it does not establish an independent, objective realm. The result here is a positive alienation where self-consciousness retains itself in its object. In this way self-consciousness can be at home in its otherness as such. "In this simple beholding of itself in the Other, otherness therefore is not as such set up independently; it is distinction in the way of distinction, in pure thought, is immediately no distinction."[54] Estrangement and the alienation that leads to estrangement are overcome. Positive alienation remains. Thus alienation that leads to universality ultimately ends not in estrangement but in positive alienation.

We must also add that Hegel does not distinguish alienation from objectification; he wants to overcome both. This means that he wants to overcome negative alienation, the form that can lead to estrangement. In accomplishing this, Hegel's idealism tends to blur the distinction between subject and object. The subject and the object are both understood as existing within an absolute consciousness; they are two parts of this consciousness. The object in its essence and appearance is no longer an independent object, the result of negative alienation. The object is the result of positive alienation; the very fact that this is so brings the end of its independence, brings reconciliation.

We have just seen how estrangement is overcome by bringing about a positive form of alienation. We must also notice that the prior existence of positive alienation can prevent the development of estrangement. In Hegel's view, Germany, because it had the Reformation, can avoid a revolution like that of France. The Protestant Reformation reconciled individual and divine consciousness. The individual and the divine, though separate, fall together within one spiritual unity.[55]

52. *PM*, p. 751; *PG*, p. 522.

53. *PM*, p. 804; *PG*, p. 561.

54. *PM*, p. 769; *PG*, p. 536.

55. *PH*, pp. 415–16, 422–23; *PWG*, 2: 880–81, 888–89. Hegel does not say that there is an alienation involved in the Protestant consciousness; nevertheless, the description of the relationship between individual and divine consciousness, the fact that they exist within a spiritual unity, is the same as in those sections of the *Phenomenology*

Due to this reconciliation, Germany's development to universality can bypass the extreme of estrangement that, in the course of spirit's development, occurred in the French Revolution.[56]

It is possible to describe in several different ways the realms in which alienation and estrangement appear. If we examine the stages in the development of spirit, or mind, as they occur in the *Phenomenology*, we find that alienation is mentioned once at the very end of the section "Self-Consciousness" (in "Unhappy Consciousness") and that it does not appear again until the section "Spirit." Estrangement does not appear at the level of "Consciousness" or "Self-Consciousness,"[57] and it is mentioned only twice toward the end of "Reason" (in "The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit"). Thus neither alienation nor estrangement was mentioned in the section "Lordship and Bondage," which some scholars take to be a paradigm for alienation and estrangement. Another way to put this is to say that these concepts do not properly operate—they certainly do not develop—at the level where Hegel is discussing individual consciousness.[58] They simply arise for the first time at that level. Alienation and estrangement reappear together, alienation leads to estrangement, and thus the development that we have described takes place only in the section "Spirit," where Hegel considers objective spirit—the consciousness of

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that describe positive alienation (see *PM*, pp. 751, 804, 769; *PG*, pp. 522, 561, 536. See also *Ph. Rel.*, 3: 134–39; *SW*, 16: 340–45).

56. *PM*, p. 610; *PG*, p. 422.

57. Estrangement was mentioned several times in the Preface but in each case referred to later parts ("Revealed Religion" and "Spirit") of the *Phenomenology* (see *PM*, pp. 81, 96; *PG* pp. 20, 32).

58. In "The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit" Hegel, it is true, is considering a purely individual consciousness, which at this point, however, begins to be hostilely confronted by an external reality (*PM*, pp. 393–97; *PG*, pp. 268–71). But to individual self-consciousness this reality appears merely as an other, or others—merely as object of its self-consciousness. This is the first intimation of the realm of objective spirit, which is beginning to force itself upon individual self-consciousness (see *PM*, pp. 375ff.; *PG*, pp. 256ff.). At this point it is proper for Hegel to mention estrangement for the first time (see *PM*, pp. 395, 397; *PG*, pp. 270, 271). But in order to say more about estrangement, or for the development of alienation and estrangement to occur, we must move beyond individual consciousness to the stage where the interrelationship of these others is grasped as a concrete substance, as a social life made up of interacting consciousnesses with their own dynamic. This world will become the object to be considered, but only in the section "Spirit."

a whole world, a culture, a society. Alienation and estrangement occur when this world becomes split and self-opposed.[59] Estrangement and the form of alienation that leads to estrangement are overcome in "Revealed Religion" and in "Absolute Knowledge," that is, at the level of Absolute Spirit. Only positive alienation then remains.

From the historical perspective, alienation and estrangement first come on the scene with Stoicism, during the Roman Empire, then develop under Christianity, increase with the rise of the modern state, continue through the Enlightenment, and reach their peak in the French Revolution. Positive alienation, however, continues on into the modern world.

From another perspective, alienation and estrangement are found in the social and political realm, in religion, and in art. Let us consider each of these.

Alienation and estrangement in the social and political realm are described in the *Phenomenology* beginning at the end of "Legal Status," in the struggle between Wealth and State Power, and throughout the description of the rise of the modern state to the French Revolution. Here we find a description of the undesirable yet necessary development of an objective and hostile state power independent of the control of its citizens, and at the same time a description of the very important development to universality embodied in the rise of absolute monarchy and the modern state. Social and political development will finally, as we shall see in the *Philosophy of Right,* pass beyond and overcome estrangement.

As for the realm of religion, we find alienation and estrangement in the *Phenomenology's* description of Enlightenment faith and in "Revealed Religion." They are also found in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.* There the Divine Being alienates himself and takes on a human form—Christ.[60] This alienation does not of itself take the form of estrangement. But due to the fall of man, the world is estranged from the Divine Being;[61] it is in sin.[62] Christ takes this estrangement onto himself when he puts on the human form. Then

59. See *PM,* p. 513; *PG,* p. 350.

60. *Ph. Rel.,* 2: 255; *SW,* 16: 125. Also *PM,* pp. 755–58, 767–69; *PG,* pp. 525–28, 534–36.

61. *Ph. Rel.,* 3: 36; *SW,* 16: 249.

62. *Ph. Rel.,* 1: 17; *SW,* 15: 35.

Christ's death overcomes this estrangement, and the world is reconciled with the Divine Being.[63] Christ's alienation first in taking on the human form and then in his death overcomes estrangement. Finally, with the development of Protestantism, we are left with a positive form of alienation between individual consciousness and the divine.[64]

We also find alienation and estrangement in Hegel's discussion of art. In the *Aesthetics* Hegel says that the concept alienates itself, evolves out of itself, in the direction of sensuous being. The concept takes on a sensuous form in a work of art. In this way the concept and its concrete manifestation are estranged. But spirit, as it is realized through the historical development of art, must come to grasp itself, recognize itself, in its estrangement. It thus overcomes this estrangement and is reconciled. When spirit recognizes this estrangement as the result of its own alienation—when spirit recognizes itself in the other—the estrangement is overcome and we are left with a positive form of alienation.[65]

Thus in the *Phenomenology*, the *Philosophy of Religion,* and the *Aesthetics*, the pattern of the development of alienation and estrangement is much the same. Alienation that takes the form of an external objectification, though necessary for the development of consciousness to universality, results in an independent, objective, and antagonistic realm; it leads to an estrangement that must ultimately be overcome. It is overcome when both self-consciousness and the objective realm have developed to the point where self-consciousness is able to see the estrangement as the result of its own alienation. Only positive alienation then remains.

This general pattern of the development of alienation and estrangement constitutes a shift from Hegel's earlier views. Separation from the world of external sensuous nature is no longer objectionable, as it was in the *Spirit of Christianity*. This separation is now seen as a form of alienation that is necessary to the development of spirit and is never overcome. At a later point Hegel even claims that nature is itself an estrangement of spirit (God).[66] Nature itself is alien. Given either

63. *Ph. Rel.*, 3: 96–97; *SW*, 16: 304–5. Also *PM*, pp. 770–76; *PG*, pp. 537–42.

64. *Ph. Rel.*, 3: 134–39; *SW*, 16: 340–45.

65. *Aesthetics*, 1: 12–13; and *SW*, 12: 34–35.

66. *Ph. Rel.*, 3: 36, 40–43; *SW*, 16: 249, 253–55. Also *Log.*, p. 29; *Enz.*, pp. 50–51. Also *PN*, 1: 205–6; *Enz.*, p. 200.

assumption, it is understandable why Hegel holds that objectification in nature is an alienation.[67] This process of development through alienation then leads to the sacrifice of individuality or personality. It brings an oppressive, estranged condition that is not overcome by a return to unity with nature. Instead it is overcome only at the level of thought.

Thus for Hegel the Greek condition must be transcended. Spirit must free itself in order to develop further on its own.

> The wisest men of antiquity . . . declared that wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance with the customs of one's own nation.
>
> From this happy state, however, of having attained its destiny, and of living in it, the self-consciousness, which in the first instance is only immediately and in principle spirit, has broken away; or perhaps it has not yet attained it: for both can be said with equal truth.
>
> Reason must pass out of and leave this happy condition. For only implicitly or immediately is the life of a free nation the real objective ethical order.[68]

Whenever Hegel discusses Greece in the *Phenomenology*, he concerns himself with its breakdown. At each stage of the discussion, out of this breakdown comes a higher development of consciousness, individuality, and subjectivity.[69]

67. *PM*, p. 789; *PG*, p. 549.

68. *PM*, p. 378; *PG*, pp. 258–59. Hegel's suggestion here concerning the possible reattainment of the Greek ideal (see also *PM*, p. 379; *PG*, pp. 259–60) will be treated at a later point—in my discussion of the state (Sec. 5 of this chapter). R. Haym suggests that both in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel's goal is to reconcile Greek aesthetic spirit with the subjective principle of the modern world (*Hegel und seine Zeit* [Hildesheim: Olms, 1962], pp. 245ff., 377ff.).

69. See *PM*, pp. 379, 460; *PG*, pp. 259, 315. Concerning the Lord and the Bondsman, see *PM*, pp. 244–45; *PG*, pp. 153–54. Concerning Antigone, see *PM*, pp. 472–73, 496–97, 499, 501–2; *PG*, pp. 323–24, 340–41, 342, 343–44. Concerning Greek religion and art, see *PM*, pp. 709–11, 746, 748, 750, 754; *PG*, pp. 490–91, 518, 520, 521, 524. On the role of Greece in the *Phenomenology*, see J. N. Shklar, *Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), esp. chap. 2. I am in agreement with this author's characterization of the ancient world as it appears in the *Phenomenology*. I cannot, however, agree with her view that Hegel still prefers Greece to the modern world. For a treatment of Hegel's return to Greece at the level of his metaphysics, see Gadamer, "Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers," in *Hegel's Dialectic*, trans. P. C. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), esp. pp. 12–13.

In the *Philosophy of History* we also find Greece characterized as an ideal. Yet the Christian principle is higher. The Greeks, says Hegel, regarded nature as something friendly to the human spirit.[70] Nature held a place in man's mind, not immediately, but only after undergoing a transformation. The Greeks were not dominated by nature as the Orient was, because nature was only a stimulus to spirit, a stimulus that spirit transformed and virtually reproduced by its own operation.[71] Man was able to step back from nature, to contemplate it. Since he had reflected on it, formed it, he was not overpowered by it.[72] This allowed some men to achieve a certain freedom. Nor had the Greeks withdrawn from nature, withdrawn and turned inward toward pure subjectivity. Greece was the median between the loss of individuality that had characterized the Orient and the infinite subjectivity that would characterize Christianity.[73] Greek culture found the mean of beauty—a concrete unity of Idea and reality in which the sensuous bore the stamp of the spiritual.[74] Hegel characterizes this period as one of aesthetic spiritual unity. This section of the *Philosophy of History* strongly echoes Schiller's aesthetic views.

But even though Greece is an ideal, it nevertheless becomes very clear that Christian subjectivity replaces the harmony of Greece as a higher model of freedom. Hegel says in the Introduction that spirit has its center in itself; it is self-contained, a unity. This is its freedom. It is not dependent upon anything external. Spirit knows and wills only itself.[75]

For Schiller, Greece was not just the beautiful beginning, but also the model for man's goal—an aesthetic unity of spirit and nature to be achieved on a higher level. For the mature Hegel, Greece is a stage on spirit's path. Spirit must advance beyond the age of aesthetic unity in order to deepen subjectivity. There will be no higher aesthetic reconciliation of spirit and nature. The goal is the fullest development of spirit—spirit as self-dependent, knowing and willing only itself.

70. *PH*, p. 234; *PWG*, 2: 560.

71. *PH*, p. 238; *PWG*, 2: 570.

72. Gray notes a parallel between Hegel's treatment of Greece in the *Philosophy of History* and the views of Schiller (J. G. Gray, *Hegel and Greek Thought* [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1941], pp. 38–45).

73. *PH*, p. 238; *PWG*, 2: 570.

74. *PH*, p. 269; *PWG*, 2: 639–41.

75. *PWHI*, p. 47; *PWG*, 1: 54.

Another of the reasons for modern man's inability to identify with ancient Greece, Hegel tells us in the Introduction to the *Philosophy of History,* is the existence of slavery in the ancient world.[76] Spirit must advance beyond attachment to the natural in order to overcome slavery.

In Hegel's mature thought it is no longer the development of the division of labor that explains the movement from the ancient world to Christianity. No more is it the power of certain classes, the military and aristocracy, which causes the state to cease appearing as the product of the citizen's own energies. The decline of Greece is no longer the result of increasing specialization and the loss of wholeness and unity. Instead, Hegel turns to the development of consciousness and subjectivity for his explanation. In this way the understanding of the movement from Greece to Christianity changes from a concrete material decline to a development, an improvement, taking place mainly or most significantly in consciousness. Spirit is driven back into itself; it leaves the outer and seeks an inner world.[77] With Socrates and the Sophists, subjectivity clashes with the existing world in the form of a morality based on insight and conviction.[78] In Rome there is subjectivity also, although it is abstract and has reality only in the form of law and property. This is a discipline, a training, for a deeper development of subjectivity that will occur in Christianity.[79] Spirit must draw back in abstraction from the natural element. The citizen is sacrificed to the state, the natural side of spirit is finished, and only then arises the free spirit of Christianity.[80]

The Greek condition of unity with nature is no longer the model for the modern world and will not be the model for overcoming alienation and estrangement (which now, in fact, are necessary for the transcendence of Greek limitations). Our task, then, must be to investigate what the model for overcoming alienation and estrangement will be. We must also investigate the role that the Greek model continues to play in Hegel's thought, since, though it has been transcended, it does

76. *PWHI,* pp. 17–18; *PWG,* 1: 13.
77. *PWHI,* p. 205; *PWG,* 1: 253.
78. *PH,* p. 269; *PWG,* 2: 643–44.
79. *PH,* p. 320; *PWG,* 2: 724.
80. *PH,* p. 278; *PWG,* 2: 661.

not disappear. Finally, we must ask whether there is any, even limited, way in which the Greek model is reattained,[81] and if so, how.

III

A tension between ancient and modern ideals is exceptionally visible in Hegel's *Aesthetics*. In general, art reconciles spirit and nature. Art is a mediation between the external—the sensuous—and pure thought, between nature and the infinite freedom of reason.[82] Art presents ideal truth to consciousness in its sensuous semblance.[83] Hegel says that man desires to become conscious of himself, to duplicate himself as a mind. He wants to see himself in the external world. He does this to divest the external world of its foreignness. Man's need for art is based on this impulse to rediscover himself in nature.[84] Man must make himself at home in the world; inward life and external existence must lose the appearance of two worlds.[85]

But even though art is a form of reconciliation, it is not the only one, nor is it the highest such form. Aesthetic reconciliation as the primary form of reconciliation in the ancient world has been replaced in the modern world by philosophy. Hegel says that in ethics (he has Kant's ethics in mind) reason negates nature; there is an opposition between the two. In modern society this opposition is the sharpest that it has ever been. For Hegel it is *philosophy's* job to dissolve the contradiction, to reconcile the two parts, and it is the task of *art* to display this reconciliation.[86] Here we begin to see the difference that develops in the *Aesthetics* between aesthetic reconciliation and reconciliation in thought. Philosophy does the reconciling and art displays it.

For Hegel, art from the Greek period on is classified into two types: classical and romantic (which closely resemble Schiller's naive and sentimental). It is between classical and romantic art that the tension in the *Aesthetics* is sharpest. Classical art, the art of the ancient world,

81. See above, n. 68 of this chapter.
82. *Aesth.*, 1: 8; *SW*, 12: 27–28.
83. *Aesth.*, 1: 101; *SW*, 12: 148.
84. *Aesth.*, 1: 31; *SW*, 12: 57–58.
85. *Aesth.*, 1: 252–53; *SW*, 12: 340–41.
86. *Aesth.*, 1: 53–55; *SW*, 12: 84–89. See also Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 293; for the German, *Enz.*, p. 441.

is characterized by a balance and harmony between spirit and nature. It is this perfect balance that makes classical art the ideal, the most beautiful art that will ever exist. At the same time, however, this very principle of classical art's greatness makes for its limitation. Spirit is limited, unable to expand to its entire independence, to expand beyond the sensuous.[87]

Romantic art is modern art, which progressively (painting–music–poetry) develops away from the sensuous and natural and increasingly finds its unity in spirit alone. Romantic art breaks the aesthetic balance between spirit and nature. Spirit, whose principle is self-sufficiency, can only discover an existence that wholly corresponds to its principle in itself. Spirit must withdraw from the limitations of the natural into itself.[88] Romantic art is no longer the ideal, the most beautiful. The highest art belongs to the past. In the modern world art loses its superior place in reality,[89] but on the other hand it has a loftier aim; it is a movement beyond art toward thought. In achieving this loftier aim it almost ceases to be art. It suggests a more exalted form of consciousness than art is in a position to supply.[90] In poetry art reaches a point that almost marks the disintegration of art. Poetry destroys the fusion of spiritual ideality with external existence so thoroughly that it almost ceases to be compatible with the notion of art. It almost leaves the realm of sense entirely for the realm of ideality.[91] Lyric poetry is described by Hegel as imagination straining beyond its own domain; it struggles with the movement of pure thinking without attaining the clarity and exactness of philosophy. It transgresses one province without making itself at home in another.[92] But in art's passing beyond itself man returns to himself; he descends into the depths of his soul.[93] He moves to greater subjectivity.

Just as Greece became a stage on the way to a higher development of spirit, so art, too, becomes a stage on the way to thought. Aesthetic reconciliation does not have the fundamental and central historical

87. *Aesth.*, 1: 79; *SW*, 12: 118–20. See also *Ph. Mind*, p. 295; *Enz.*, p. 444.

88. *Aesth.*, 1: 517–18; *SW*, 13: 121.

89. *Aesth.*, 1: 9–10; *SW*, 12: 32. On this issue see H. Zander, *Hegels Kunstphilosophie* (Wuppertal: Henn, 1970), pp. 182–91.

90. *Aesth.*, 1: 438; *SW*, 13: 17.

91. *Aesth.*, 2: 968–69; *SW*, 14: 232–33.

92. *Aesth.*, 2: 1128; *SW*, 14: 440–41.

93. *Aesth.*, 1: 607; *SW*, 13: 235.

significance that it did for Schiller. It will not return again in the future. The classical was the highest form of art, but art and an aesthetic harmony between spirit and nature are not the highest forms of consciousness. Hegel will not completely reject Schiller's ancient ideal, but he does reject it as a model for the modern world. Nor does Hegel seek for classical and romantic art the synthesis that Schiller sought for the naive and the sentimental.[94] To regain the highest art is not Hegel's goal.

How, then, will art in the modern world, romantic art, function with regard to overcoming alienation and estrangement? At first sight it seems that it is precisely in romantic art that we would find estrangement, estrangement from nature. This in one sense is true. In the *Aesthetics* Hegel does use the term in the sense of a separation from nature.[95] Nevertheless, we must recall that in the *Phenomenology* this form of estrangement was necessary for development. In another passage, already cited, Hegel says that the concept alienates itself, evolves out of itself in the direction of sensuous being. The concept and its concrete manifestation are estranged. But then spirit must be able to grasp itself in its estrangement and thus overcome it. When spirit recognizes this estrangement as the result of its own alienation, when spirit recognizes itself in the other, the estrangement is overcome[96] (this is the same pattern that was found in the *Phenomenology*). If estrangement is overcome through the higher development of spirit, through spirit's power of recognizing the developed Idea in the sensuous, then romantic art, which embodies this higher development, which is closer to thought, would be in a position to overcome estrangement or at least to display this reconciliation (since reconciliation is really the job of philosophy).

The development of spirit will not only provide the modern world with a higher principle, but it will ultimately, Hegel thinks, bring unity and reconciliation without returning to a balance with nature.

IV

In the *Aesthetics* Hegel returns to a discussion of the ideal of labor. This ideal is found in the Heroic Age of the ancient world. In that

94. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 2.
95. *Aesth.*, 1: 261; *SW*, 12: 352.
96. *Aesth.*, 1: 12–13; *SW*, 12: 34–35.

age Heroes did much of their own work (e.g., Odysseus constructed his own bed). Through this work the Hero felt in touch with something produced by himself, with his own substance, rather than with objects that emanated from an estranged world over which he was not master. The objects of labor had human worth.[97] With his own volitions man interpenetrated the outer world and humanized his environment.[98] He adapted external objects to his own uses. Nature thus satisfied his needs and was unable to dominate him. The relationship between man and his object was a harmonious one.

For this ideal to exist, poverty and toil must vanish.[99] But it would not suffice for man to be in an idyllic state, a paradise where nature supplied his every need. Here his needs would be met, but he would not work; he would not be responsible for his own condition.[100] He would be dependent, dependent upon nature. Man's needs must be adequately satisfied through his own labor, but this labor must not be toilsome. Labor was satisfying for the Hero; it was not drudgery.[101]

Just as the idyllic state falls short of the ideal, so, in Hegel's opinion, does the sort of work found in the modern world. Here we find another sort of dependence. Individuals have no real substantiality in themselves apart from the state as a whole. The life of the state does not depend on any single person. Authority derives not from the individual but from a general will. Man is immersed in a network of relations with others and suffers a loss of his independence. The share any individual has in the modern state is of a restricted and subordinate sort. Work is subdivided; there is a complex division of labor. There are activities and trades of great complexity, and they must be carried out by associations of businessmen. Under these conditions a Hero is impossible. For there to be a Hero, Hegel says, the universal must not be separated from individuality. Law, morality, and authority in society must be identical with the Hero's personal volition.[102] The self-subsistence and independence of the Hero are incompatible with the modern state. In the modern state the individual cannot be directly responsible for satisfying his own needs through

97. *Aesth.*, 1: 261; *SW*, 12: 352. See also *System der Sitt.*, pp. 20–21.
98. *Aesth.*, 1: 256; *SW*, 12: 345.
99. *Aesth.*, 1: 257; *SW*, 12: 346.
100. *Aesth.*, 1: 259; *SW*, 12: 350.
101. *Aesth.*, 1: 261; *SW*, 12: 352.
102. *Aesth.*, 1: 181–85; *SW*, 12: 251–55.

his own labor: he must depend upon others.[103] Also in the modern state we find some men in poverty and others who have great wealth but who do not work.[104] Those who work find their work mechanical and toilsome and are unable adequately to satisfy their needs. Those who do satisfy their needs do not work.

The relationship between the worker and his object in the modern world is also incompatible with the ideal. The modern world of machinery, factory made products, and a scientific outlook independent of all personal views is incompatible with ancient man's vital connection with nature.[105] The environment is not humanized through such mechanical work; man does not leave the stamp of his individuality upon the external world.

As in the *Positivity of the Christian Religion*, the ideal here requires that man satisfy his needs through his own work, work that is satisfying and that humanizes the environment. The ideal is incompatible with either a split between labor and satisfaction or a split between labor and leisure (a split between a working and nonworking class, or the idyllic condition of all leisure and no work).

In the *Aesthetics* the ideal of labor, though impossible and obviously no longer expected in the modern world, nevertheless seems preferable and stands out as a critique of modern conditions. On the other hand, in the *Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel develops more fully his views on modern labor, consideration of the ideal is left out.

Despite the omission of this ideal, one of the first things we notice in the *Philosophy of Right* is that for Hegel there is no estrangement at the level of civil society or of the political state. The conditions that hold in the *Philosophy of Right* are not like the conditions leading up to the French Revolution as depicted in the *Phenomenology*.[106] We have

103. In discussing the Hero, Hegel seems to ignore the fact that to some extent he depended upon slaves at least for the most menial tasks.

104. *Aesth.*, 1: 260; *SW*, 12: 351.

105. *Aesth.*, 2: 1053; *SW*, 14: 342–43.

106. The *Phenomenology* contained a description of the development of consciousness and culture and the role that alienation and estrangement played in that development. The *Philosophy of Right*, on the other hand, does not purport to be a description of such a development. Instead it deals with the "philosophic science of the state" (see *PR*, p. 156; *GPR*, p. 209). It is a description of the goal—an ideal state and true freedom—but at the same time it grasps the state in all of the historical forms it has taken.

moved beyond that, have overcome estrangement, and have done so without a return to the Greek model. As we proceed we must ask how this has occurred.

Estrangement does appear once in the *Philosophy of Right*, but only at the level of the family: "Civil society tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons."[107] This, as in the *Phenomenology*, is estrangement from the natural. It is necessary for development and does not have harmful consequences for society, though it does represent a threat to the family. The individual is torn from the natural immediacy of the family and is pushed toward the universality of civil society.

On the other hand, alienation, as it appears in civil society, is almost the foundation of the *Philosophy of Right*. Civil society, for Hegel, possesses the remarkable virtue of combining two of the characteristics of alienation noticed in the *Phenomenology* and of contributing to the exclusion of a third. It is Hegel's view that civil society embodies positive alienation and alienation that leads to universality while contributing to the exclusion or prevention of alienation that leads to estrangement.

The foundation of civil society, for Hegel, is private property and exchange. Hegel's discussion follows the political economy of Smith and Ricardo;[108] the workings of a market economy replace the more abstract and general struggle of spirit that was depicted in the *Phenomenology*.

Hegel speaks of the sale or exchange of property as an alienation.[109] This is a desirable form of alienation and is in no sense negative. It is healthy for society. Exchange produces a development from particularity to universality, though this is only unconscious and implicit. If we consider the inner necessity behind the outward appearance of civil society, we discover this Smithian or Ricardian implicit development to universality. Each individual is motivated only by particular

107. *PR*, p. 148; *GPR*, p. 198.

108. *PR*, pp. 126–27; *GPR*, p. 170.

109. In this context Hegel uses interchangeably the terms *Veräusserung* and *Entäusserung* (cf. *PR*, pp. 46 and 52; *GPR*, pp. 63 and 72). The alienation *(Veräusserung)* of erudition and talents seems to be simply a subcategory of alienation as sale or exchange (*PR*, p. 41; *GPR*, pp. 56–57).

selfish aims,[110] but at the same time each is related to others in a system of complete interdependence due to the division of labor.[111] Each must depend upon others for the satisfaction of needs. Since each can find satisfaction only by means of others, self-seeking results, unconsciously,[112] in a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of all—it results in the production of a common capital, a national wealth, from which each may gain a share.[113] Individuals gain their own particular ends only if, despite intentions to the contrary, they act in a universal way, only if they contribute to the growth of national wealth. They must "make themselves links in this chain of social connections."[114] As with Adam Smith's "invisible hand,"[115] particular self interest results in a universal or common interest. Alienation in exchange leads to universality.

Private property and exchange also produce positive alienation, at least implicitly. In the *Philosophy of Right*, the movement from possession to exchange progressively incorporates at each stage a more ideal element. Each stage is constituted by a more general form of recognition. In simple possession the individual objectifies and recognizes his own will in a thing.[116] For possession to become property this objectification must be recognized by others.[117] In contract and in the exchange of property, the scope of this recognition is enlarged; it is mediated through others in a market and becomes general recognition.[118] These stages are necessary in order that the will of the individual become objective, acknowledged, and determinately existent. Determinate existence, Hegel says, is being for another. In exchange the individual holds property not merely by his own subjective

110. *PR*, pp. 122–25; *GPR*, pp. 165–67.

111. *PR*, p. 129; *GPR*, pp. 173–74.

112. *PR*, p. 125; *GPR*, p. 167.

113. *PR*, pp. 129–30; *GPR*, pp. 173–74.

114. *PR*, p. 124; *GPR*, p. 167.

115. *The Wealth of Nations*, ed. E. Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. 423. For an interesting historical discussion of the political origin of "invisible hand" arguments, see A. O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

116. *PR*, pp. 40–42; *GPR*, pp. 55–57. Hegel discusses economic issues (property, exchange, wage labor) not only in the section "Civil Society" but also in "Abstract Right." The latter must be understood as constituting a moment of the former.

117. *PR*, p. 45; *GPR*, p. 62.

118. *PR*, p. 57; *GPR*, pp. 78–79.

will, but through the will and recognition of others, through a common will. This is a relationship at the level of mind. In contract, "I am and remain the independent owner of something from which I exclude the will of another only insofar as in identifying my will with the will of another I cease to be an owner." In this contractual relationship, "one identical will can persist within the absolute difference between independent property owners."[119] This is the positive alienation we found in the *Phenomenology*. Separation or distinction is held within unity: "My will as alienated is at the same time another's will. Consequently this situation wherein the compulsion of the concept is realized is the unity of different wills and so a unity in which both surrender their difference and their own separate character."[120] Though this unity has yet to be developed to full consciousness, the type of alienation described here is positive rather than negative. It does not lead to estrangement.

This combination of alienation that leads to universality together with positive alienation is the first step in the argument that explains the exclusion of estrangement. However, there is quite a bit more that we must examine.

Hegel does mention the alienation of personality: "Examples of the alienation of personality are slavery, serfdom, disqualification from property holding, and so forth."[121] Any violation of a person's substantive freedom of will would constitute the alienation of personality. This is an undesirable form of alienation which has been eliminated from the modern state. Were it to exist, it would be what in the *Phenomenology* we called negative alienation, alienation that led to estrangement.[122]

Hegel also speaks of the alienation of labor.

> Single products of my particular physical and mental skill and of my power to act I can alienate [*veräussern*] to someone for a restricted period, because,

119. *PR*, p. 58; *GPR*, p. 79.

120. *PR*, p. 58; *GPR*, pp. 79–80.

121. *PR*, p. 53; *GPR*, pp. 72–73.

122. Alienation of personality is the same thing as negative alienation, which in the *Phenomenology* led to estrangement. There Hegel spoke of the loss of personality, individuality, essentiality, and of self (*PM*, pp. 509–10, 527, 529; *PG*, pp. 347–48, 360–61, 362). In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel uses the terms *Veräusserung* and *Entäusserung* interchangeably in this context (*PR*, p. 53; *GPR*, pp. 72–73).

on the strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and universality of my being. By alienating [*Veräusserung*] the whole of my time, as crystalized in my work, and everything I produced, I would be making into another's property the substance of my being, my universal activity and actuality, my personality.[123]

Here Hegel employs the forms of alienation just noted. If the laborer alienates his labor for only a restricted period of time, this is alienation in the form of exchange. This leads to universality and is positive. It is healthy for society. On the other hand, were the laborer to alienate his labor for an unrestricted period of time (which he does not do in modern society), this would become the alienation of personality—slavery or serfdom and thus negative alienation.

At this point it is difficult to agree with Hegel. If alienation for an unrestricted time constitutes the alienation of personality, negative alienation, why does not alienation for a restricted period of time constitute a partial or serial alienation of personality, as Marx argues? Why is it not the case that slavery is simply traded for the oppression of the modern wage worker?[124] For Hegel to admit this, however, would be to leave the door wide open to estrangement.

There is alienation leading to estrangement in civil society, despite Hegel's denial of the fact. But let us examine Hegel's argument further before we object to it. Hegel must move to the level of the state in order to make his case that alienation that leads to universality will not lead to estrangement. Just as civil society, for Hegel, cannot exist alone in separation from the political state, so estrangement cannot be overcome solely in civil society.

Alienation that takes the form of overcoming estrangement has not played a role in civil society (it will, we shall shortly see, at the level of the political state). Instead, positive alienation and the desirable

123. *PR*, p. 54; *GPR*, pp. 73–74. Marx comments on this passage in *Capital* (ed. F. Engels, 3 vols. [New York: International, 1967], 1: 168; for the German, *Marx Engels Werke*, 23: 183). Marx points out that this distinction Hegel makes separates the free laborer of capitalist society from the slave; the free laborer sells his labor time partially.

124. See Hegel's earlier discussion of wage labor, *Realphilos.* 1, pp. 238–40. Against Hegel, Marx argues that the laborer does in fact exchange "his entire labouring capacity . . . say, in 20 years" (*Grundrisse*, trans. M. Nicolaus [London: Allen Lane, 1973)], pp. 293–94; for the German, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* [Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, n.d.], p. 201).

alienation involved in exchange contribute to the prevention of estrangement. A healthy market, if it is kept in balance, kept from producing a polarization of classes, pauperism, and economic crises (the possibility of which, we will examine shortly), contributes to the prevention of estrangement.

Next, the development to universality that is unconscious and implicit in civil society becomes explicit and consciously recognized at the level of the state. At the level of the state, "the consciousness that my interest, both substantive and particular, is contained and preserved in another's (i.e., in the state's) interest and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as an individual," is achieved.[125]

Reconciliation occurs because we find rationality in the actual world. The movement to universality in civil society is implicitly rational. This rationality becomes objective and explicit in the laws and institutions of the state. When this is consciously recognized by rational individuals, they are reconciled with the actual.[126] Individuals then "know and will the universal; they recognize it as their own substantive mind."[127] In duty to these rational laws and institutions the individual finds freedom.[128]

Estrangement does not exist in the *Philosophy of Right*, because individuals, in confronting their world, confront themselves. In the state based on reason, self-consciousness is at home with itself; it is related to its objectified essence. The individual is related to the rational state as an accident to its substance.[129]

Just as we noted in the *Phenomenology*, estrangement is overcome when self-consciousness, the consciousness of the individual, is able to recognize itself in the object, to recognize that the universality and rationality that confront it are the result of its own alienation. Given this recognition, estrangement is overcome; consciousness is reconciled with its world, with its state, laws, and institutions.

In my reading of the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel has done the following: he first emphasizes positive alienation and alienation that leads to universality. At the same time he ignores the fact of alienation's

125. *PR*, p. 164; *GPR*, p. 219.
126. *PR*, pp. 12, 155–56; *GPR*, pp. 16–17, 208.
127. *PR*, p. 160; *GPR*, pp. 214–15.
128. *PR*, p. 107; *GPR*, p. 145.
129. *PR*, pp. 105–6; *GPR*, pp. 142–43.

leading to estrangement. Finally, he jumps to the level of the political state where estrangement is excluded because the universality and rationality implicit in civil society become explicit and conscious. Reconciliation occurs in thought despite estrangement in actuality.

Hegel has not really overcome alienation that leads to estrangement. It exists in wage labor. Further, in the *Philosophy of Right*[130] and later in the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel admits that there is a necessary tendency toward a polarization of classes in modern society: "As to the politics of North America, the universal purpose of the state is not yet firmly established, and there is as yet no need for a closely knit alliance; for a real state and a real government only arise when class distinctions are already present, when wealth and poverty are far advanced, and when a situation has arisen in which a large number of people can no longer satisfy their needs in the way to which they have been accustomed."[131] This tendency is to estrangement, to the domination of one section of society by another. It is, after all, the alienation of labor, mediated by market forces, that produces a dominant owning class as an independent, objective power over against wage labor. This is a clear case of alienation's taking the form of estrangement.

In the *Philosophy of Right* it is simply the duty of the corporations, the police, and the state, with the aid of a healthy market, to hold this tendency back from extremes. They must prevent a great mass from falling below the means of subsistence; they must prevent the sort of pauperism that was occurring in England.[132] But even if the state succeeds in this limited task, the wage-earning class has not been reconciled with the objective world standing over against it. Its activity and actuality remain subordinate to the complex interdependence of

130. *PR*, pp. 149–50; *GPR*, pp. 200–202.

131. *PWHI*, p. 168; *PWG*, 1: 207. See also *Aesth.*, 1: 260; *SW*, 12: 351. For Hegel, classes retain many of the characteristics of estates (see S. Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* [London: Cambridge University Press, 1972], pp. 104–9, 155–60).

132. *PR*, pp. 147–48; *GPR*, pp. 197–98. This was also Hegel's view earlier (*System der Sitt.*, p. 84. Also *Realphilos.* 2, pp. 232–33). E. Weil handles the fact that Hegel has no solution for this problem in the modern state by suggesting that it is enough that Hegel saw the problem clearly (*Hegel et l'état* [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1950], pp. 91–92, 97). In fairness to Hegel it must be said that in 1821 he could not be expected to foresee the magnitude this polarization of classes would later reach nor appreciate the state's inability to stop it.

units brought about by the division of labor and the market. The laboring class contributes to the universal common interest, to the satisfaction of the needs of all, to the production of a common capital, but it tends to remain cut off from participation in this universality and satisfaction.[133] It is estranged from its product and from the full and secure satisfaction of need.

The polarization of classes threatens the breakdown and failure of modern society. In the ancient world, Hegel tells us, the principle of civil society—subjective freedom—destroyed Greek culture. In modern society this principle is supposed to have a place to be contained.[134] The greatness of modern society is that it combines subjective freedom with the organization and stability of the whole.[135] But the polarization of classes seems to bode the end of freedom for the laborers and a clear threat to the stability of the whole.

The *Philosophy of Right* does not end the undesirable aspects of the division of labor. With regard to the division of labor between classes, it is simply the duty of the state to see that this antagonism does not grow to destructive proportions. The goal is not to overcome the division of labor either in the work process or between classes. It is not to overcome the split between the laboring and the leisure class, or between labor and the enjoyment of the results of labor.

Within certain limits there is a parallel between modern civil society and the discussion of "Lordship and Bondage" in the *Phenomenology*. The parallel is in the separation of labor from enjoyment and of labor from leisure. The Bondsman labors, whereas the Lord performs no labor but nevertheless enjoys the results of the Bondsman's labor.[136]

It must be noted that the Lord of the *Phenomenology* is quite different from the Hero of the *Aesthetics*. The Hero must satisfy his needs through *his own* labor. The ideal of labor is incompatible with a split between labor and either satisfaction or leisure. On the other hand, the Lord's leisure is a primary source of his ultimate weakness.[137]

There are also fundamental and interesting differences between "Lordship and Bondage" and modern civil society. The Bondsman

133. *PR*, p. 149; *GPR*, p. 190.
134. *PR*, pp. 123–24; *GPR*, p. 166.
135. *PR*, pp. 160–61; *GPR*, pp. 214–15.
136. *PM*, pp. 235–39; *PG*, pp. 146–49.
137. *PM*, pp. 238–39; *PG*, pp. 148–49.

has a direct personal relationship to his Lord, a relationship of fear, service, and obedience. It is this realtionship that creates the discipline of the Bondsman. It keeps him progressing in his work and forces his consciousness to develop. In modern civil society there are no Lords or Bondsmen. The Lord is replaced by the division of labor. This is an abstract, not a personal, master. Instead of a discipline of bondage we have the discipline of culture. The satisfaction of need requires dependence upon others. The division of labor, competition, and the market create a complex interconnection of each with all such that each is determined by all. To satisfy one's need one must submit to the discipline of this complex interconnection. There is no attempt on Hegel's part to eliminate or alleviate the division of labor in modern society. He is no longer critical of it as he was in his early writings. The division of labor is not merely tolerated, it actually becomes a positive principle. It holds society together and provides the discipline of culture.

Modern division of labor has the virtue of eliminating slavery—the Bondsman of the ancient world—but at the same time it also eliminates the Hero, whose existence is incompatible with subordination to such interdependence.[138] On the other hand, as the slave of the ancient world is eliminated the modern wage earner is produced, subordinate not to another person, but to the division of labor, the market, and the owning class. There remains, finally, a certain parallel between the Lord and the wealthy leisure class of modern society.[139]

In civil society, where the worker directly confronts and transforms the external natural world, there is no reconciliation—or what there is falls far short of that of the ancient world.

We are now in a position to notice a further problem. Hegel claims that there is no estrangement present either in the labor of the Epic Hero or in the civil society of the *Philosophy of Right*. In making these two claims, Hegel uses the concepts of alienation and estrangement in two different and opposed ways. In the *Aesthetics* he says that the

138. See *PR*, p. 245. Weil thinks that the Hero still has a place in the modern world as the founder of a state (e.g., Napoleon) (Weil, pp. 81–84).

139. A. Kojève implies that Hegel's only conception of labor is that of the slave's labor (*Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. J. H. Nichols, Jr. [New York: Basic Books, 1969], pp. 227–28). He also seems to assume that for Hegel there are still masters and slaves in the modern world (pp. 230–31).

Hero's labor put him into such a unity with nature that the natural world did not appear estranged.[140] In denying that there is estrangement here, Hegel uses the term to refer to an individual's separation from and antagonism to nature. On the other hand, once Hegel adopts the Christian perspective, external nature itself is alien to spirit.[141] This second, very different notion can also be found in the *Aesthetics*. Hegel had said that the concept alienates and estranges itself in taking on a sensuous form in a work of art.[142] In this second case alienation and estrangement are the opposite of what they were in the first, where estrangement was an individual's separation from and antagonism to nature. Here alienation and estrangement are separation from spirit; here a laborer's very objectification in nature would be alienation, not unity. The opposition between these two usages closely parallels the shift that Hegel made (between the *Spirit of Christianity* and the *Phenomenology*) concerning the value of man's unity with nature.

The laborer of the *Philosophy of Right* has lost the vital connection with nature characteristic of the Greeks and of the Hero. Unlike the Hero, the laborer is estranged from nature, his product, and a humanized world.[143] Alienation from nature, as we recall from the *Phenomenology*, is necessary for development.[144] It is also necessary for the overcoming of slavery. Thus the condition of the modern worker is neither that of the Hero of the *Aesthetics* nor that of the Bondsman of the *Phenomenology*. The modern laborer exists in a realm between these two. On the other hand, from the second perspective on alienation, in which nature itself is alien to spirit, the modern worker's labor, his objectification in nature, must be seen as an alienation from spirit. Hegel does not discuss this issue in the *Philosophy of Right*, nor does he show how, within the labor of civil society, self-consciousness might develop to the point where it could recognize itself in its object

140. *Aesth.*, 1: 261; *SW*, 12: 352.

141. *Ph. Rel.*, 3: 36, 40–43; *SW*, 16: 249, 253–55. Also *Log.*, p. 29; *Enz.*, pp. 50–51. Also *PN*, 1: 205–6; *Enz.*, p. 200.

142. *Aesth.*, 1: 12–13; *SW*, 12: 34–35.

143. *Aesth.*, 2: 1053; *SW*, 14: 342–43.

144. Even though alienation from nature was necessary in the *Phenomenology*, it did lead to estrangement, which was overcome only at a much later stage. The *Philosophy of Right*, however, was not intended to be a description of this development: it is the description of an ideal where alienation and estrangement are supposed to have been overcome.

and thus overcome its estrangement.[145] Indeed, how could the laborer be reconciled with his object when his activity, actuality, and personality are subordinate to the owning class and the complex interdependence of units brought about by the division of labor and the market? From *either* perspective the worker is alienated. He merely avoids slavery or serfdom.

Alienation and estrangement have not been overcome in civil society. After Hegel's shift from the Greek to the Christian model, alienation from nature was accepted as necessary, while only alienation from spirit was supposed to be overcome. Such a model seemed to present no difficulties in the *Phenomenology* or the *Aesthetics;* but in the *Philosophy of Right,* where Hegel discusses labor, the problem produced by this shift in models becomes apparent, and his attempt to go beyond the Greek model can be clearly seen as a failure. Without a return to something at least in certain respects resembling the Hero's condition—to a reconciliation with nature, the product, a humanized world, and thus to control over one's activity and actuality—how could the working class overcome its alienation? This is the approach that the young Marx will take.

Hegel does not seek the overcoming of alienation from nature, the form most relevant to the working class. However, he does seek the overcoming of alienation from spirit. But this cannot occur in civil society where it matters; it will occur only in thought, at the level of the state, and there it will not help the wage worker.

V

In ancient Greece the citizen and the state formed a harmonious unity. The state appeared as a product of the citizen's own energies. The

145. One might object that the very fact that nature is the alienation and embodiment of spirit allows for reconciliation, i.e., that this alienation is positive alienation. Since nature embodies spirit, consciousness could be reconciled with it, recognize itself in it. This is true. But it can occur only at a certain level of consciousness, which, as we saw in the *Phenomenology,* requires the overcoming of objectification (see above, Sec. 2 of this chapter). This is precisely the problem for the laborer. He must confront nature as an object, transform it in a physical way, and objectify himself in it. For Hegel, reconciliation occurs in thought. It is no longer, as in the early writings, conceived of as direct reconciliation with nature. Reconciliation can occur only for man as citizen, no longer for man as laborer. Or, put differently, the laborer, as citizen, could (at the level of the state) be reconciled in thought, despite being actually estranged in his laboring activity (in civil society). This, however, makes him a second-class citizen.

interests of the state were the interests of the citizen, because reflection, subjectivity, and private interest had not yet developed. The state was not abstract.[146] The care of the state was entrusted not to a few but to all. Later, in the historical development of the state leading up to the French Revolution, the state came to be marked by alienation and estrangement. Hegel's ideal state for the modern world does try to embody some of the characteristics of the Greek state but not all.

There are two ways, for Hegel, that the individual can be reconciled with the state: the first was the way of Greece; the second occurs in the modern world. The individual is reconciled with the modern state because he freely accepts and recognizes the rationality underlying its laws and institutions.[147] Reconciliation occurs in consciousness, in rational thought: "What lies between reason as self-conscious mind and reason as an actual world before our eyes, what separates the former from the latter and prevents it from finding satisfaction in the latter, is the fetter of some abstraction or other which has not been liberated and so transformed into the concept. To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual. . . ."[148]

There is a unity between general and particular interest in the modern state, as there was in Greece.[149] But better than that of the Greeks, this unity is between the state and a much more highly developed principle of particular interest: "The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself."[150] Individuality and particular interest not only achieve their complete development, but also of their own accord agree with the interest of the universal, recognizing it as their own substantive mind.[151] This is possible because the relationship of the citizen to the state is that of an accident to its substance; the citizen is related to the state as to his own essence.[152]

146. *PH*, pp. 252–53; *PWG*, 2: 603–6.
147. *Aesth.*, 1: 182–83; *SW*, 12: 251.
148. *PR*, p. 12; *GPR*, p. 16. See Also *PR*, pp. 155–56; *GPR*, p. 208.
149. *PR*, pp. 163–64; *GPR*, p. 219.
150. *PR*, pp. 160–61; *GPR*, pp. 214–15.
151. Ibid.
152. *PR*, pp. 105–6; *GPR*, pp. 142–43.

On the other hand, unlike Greece, the modern state stands above its citizens. It no longer appears as a product of the citizen's energies. It is not determined by individuals, who find their objectivity only as parts of the state.[153] The individual's role is restricted and subordinate [154]—subordinate to the substantial interest of the state, his higher essence.[155]

But even the little reconciliation that Hegel does claim at the level of the state seems vitiated by the realities existing in civil society. Agreement between general and particular interest at the level of the state is supposed to occur despite the tendency toward polarization of classes in civil society. And reconciliation, the overcoming of alienation and estrangement, through consciousness of an underlying rationality at the level of the state is supposed to occur despite the concrete alienation of the working class in the actual conditions of civil society.

Hegel's state resembles the state that Schiller described in his essay "On Grace and Dignity," the state of the rational monarch. In both, the interests of the citizen and of the state are supposed to agree; but in neither does the citizen determine the state. Both states fall short of the Aesthetic state, which merely reflects the will of individuals and in which individuals determine the state. This is no longer the goal Hegel had in his early writings. Instead he switches to rational reconciliation, to the substance-accident model. The individual must be subordinate to the substantial interest in the state, his higher essence.

Hegel's view is that man is free only at the level of thought.

> In Thought, Self moves within the limits of its own sphere; that with which it is occupied—its objects are as absolutely present to it; . . . for in thinking I must elevate the object to Universality. This is utter and absolute Freedom, for the pure Ego, like pure Light, is with itself alone (is not involved with any alien principle); thus that which is diverse from itself, sensuous or spiritual, no longer presents an object of dread. . . . Man is not free, when he is not thinking; for except when thus engaged he sustains a relation to the world around him as to another, an alien form of being. This comprehension—the penetration of the Ego into and beyond other forms of being with the most

153. *PR*, p. 156; *GPR*, p. 208. See also Hook, p. 21. Hook argues that for Hegel the state determines society; not society, the state.

154. *Aesth.*, 1: 182–83; *SW*, 12: 251–52.

155. *PH*, p. 449; *PWG*, 2: 928.

profound self-certainty (the identity of subjective and objective Reason being recognized) directly involves the harmonization of Being: for it must be observed that the unity of Thought with its Object is already implicitly present (i.e., in the fundamental constitution of the Universe) for Reason is the substantial basis of Consciousness as well as the External and Natural. Thus that which presents itself as the object of Thought is no longer an absolutely distinct form of existence, not of an alien and grossly substantial (as opposed to intelligible) nature.[156]

Subjectivity and objectivity, thought and its object, spirit and the external, or natural—these are unified, but only in thought. For this harmonization to occur, natural empirical existence must be overcome.[157] The external, or natural, is present; it is in unity with thought. But it is the external, or natural, as embodying reason, as object of thought, that is unified with thought. Since reason underlies both thought and the external, or natural, the two are not alien. In a similar way, since the modern state is the realization of the historical development of spirit, reason underlies the state; the state and the thought of the individual are thus in unity. This is similar to the sort of reconciliation that we found at the end of the *Phenomenology*. Thought and the external are reconciled *within* thought. For Schiller and for the Greeks there was a reconciliation *between* reason and sensuous experience, an aesthetic reconciliation.

VI

Why this inability to accomplish in a new way what the Greek world had achieved? To illuminate this it will be helpful to notice that for Hegel there are really two different periods of Greek culture, two periods that form the basis for two different ideals—the ideal of the state and the ideal of labor. In the *Aesthetics* we find the ideal of labor located in the Heroic Age, the epoch of Homeric Heroes. In the *Philosophy of History* the political ideal is found during the "perfect bloom of Greek life," the period of the Athenian city-state, the sixty years between the two wars.[158] We must notice that these two ideals

156. *PH*, pp. 438–39; *PWG*, 2: 914–15.

157. *PH*, p. 319; *PWG*, 2: 721.

158. *PH*, p. 265; *PWG*, 2: 641. These two ideals were not separate in the *Positivity of the Christian Religion*. The labor ideal was integrated with the city-state ideal (see above, Sec. 1 of this chapter).

are incompatible *even* in the ancient world. In the *Aesthetics* Hegel says that a state is a positive and necessary power independent of individuality and subjectivity. Even in a state based upon the free acceptance of rational laws, individuals have no real substantiality in themselves apart from the state. The share any individual has in the state is restricted and subordinate. The state involves a complex interdependence of each upon all due to a division of labor. Authority and law cannot be determined by an individual as it must be with the Epic Hero.[159] Individuality is in conflict with the state. We might say that in the Greek city-state a balance was struck. Authority and law appeared not as the product of an individual Hero, but as the result of the collective energies of the individual citizens, although this did include slavery. In the modern state, with its exclusion of slavery through the higher development of individuality and subjectivity, on the one hand, and social complexity on the other, this balance becomes impossible. All that can be accomplished is that general and particular interest agree when the citizens recognize the rationality underlying the state and voluntarily subordinate themselves to it; they cannot determine the state.

Yet the modern political ideal comes closer to the ideal of the city-state than modern labor comes to the ideal of the Heroic Age. Heroic labor, the humanization of nature, the satisfaction of needs directly and independently through one's own labor, is totally incompatible with separation from nature, with the division of labor, the dependence of each upon all, the separation of classes. The only thing gained at this level is the elimination of the Bondsman. The ideal of labor is dropped, the goal becoming merely to embody as much of the city-state model as is compatible with the increased development of subjectivity, individuality, and complexity in the modern world.

159. *Aesth.*, 1: 180–85; *SW*, 12: 250–55.

III

Marx (1835–48)

MARX ACCEPTS only some of Hegel's assumptions concerning alienation and estrangement. Against Hegel, he turns toward reconciliation with nature through objectification. His model for labor and the state thus is not as close to the views of the mature Hegel as it is to the Greek ideal, to Schiller, and to the parts of Hegel that were closer to Schiller. This, I will argue, is the case in the earlier writings. Marx will change some of these views in later writings.

The division between the early and the mature Marx is often set at 1845, when Marx and Engels began writing the *German Ideology* and first developed the doctrine of historical materialism. I have said in the Introduction that I do not agree with the theory of a single dividing point. Besides, for the themes with which we are concerned, especially Marx's model for humanized labor, 1845 is not at all suitable as a breaking point. The first signs of a shift on this issue come in the *Grundrisse,* not in the *German Ideology.* Thus I propose to begin by considering Marx's views up to 1848. Chapter 4 will be devoted to his views after 1848. I hope to show that this is a reasonable way, for organizational purposes, to separate Marx's thought.

I

Marx's concepts of alienation and estrangement have definite similarities to Hegel's. But the way in which these concepts are related to each other and the way in which they are overcome are quite different for the two.

Marx often uses the two terms seemingly in apposition. For example, he says that "appropriation appears as estrangement, as alien-

ation."[1] It has been argued that Marx, unlike Hegel, makes no distinction between the two terms[2]—that alienation and estrangement have the same meaning for him. I want to dispute this. It is clear, at the very least, that there are two concepts present. In the *1844 Manuscripts* Marx argues, on the one hand, that the realization of labor, its objectification, appears as a loss to the worker. The worker puts his life into the object, and the object belongs no longer to him but to another (the capitalist). The emphasis here is on the worker's subjective loss. The object instead comes to possess the life, the reality, that the worker lacks. This is the concept of alienation much as we found it in Hegel. Of course, Marx is applying it to the economic realm, the realm of labor, and in so doing is disagreeing with Hegel's appraisal of wage labor. On the other hand, a second concept can also be found. The type of labor just described results in the production of a realm of objects that confronts the worker as an independent and hostile power.[3] The worker finds himself dominated by a domain of objects ruled by the market. Here the object reacts upon the subject, and the subject has no awareness of being responsible for the action of the object. This is estrangement much as we found it in Hegel, except that Marx disagrees with Hegel's appraisal of the market. Despite the fact that the two terms often appear in seeming apposition, the two concepts we met in Hegel are here.

One might still want to argue that the two *concepts* are being conflated. But in one passage it is evident that Marx recognizes that there are two distinct concepts, that they can be involved in different processes which have different results, and that this was the case for Hegel. However, Marx is only partially aware of the variety of relationships that held between these two concepts for Hegel. In the last section of the *1844 Manuscripts* Marx notes that, for Hegel, alienation either *led* to estrangement or worked to *overcome* it: "The whole history of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction of the alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the production

1. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans. M. Milligan (New York: International, 1964), p. 119; for other examples see pp. 108, 110, 117, 118. For the German, *Marx Engels Werke*, supp. vol. 1, pp. 522, 512, 514, 520, 521.

2. See Bottomore's introduction to *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. xix. For a somewhat different view see Schacht, *Alienation*, p. 72. Also, Ollman, *Alienation*, pp. 132n., 299n.

3. *EPM*, p. 108; *MEW*, supp. 1: 511–12.

of abstract (i.e., absolute) thought—of logical, speculative thought. The estrangement which therefore forms the real interest of this alienation and the transcendence of this alienation, is the opposition of in itself and for itself. . . ."[4] In this passage Marx explicitly recognizes the distinction between alienation and estrangement, or more accurately, the distinction between alienation that leads to estrangement and the overcoming of estrangement through the overcoming of alienation that leads to estrangement. We cannot say that the two terms are simply synonymous for Marx. I suggest instead that the concepts are understood as correlates; they are different but mutually dependent. This is possible because Marx disagrees with Hegel. For Marx (as we shall see), alienation always leads to estrangement, never overcomes estrangement, and is never found alone in a positive form. Since a case of alienation is always a case of estrangement (and vice versa), it is possible for Marx to use the terms together as correlates.

However, this is not simply a matter of disagreement. In the above quotation Marx seems to be unaware, or at least does not point out, that positive alienation, for Hegel, was desired for its own sake. Nevertheless, Marx's analysis is fundamentally opposed to the notion of positive alienation.

I shall try to show the following: that Marx's analysis is opposed to the notion of positive alienation found in the discussion of religion in the *Phenomenology* and of exchange in the *Philosophy of Right,* that Marx explicitly rejects alienation that overcomes estrangement as it appears in the sections "Revealed Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge" of the *Phenomenology,* and finally that Marx accepts alienation that leads to estrangement much as it appears in the section "Spirit in Self-Estrangement" of the *Phenomenology.*[5] We must examine each of these cases. Let us begin with positive alienation.

For Marx, all alienation and estrangement have their source in

4. *EPM,* p. 175; *MEW,* supp. 1: 572. See also *EPM,* p. 183; *MEW,* supp. 1: 579–80.

5. Marx's treatment of alienation and estrangement does not follow Hegel's treatment of "Lordship and Bondage." For an argument that it does, see J. Y. Calvez, *La Pensée de Karl Marx* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1956), pp. 251ff. Prior holds this view also (*Revolution and Philosophy,* pp. 52, 108, 114–15); so does I. Fetscher (*Hegel—Grösse und Grenzen* [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971], p. 47). As I have pointed out, Hegel does not even use the terms "alienation" and "estrangement" in that section. For an interesting treatment of alienation in Hegel, Marx, and later writers, see Petrović, pp. 135–53.

economic phenomena—in wage labor, exchange, and the division of labor. This was not the case for Hegel. Alienation, especially a positive form of alienation, could be found independently in the realm of religion. If we had to point to the fundamental source of alienation for Hegel, we would point to the self-struggle and development of spirit; wage labor, exchange, the economic realm in general, can be seen as one expression of this struggle, but certainly not as the fundamental source of alienation and estrangement. For Marx, alienation and estrangement, even in the religious and political spheres, have their source in the economic or social realm, and they are not positive or desirable. They are reflections of the alienation and estrangement that exist at the socioeconomic level and can be overcome only by overcoming the latter.[6]

In civil society of the *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel's goal was to end all estrangement, but not all alienation. Negative alienation was to be overcome, but positive alienation in exchange was to be maintained. Exchange was healthy for society. For Marx, exchange is a harmful and destructive form of alienation, an alienation that inevitably takes the form of estrangement. Hegel's claim to have overcome estrangement while preserving a positive form of alienation in exchange is, for Marx, the mere appearance of having overcome estrangement. Real estrangement remains in exchange and wage labor.

Marx addresses himself to the issue of alienation and exchange in his "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy.*" In Marx's view, as soon as exchange develops, the product loses all personal significance for the producer. Its only significance is that it can be equated with another product. Products become equivalents, substitutes. What becomes important for the producer is only abstract value, exchange value. Marx is interested not so much in the development to universality implicit here as in the fact that the labor that produces these products, as production and exchange develop, will become wage labor. This will cause a further divorce of the product from the producer, or laborer. The product will stand in no immediate relation

6. *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* trans. A. Jolin and J. O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 131–32; *MEW,* 1: 378–79. Also, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,* ed. L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (Garden City: Anchor, 1967), pp. 220–25; *MEW,* 1: 350–55. See also, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *WYMPS,* p. 401; *MEW,* 3: 6.

to the laborer's need, to his essence. Since it is produced only as an exchange value, it will be determined by market forces indifferent to the laborer. Wage labor also implies that the worker's life activity, no longer directed to production that satisfies personal need, will be reduced to a mere means to gain a wage. Necessary to the development of the market and of exchange value is a medium of exchange—money. With the introduction of this medium we find a divorce, or alienation, not just between persons and their products, but between the persons themselves who produce and exchange these products. Social interaction, which until this development was mediated in a direct way by human beings themselves, now becomes an interaction mediated by a force external to man, above and beyond his control. Since social interaction occurs through a market, this interaction will follow the abstract, impersonal, and mechanical laws of that market. Man comes to regard "his will, his activity, and his relationships to others as a power independent of himself and of them." The market laws, which control the movement of products, also control and dominate the human activities and relationships involved in producing and exchanging these products. Here we have the "domination of the thing over the person, the domination of the product over the producer." Here alienation takes the form of estrangement.[7] In an exchange economy there is no positive alienation. Exchange, as soon as it develops, implies alienation and estrangement. Pauperism, for Marx, is only the natural development of a higher stage of exchange—modern industry.[8] Hegel admitted the tendency toward a polarization of classes and pauperism; he thought, however, that they could be counteracted.

For Hegel, alienation and estrangement were also necessary for the development of culture. A version of this view can be found in Marx. He tells us that "industry had to ruin itself so as to learn to believe

7. "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*," in *WYMPS*, pp. 266–67, 273–77; *MEW*, supp. 1: 445–47, 452–56. Althusser argues that since Marx's later treatment of the fetishism of commodities has nothing to do with the earlier treatment of alienation from the species, the concept of alienation, for Marx, takes on a totally altered meaning (*Reading Capital*, p. 17). Althusser overlooks the fact that in the "Comments on Mill" we find a treatment of alienation that includes what is later said in the discussion of the fetishism of commodities.

8. "Critical Notes on the 'King of Prussia and Social Reform'," in *WYMPS*, p. 345; *MEW*, 1: 398.

in man,"[9] and that "natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the more practically through the medium of industry. It has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering of the dehumanization of man."[10] The increased productive capacity of modern industry is necessary for human emancipation. But the development of modern industry in an exchange economy inevitably involves alienation and estrangement. This is the sad fact. Once modern industry has developed, society must be transformed, alienation and estrangement overcome, and the results of industry turned to the benefit of all.[11] In another passage Marx observes: "No antagonism, no progess. This is the law that civilization has followed up to our days."[12] But for Marx the most that can be said is that alienation and estrangement have been necessary evils. There is no sense in which alienation is something of lasting value, something that must be maintained in a positive form.

Let us turn to alienation that overcomes estrangement. In the last section of the *1844 Manuscripts* Marx attacks Hegel's idealistic treatment of objectification and the overcoming of estrangement. Reconciliation occurs, for Hegel, when self-consciousness knows the object as the result of its own alienation. "Knowing," says Marx, "is its sole act."[13] Hegel can argue this way, Marx says, because he understands the object as a thing posited by self-consciousness. Objects are not independent of self-consciousness; in essence they have no objectivity outside the knowing. Only with this assumption can Hegel argue that reconciliation is a matter of recognition.[14]

Marx fundamentally disagrees with this. Hegel's overcoming of the object in thought leaves real estrangement just as it was in the actual world—unchanged—but sees through it and believes that it has been overcome.[15] Consciousness alone, for Marx, will not bring about reconciliation. Estrangement involves the action of real, independent, objective forces. Man must actually change the interactions between

9. *EPM*, p. 105; *MEW*, supp. 1: 510.
10. *EPM*, p. 142; *MEW*, supp 1: 543.
11. Compare with K. Marx and F. Engels, *German Ideology*, ed. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress, 1968), pp. 46–47; *MEW*, 3: 34–35.
12. *Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 61; *MEW*, 4: 91–92.
13. *EPM*, p. 183; *MEW*, supp. 1: 580.
14. *EPM*, pp. 180–84; *MEW*, supp. 1: 576–81.
15. *EPM*, pp. 184–85; *MEW*, supp. 1: 581–82.

persons and between persons and objects that produce estrangement. Social, economic, and political actuality must be transformed. It is not enough to see the rationality behind the appearance. The recognition that it is man's own alienation that produces estrangement, while true, nevertheless does nothing in itself to overcome estrangement.

Marx's treatment of objectification is fundamentally different from Hegel's. Marx says that the product is objectified labor, labor that has been embodied in an object. To create, the worker needs nature as the material in which his labor is realized and upon which his labor is active.[16] Objectification in nature, the external world, is desirable for Marx and, in itself, does not constitute alienation. There is nothing objectionable or alien about this form of the independence of the object.

For Marx, objectification is not something that can or ought to be overcome. Only alienation and estrangement are to be overcome. In further opposition to Hegel, he holds that it is objectification itself, not exchange, that leads to true social development and universality. Moreover, objectification, if it can take place without alienation and estrangement, *itself* constitutes reconciliation. Objectification, for the young Marx, is the proper activity of a species-being and constitutes "true species life."[17]

A species-being is a being for whom the species can be the object of both thought and practice. This distinguishes the human species from animals; it identifies the human essence, or human nature. Humankind is able to conceive the species as a whole (i.e., to conceive universal or general ideas), whereas animals can conceive only particulars. The species can also be the object of practice; humanity as a whole can be the object or goal of human activity. The development of the species toward its end is brought about by its own consciousness and activity.[18]

The life of the species involves a constant interchange with nature. The species develops, becomes more universal, through the activity

16. *EPM*, p. 108; *MEW*, supp. 1: 511–12.

17. *EPM*, pp. 112–14; *MEW*, supp. 1: 515–17. K. Axelos, like Hegel, seems to identify objectification with alienation and is thus critical of Marx (*Alienation, Praxis, and Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx*, trans. R. Bruzina [Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1976], pp. 126–30, 133).

18. *EPM*, pp. 112–13; *MEW, supp.* 1: 515–16.

of transforming nature. Transformed nature, in an ever wider way, serves for subsistence as well as for instruments, or tools, to further carry on this transformation. The human species must transform the natural world through its labor in order to satisfy its needs. It is important to note that there are two aspects to this process, two developments toward universality, that occur in dialectical interdependence. In the first place, the natural world is transformed and developed in an ever wider way into useful products. Secondly, and at the same time, the species itself, its powers and capacities, are transformed and developed, made more universal. These two developments interact and further each other. In creating new products, workers subject an ever larger part of the natural realm to their will, to a plan they have conceived. The products satisfy the needs for which they were produced but also react upon and develop the producers. A subject with the new ability to satisfy given needs becomes a changed subject, one who has been freed to discover new needs. New needs may well in turn demand a more complex production process. Subjects, for example, who produce new tools are changed subjects when they begin to use the tools. They exercise new powers and capacities and may well discover new potentialities.

Human need, for Marx, is an indication of human nature, the species essence.[19] The quality of the need indicates the level to which human nature has developed, but at the same time it indicates the way in which existence must yet be transformed through human labor so as to accord with essence—and thus for human freedom to be realized.[20] From this we can see the central importance of objectification. The term "objectification" refers both to transformed nature, nature objectified to satisfy human need, and to the actualization or objectification of the laborer's powers and capacities. In both instances objectification gives rise to the development of the species, the human essence. The object itself, whether intellectual or practical, is the actualization of the human species. Only in the object are the powers and capacities of the species actualized. Only by the object are needs

19. "Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly," in *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works*, 16 vols. to date (New York: International, 1975–), 1: 137; *MEW*, 1: 33.

20. *EPM*, pp. 135, 140–41, 165; *MEW*, supp. 1: 536, 541–42, 562–63. Also *CHPR*, p. 30; *MEW*, 1: 231. For a valuable discussion of Marx's concept of need, see A. Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (New York: St. Martin's, 1976), pp. 40–58.

satisfied. Only in the object can we recognize the level that human need has reached in the development of the species. And finally, only in interaction with the object do higher needs and powers develop.[21]

The development of the species involves a continuous interdependent transformation of nature, of the production process, and of human abilities, needs, and awareness; it is a development in which the species achieves a greater universality of control, understanding, and satisfaction. The key to this development, its motor force, is the dialectic between human need and labor.

A further requirement must be added for this objectification process ultimately to constitute true species life: it must take place consciously and purposefully.[22] The species must consciously direct this process toward the goal of benefiting or improving the species as a whole. In this way the object, in the sense of the purpose of the species, also becomes a universal. Only in this way can the species be free. The species will be consciously *self*-determined toward a universal end, toward itself as universal. This does not imply a fixed, static, asocial norm toward which the species must strive. The goal itself is this very process of free activity and development. The goal is conscious, collective, self-determined, and purposive life activity.

Lacking this, the species will be driven by need, dominated by the process of production, and controlled by the laws of social interchange—its members will scarcely be better off than animals. The animal is one with its activity; it produces under the domination of immediate need. It is a slave to nature. Man can make his activity the object of will and consciousness. Men do produce when no longer dominated by physical need and truly produce only in freedom from need.[23] Recall Schiller's view that the animal works when the stimulus

21. H. Arendt distinguishes between labor—the slavish activity of *animal laborans*, which merely reproduces life—and work—the craftsmanlike activity of *homo faber*, which constructs lasting objects. Arendt mistakenly argues that Marx reduces all work to labor (*The Human Condition* [Garden City: Anchor, 1959], pp. 71–117). Arendt does admit that Marx's discussion of labor sometimes strays and becomes a discussion of work, especially when he discusses *objectification* (pp. 89; 330–31, nn. 36, 41). Arendt fails to see that this is the *main* meaning the young Marx gives to work. Marx's goal, after reducing work to labor, Arendt argues, is simply to abolish labor. Arendt ignores Marx's discussion of transforming labor into an end in itself.

22. *EPM*, pp. 112–13; *MEW*, supp. 1: 515–16.

23. *EPM*, p. 113; *MEW*, supp. 1: 516.

to activity is need and that he plays when the stimulus is the sheer plenitude, the superabundance of life.[24] As with Schiller, Marx's goal is that man be in control of his activity so that he is able to stand back from it, contemplate it, and make it the free object of his will and consciousness. It is true that labor is always directed to the satisfaction of need and only thus leads to the development of the species; nevertheless, the satisfaction of need does not have to be compulsive, dominated by the need itself. It can take place freely and be directed toward conscious universal ends.

In a capitalist economy individuals are cut off, estranged, from the development of true species life. Estrangement from the species is the result of two other forms of estrangement inevitable in such economies: estrangement of the worker from the product and estrangement of the worker in the process, the activity, of production. If the laborer is estranged from the product, if, in other words, he does not have direct and conscious control over it, it will not be turned to the benefit of the species; it will not serve a universal purpose. Rather, it will benefit only an individual—the owner of the product—in opposition to other members of the species. Similarly, if the laborer is estranged from his own activity in the process of production, if, in other words, his activity is painful and coerced, if it belongs to, and is determined by, another, it will be impossible for the laborer freely and consciously to direct his activity toward the improvement of the species. Again his activity will serve only an individual in opposition to other members of the species—it will gain a wage for *his own* bare existence.[25] In both cases human labor, species activity, is not universal—it does not have the species as its object or goal, it does not result in the development of the powers and capacities of the species as a whole, and it does not result in an increasing universality of the conscious subordination of the world to purposeful control and satisfaction.

The concept of species-being is used by Marx in an attempt to

24. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 3.

25. *EPM*, pp. 108–12; *MEW*, supp. 1: 511–16. Fetscher argues that Marx does not change his views on alienation (*Marx and Marxism*, pp. 9, 13, 15). But, not having treated in detail Marx's concept of alienation from the species, Fetscher does not see that this aspect of the notion of alienation is later dropped.

present the case that human nature is essentially social, or communal. Human nature is fully realized, essence will accord with existence, when individuals are socially associated, when they produce in common, and when they cooperate directly and consciously (and only in this way freely) for the benefit of the species.[26]

If human need is an indication of human essence, then the vast number of human needs that can be satisfied only by others demonstrates that one is essentially in need of others. Thus the transformation of existence so as to accord with essence, so as to actualize human freedom, requires the direct, conscious, and purposeful social cooperation of others.[27] Without this, the workers' product will be left to the determination of the impersonal and mechanical laws of the market. The workers' entire product, their entire world, will confront and dominate them as an independent, objective, and estranged realm out of their control.

Estrangement from the product also means estrangement from nature. Hegel found this sort of estrangement in Christianity. Schiller described it in the rational condition.[28] It can also be found in the writings of Feuerbach.[29] For Marx, the worker needs nature as his object. He needs it as a means of life—both to work on and to provide subsistence. In an exchange economy, nature, as it is transformed through labor into products, appears lost to the worker. Since the worker is not in control of the product, yet still has a need for it, he becomes a slave to it.[30] The more he produces, the less he possesses.

26. "Comments on Mill," p. 281; *MEW*, supp. 1: 462–63.

27. "Comments on Mill," p. 273; *MEW*, supp. 1: 452.

28. *Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 177, 179; *W*, 20: 391–93.

29. Feuerbach compares the heathen to the Christian. For the heathen, matter is eternal, real, and objective; for the Christian, all is subjective. The concept of creation makes matter secondary, unreal, uneternal, and unobjective. God, who is abstract and formal, first thinks the world, then it is created, and then finally it becomes an object of sense. Thus the origin of things is in the subjective understanding of God. Subjectivity is primary (L. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. G. Eliot [New York: Harper & Row, 1957], pp. 84–85; for the German, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl, 13 vols. [Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1959–64], 6: 102–3). On the other hand, the eternality of matter implies the essentiality of matter. Christian creation implies the inessential nature of matter. Creation affirms subjectivity (which is really the subjectivity of man) and thus separates subjectivity from matter. Man is distinguished from nature and placed above it (*Essence of Christ.*, p. 106; *Sämtliche Werke*, 6: 127–28).

30. *EPM*, p. 109; *MEW*, supp. 1: 513.

He falls under the domination of the product,[31] controlled not by him but, as in religion, by a distant abstract power above and beyond him. Human need, which should bind the community together so that individuals cooperatively mould their existence to suit their essence, instead, through the mediation of the abstract and impersonal laws of the market, turns the individual into a slave to nature.

Alienation in the activity of production means that work is external to the worker. He does not develop himself mentally or physically; he ruins himself. His labor is not voluntary, but coerced. The work itself does not directly satisfy a human need; it does not confirm his essence, but is only a painful means to satisfy a need external to the work. Work becomes a form of slavery.[32] Need leads not to actualization and development, but to estrangement. Man is estranged from his own activity. Schiller had said of modern labor that man's nature is destroyed for the moment by any particular task and continuously by a life of such toil.[33] In it man develops only a small part of his capacities.[34]

31. *EPM*, p. 108; *MEW*, supp. 1: 512. See also "Comments on Mill," p. 278; *MEW*, supp. 1: 459–60.

32. *EPM*, pp. 110–11; *MEW*, supp. 1: 514–15.

33. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 3.

34. For a general treatment of the relationship between Marx and Schiller, see Schacht, pp. 15–17. See also G. Lichtheim, *A Short History of Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 68–69. Also M. Rader, *Marx's Interpretation of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 142–46, 173. On the relationship of Marx to Schiller and to classical aesthetics in general, see S. Morawksi, "The Aesthetic Views of Marx and Engels," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 28 (1970): 310–11. Marx refers many times to Schiller's poetry and drama, but never to his aesthetic and philosophical writings. However, we can most likely assume that he was familiar with the *Aesthetic Education*, which was quite well known at the time. Besides, Hegel summarizes the *Aesthetic Education* in his *Aesthetics* (1: 62; *SW*, 12: 97–98). M. Lifshitz argues that Marx probably read Hegel's *Aesthetics* during the summer of 1837, and he points out that Marx refers to reading this work in one of his poems: "For by rote we have studied Hegel,/ And we are not purged of his *Ästhetic*" (*The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx*, trans. R. B. Winn [New York: Critics Group, 1938], pp. 10–14). See also *MECW*, 1: 577; for the German, *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Rjazanov, 7 vols. (Glashütten im Taunus: Detlev Auvermann, 1970), pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 42. Another source that discusses Schiller's *Aesthetic Education* and that Marx probably read is G. A. Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* (Posen: Leitgeber, 1908). This book first appeared in 1838. In a letter to Engels of Jan. 12, 1882, Marx speaks of having met Cieszkowski in Paris during the time of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*MEW*, 35: 35). For a general summary of Marx's work and of the influence of Cieszkowski on Marx, see S. Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),

We are now able to examine more closely certain differences in the ways Hegel and Marx understood the overcoming of estrangement. For both, economic activity plays an important role in human development. For Hegel, this occurs through private property and exchange. Exchange of property establishes an interrecognition of wills necessary to the realization of individuality and society. For Marx, exchange and private property are destructive of true human development. A development toward a common social benefit actually does occur in an exchange economy, as Adam Smith and Hegel argue, but behind the back and despite the will of the individual. Each seeks only his particular interest, but due to close economic interdependence of each upon all—to an "invisible hand"—each, whether he intends to or not, contributes to the benefit, the satisfaction of the needs, of all. This competitive group of self-seekers produces the wealth of the nation, the growth of social capital from which each may gain a share. It is precisely this sort of social interchange that is neither direct, conscious, nor purposeful. It is on these grounds that Marx objects to it—it will frustrate rather than develop true species life.

Even for Hegel, consciousness must move beyond the competitive exchange economy of civil society. Hegel will not admit that there need be alienation leading to estrangement in civil society. Nevertheless, consciousness cannot be allowed to remain at this level. Civil society must be transcended but not eliminated. Reconciliation occurs at the level of the state, and it occurs only in thought; it leaves the external economic realm unchanged. Consciousness merely penetrates behind the antagonistic appearance of civil society, recognizes the rationality immanent in it, and brings this rationality and universality to explicit consciousness at the level of the state.

For Marx, it is not enough that this implicit rational direction be recognized as the essence behind the appearance such that this aware-

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pp. 125ff. See also A. Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels; Leur vie et leur oeuvre,* 3 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955–62), 1: 142ff. Cieszkowski quotes directly from the *Aesthetic Education* and makes the following relevant points: (1) for Schiller, art (beauty) is a reconciliation of spirit and nature both in the individual and in a people; this reconciliation is the culmination point of history (*Prolegomena,* pp. 80–81). (2) To achieve a higher development, the Greek ideal must be transcended, but this ideal harmony will return again at a higher level. The Greek ideal belongs not merely to the past, but is the goal toward which history is moving in the modern world (*Prolegomena,* p. 139). (3) Schiller's goal is an aesthetic state and an aesthetic culture (*Prolegomena,* p. 85).

ness can then be superimposed upon the antagonistic and estranged workings of civil society. Conscious, rational, and purposeful direction must actually be embodied in economic activity itself. Existence must actually be brought into accord with essence. Exchange must actually be replaced by cooperation. True species activity must be objectified. Objectification in its true form overcomes alienation and estrangement. Only then does recognition occur. Through the laborer's objectification, "nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life; for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created."[35] Interchange between man and nature, and between man and man, will no longer develop as a process that goes on behind the back of man. It will become a process in which man consciously participates, which he can control and direct for his own benefit. It will thus be a process in which he will recognize himself both as causal agent and as goal.

It is worth noting at this point that alienation and estrangement would be present not just in a capitalist economy but in any developed exchange or market economy.[36] Consider an exchange economy that has not developed to full capitalism. Take the case of simple commodity production, where separate individuals hire no wage laborers, own their own means of production, and produce independently for a market. Alienation from the product, in the process of production, and from the species would all be present here. Impersonal laws of the market would control the products as well as the process of pro-

35. *EPM*, p. 114; *MEW*, supp. 1: 517.

36. In his "Comments on Mill," Marx accuses political economy of misunderstanding the true common life of man. For political economy, exchange is the original, essential, and definitive characteristic of all society. By way of criticizing this position, Marx sketches the development of such an exchange economy. He begins with its simplest and most original form and then moves step by step toward more complex and later forms. He first examines private ownership alone, then exchange as barter, then wage labor, and finally money ("Comments on Mill," pp. 272–75; *MEW*, supp. 1: 451–54). The point that interests us here is that the simplest of exchange economies, even barter, is marked by alienation and estrangement: "Exchange or barter, therefore, is the social generic act, . . . the externalized [*entäusserte*] generic act" ("Comments on Mill," p. 274, also p. 275; *MEW*, supp. 1: 453; 454). Exchange itself, long before wage labor, money, and certainly capitalism, is alienating.

duction (with capitalism and the development of wage labor, of course, estrangement would be intensified). Since the root of estrangement is exchange, the characteristics of exchange that lead to estrangement must be overcome. In 1844 Marx does not think this is possible by simply controlling or modifying exchange. Exchange must be abolished. Man's species essence demands for its realization that all social relations be direct, conscious, and cooperative in a communal sense. The relationship between the person and his product, and between producer and consumer, must be immediate, conscious, and confirming.[37] The worker must actually be able to contemplate himself in his object.

To achieve true objectification, man must neither be dominated by his object—his world, nature, or need—as the animal is, nor be removed from his object so that it is lost to him, as the object is lost in religion. Marx's ideal resembles Hegel's view of ancient Greece, where man was neither subordinate to nature as in the Orient nor removed from it as in Christianity. It is also like Schiller's view, in which man makes nature his object, forms it, so that it no longer rules him as a force; he must control his object so that while he is active he will be able to contemplate. Marx's ideal of labor is opposed to that of the mature Hegel, to man's separation from nature, and to the discipline of culture. Labor driven by abstract compulsion, by need, or by the division of labor, no matter how rational it may seem in essence, is not the ideal. Man produces, ideally for Marx as for Schiller, when free from compulsion.

Work ought to be an enjoyment, an end satisfying in itself.[38] It should not be merely a means to the maintenance of bare existence, a means to an end external to the activity itself. In satisfying human need, labor links men together and develops the species by actualizing its powers and capacities. When this is consciously recognized and purposefully directed, the relationship of the individual to his object (things as well as persons)—even man's very perception of the object—

37. "Comments on Mill," p. 281; *MEW*, supp. 1: 462–63.

38. Cornu points out that Marx's notion of labor as enjoyment was probably influenced by Hess (*Marx et Engels*, 3: 38ff.). See also Hess's article "Kommunistisches Bekenntniss in Fragen und Antworten," in *Moses Hess*, ed. A. Cornu and W. Mönke (Berlin: Akademie, 1961), pp. 359ff. Marx was probably also influenced by Fourier, and his views, of course, are much like those of Schiller.

will, for Marx, be profoundly transformed. The relationship to the object will become one that must be described as aesthetic.

If the life activity of the species—labor—is only a means to an external end, it will be need driven and distorted. Appropriation will be one-sided and grasping; when dominated by need, appropriation makes sense only in terms of possessing, of having. Contemplation would be impossible under these conditions; contemplation must be disinterested, free. The senses must not be caught up in crude practical need: "The care burdened man has no sense of the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value, not the beauty," of the stone.[39] In communist society, man can have a human, a free, contemplative relation to his world. The senses will become theoreticians in their practice;[40] that is, in their activity the senses will contemplate, appreciate, the object as an end in itself. If man is emancipated from activity driven by need, he will be able to overcome this grasping, possessive attitude. If labor gives rise to conscious control of one's world and to the continuing actualization of the species, then the individual, far from finding himself either subordinate to this process or lost in it, will experience in it his own realization and development. His attitude will become one of appreciation, contemplation, of this whole process as an end in itself. Since one is also actively engaged in this process, since one's sensuous and physical activity (one's labor) is bound up with it just as much as one's conscious and intellectual activity (in the form of direction as well as appreciation), this attitude can be called aesthetic much as was the case for Schiller. Contemplation and activity, consciousness and sensuous practice, will be equally in play. As Marx says, man will be able to form things in accordance with the laws of beauty.[41] Labor will be experienced as a fulfillment, an enjoyment.

The object perceived will no longer appear as something foreign. Man contemplates a world he has created. It appears as his own work and reality, as his own powers and capacities actualized, the objectification of his species life. Man faces a world humanized through the

39. *EPM*, p. 141; *MEW*, supp. 1: 542. In the material condition, for Schiller, man was self-seeking; he saw nature as a prey and thus could not appreciate its beauty. He saw it only as a means and not as an end in itself (*Aesth. Ed.*, pp. 171–73; *W*, 20: 388–89).

40. *EPM*, pp. 138–39; *MEW*, supp. 1: 539–40.

41. *EPM*, pp. 113–14; *MEW*, supp. 1: 517.

transformative power of his own labor, a world made in accordance with his own essence. He sees himself in the object, and it confirms and realizes him.[42] The contemplation of oneself in one's object, a concept taken from Feuerbach and Hegel (and which Schiller hints at), makes man's reconciliation with nature complete.[43] The world is humanized much as it was for Hegel's Epic Hero.

Reconciliation has an aesthetic character. In this respect Marx is closer to Schiller than to the rational reconciliation of the mature Hegel. Yet there is a fundamental difference between Marx and Schiller. Marx does not naively think that the aesthetic condition is enough to overcome estranged labor. Practical activity is required; the world must actually be changed. Estranged labor, private property, and exchange must be abolished. The aesthetic condition will not bring about this change; it results from the change.[44]

42. *EPM*, p. 140; *MEW*, supp. 1: 541.

43. For Feuerbach, the subject recognizes himself in the object to which he is essentially related (see *Essence of Christ.*, pp. 4–6, 12–14; *Sämtliche Werke*, 6: 5–6, 15–17). This is a concept that Schiller only hints at when he says that "man is more than a match for any of nature's terrors once he knows how to give it form and convert it into an object of his contemplation. Once he begins to assert his independence in the face of nature as phenomenon, then he also asserts his dignity *vis-à-vis* nature as force, and with noble freedom rises in revolt against his ancient gods. Now they cast off those ghastly masks which were the anguish of his childhood and surprise him with his own image by revealing themselves as projections of his own mind" (*Aesth. Ed.*, p. 185; *W*, 20: 395). Schiller also says that the Greeks "transferred to Olympus what was meant to be realized on earth" (*Aesth. Ed.*, p. 109; *W*, 20: 359). A passage from Hegel's *Aesthetics* explains rather clearly what Marx means by contemplating oneself in the object: "Man . . . has the impulse . . . to produce himself and therein equally to recognize himself. This aim he achieves by altering external things. . . . Man does this in order . . . to strip the external world of its inflexible foreignesss and to enjoy in the shape of things only an external realization of himself. Even a child's first impulse involves this practical alteration of external things; a boy throws stones into the river and now marvels at the circles drawn in the water as an effect in which he gains an intuition of something that is his own doing. This need runs through the most diversiform phenomena up to that mode of self-production in external things which is present in the work of art. . . . The need for this spiritual freedom he satisfies, on the one hand, within by making what is within him explicit to himself, but correspondingly by giving outward reality to this his explicit self, and thus in this duplication of himself by bringing what is in him into sight and knowledge for himself and others" (*Aesth.*, 1: 31–32; *SW*, 12: 57–59). Feuerbach also speaks of aesthetic contemplation (see *Essence of Christ.*, pp. 112–13, 196; *Sämtliche Werke*, 6: 134–35, 237).

44. On this topic see Mészáros, pp. 209ff.

Labor itself, for Marx, ought to be a free manifestation of life, an enjoyment of life.[45] There should be no separation of labor and enjoyment; nor, in these early writings, does one find any suggestion that there should be a separation of work and leisure. Marx finds man's highest satisfaction, enjoyment, and development in work itself—in true species activity. We have a synthesis of activity and contemplation, labor and leisure, work and enjoyment, after the attempted pattern of Schiller, of Hegel's Epic Hero, and of the Greek condition.

II

Specific references to the ideal of ancient Greece are not found as frequently in Marx's writings as in those of Schiller or Hegel. Nevertheless, they do occur. In a letter of 1843, Marx observes:

> Freedom, the feeling of man's dignity, will have to be awakened again in these men. Only this feeling, which disappeared from the world with the Greeks and with Christianity vanished into the blue mist of heaven, can again transform society into a community of men to achieve their highest purposes, a democratic state.[46]

He tells us in the *1844 Manuscripts* that

> the sensuous consciousness of the fetish-worshipper [i.e., the worshipper of precious metals and money] is different from that of the Greek, because his sensuous existence is still different. The abstract enmity between sense and spirit is necessary so long as the human feeling for nature, and therefore also the natural sense of man, are not yet produced by man's own labor.[47]

45. "Comments on Mill," p. 281; *MEW*, supp. 1: 462–63.

46. *WYMPS*, p. 206; *MEW*, 1: 338–39.

47. *EPM*, p. 154; *MEW*, supp. 1: 552–53. We can also find passages where, though Marx does not mention Greece, he does speak of a reconciliation between sense and spirit (see "Reflections of a Youth on Choosing an Occupation," in *WYMPS*, p. 37; *MEW*, supp. 1: 592). Also, Cornu argues that in the dissertation one of Marx's main concerns was to deal with the post-Greek (which was much like the post-Hegelian) separation between philosophy and the world. The problem was to overcome this separation (*Marx et Engels*, 1: 182–87, 201ff.). Also see Lifshitz, pp. 16, 19–21. For a very interesting discussion of this, see A. T. van Leeuwen, *Critique of Heaven* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1972), pp. 25ff., 182ff. See also Marx's dissertation notebooks in *MECW*, 1: 491ff.; *MEW*, supp. 1: 214ff. On Marx's early interest in Greek art, see Lifshitz, pp. 25ff.

And in the *Poverty of Philosophy* Marx quotes Lemontey approvingly:

> We are struck with admiration . . . when we see among the Ancients the same person distinguishing himself to a high degree as philosopher, poet, orator, historian, priest, administrator, general of an army. Our souls are appalled at the sight of so vast a domain. Each one of us plants his hedge and shuts himself up in his enclosure. I do not know whether by the parcellation the field is enlarged, but I do know that man is belittled.[48]

As the third passage suggests, the difference between ancient and modern man is due to the development of specialization and the division of labor. The development of the division of labor was responsible for the decline of the ancient world; and, in general, Marx argues in the *German Ideology*, different forms of society are historically determined by the development of the division of labor.[49] Slavery, for example, developed and was overcome, due not, as the later Hegel often argued, to an advance in consciousness, but due to changes in the organization of production, in the division of labor, and in resulting political conditions.[50]

Although the division of labor did overcome ancient slavery, nevertheless, as it develops, work becomes more and more one-sided and machine-like. The worker is depressed spiritually and physically; he becomes less than a man.[51] At a certain point a division between mental and physical activity occurs: "intellectual and material activity—enjoyment and labor, production and consumption—devolve on different individuals and . . . the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labor."[52]

48. *Poverty of Phil.*, p. 144; *MEW*, 4: 157.

49. Marx argues that the different forms of ownership, i.e., the different forms of society that have occurred, are due to the development of the division of labor. First was tribal ownership, with very little division of labor. Then ancient communal and state ownership, where slavery had developed. There is some private ownership here, but it is subordinate and abnormal. The decline of this world—the Greek world—is caused by an increase in the division of labor and private property. In Rome there is private property to a higher degree. In the medieval period there is a return to a low level of the division of labor, and there is communal ownership (*GI*, pp. 32–37; *MEW*, 3: 22–25).

50. *GI*, pp. 35–37; *MEW*, 3: 24–25.

51. *EPM*, p. 68; *MEW*, supp. 1: 473–74.

52. *GI*, pp. 43–45; *MEW*, 3: 31–33.

The division of labor also gives rise to a contradiction between individual and communal interest, which eventually takes the form of a state standing over against and in opposition to the individual in society.[53]

As was the case for Schiller, the division of labor in the modern world separates classes, separates thought from activity, separates enjoyment from labor, separates private interest from general interest, separates the state from society, restricts laboring activity to a narrow sphere, and makes it mechanical in a way that men do not develop themselves in their work.[54]

Humanized labor requires the overcoming of the division of labor.[55] The division of labor in the form of classes must be totally overcome. The division between mental and physical labor,[56] between the worker and the nonworker, between proletariat and capitalist, must be abolished. When the proletariat takes power it will end wage labor, private property, and classes. On the other hand, the division of labor within the production process will be treated differently. Marx calls for exchangeability of function:

> For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.[57]

This is not to eliminate totally the division of labor as with classes. It is to preserve the division of labor, but to end its bad effects. There will still be differing spheres of activity; jobs will still be divided up. But the individual will no longer be permanently forced into one of

53. Ibid.
54. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 1.
55. *GI*, p. 44; *MEW*, 3: 32.
56. *GI*, p. 43; *MEW*, 3: 31.
57. *GI*, p. 45; *MEW*, 3: 33.

these spheres. He will be able to move around among several, thus allowing greater development of his powers.

Despite the fanciful language of this passage from the *German Ideology,* and the reference to economic activities that predominate in societies at a very low economic level, the general point is that the division of tasks in the factory will remain, but no worker will be chained to one task. Only specialization is abolished. In the *Poverty of Philosophy,* Marx gives a less fanciful description of the exchangeability of function; he says, in quoting Andrew Ure:

"The principle of the factory system then is, to substitute mechanical science for hand skill, and the partition of a process into its essential constituents for the division or gradation of labor among artisans . . . on the automatic plan, skilled labour gets progressively superseded, and will, eventually, be replaced by mere overlookers of machines. . . . a person of common care and capacity may be entrusted with any of the said elementary parts after a short probation, and may be transferred from one to another, on any emergency . . . and when he transfers his services from one machine to another, he varies his tasks, and enlarges his views, by thinking on those general combinations which result from his and his companions' labors. Thus, that cramping of the faculties, that narrowing of the mind, that stunting of the frame, which were ascribed, and not unjustly by moral writers, to the division of labor, cannot, in common circumstances, occur under the equable distribution of industry. . . ."[58]

And Marx himself adds:

What characterizes the division of labor inside modern society is that it engenders specialized functions, specialists, and with them craft idiocy.

"We are struck with admiration," says Lemontey, "when we see among the ancients the same person distinguishing himself to a high degree as philosopher, poet, orator, historian, priest, administrator, general of an army. . . ." What characterizes the division of labour in the automatic workshop is that labour has there completely lost its specialized character. But the moment every special development stops, the need for universality begins to be felt. The automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idiocy.[59]

58. *Poverty of Phil.,* pp. 142–43; *MEW,* 4: 156.

59. *Poverty of Phil.,* p. 144; *MEW,* 4: 157. Engels seems to go a bit further than Marx does: "The division of labor as hitherto known will disappear *entirely.* . . . But when the whole society shall carry on industry in common and according to plan, then men

The point is to end specialization as a means of allowing the individual to move closer to an all-around development of his powers and capacities.

Marx's goal is not, as he shows in an attack on Proudhon's model for overcoming the division of labor, to do away with all division of tasks: "M. Proudhon . . . takes a step backwards and proposes to the worker that he make not only the twelfth part of a pin, but successively all twelve parts of it. . . . And to realize this ideal, he can think of nothing better than to take us back to the journeyman or, at most, to the master craftsman of the Middle Ages."[60] Though there is no return to the craftsman of the Middle Ages (nor to the Epic Hero), the exchangeability of function will make possible the development of that whole individual that Lemontey and Schiller[61] found in the ancient world.

The exchangeability of function would undoubtedly make possible a

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will be needed whose faculties have been developed from every point of view, men able to comprehend the entire system of production. The division of labor which compels one man to be a peasant, another a cobbler, another a factory hand, another a stock market operator, will disappear *completely*. Reeducation will teach the young folk to familiarize themselves quickly with the whole system of production, they will be in a position to pass from one branch of industry to another according to the needs of society or their own inclinations. They will no longer, as today, be one-sided in their development as a result of the division of labor. Thus a communistically organized society will be able to provide opportunities for the all-round cultivation of all-round faculties" ("Principles of Communism," in *Birth of the Communist Manifesto*, ed. D. J. Struik [New York: International, 1971], p. 184; *MEW*, 4: 375–76. Emphasis mine.). What does Engels mean when he says that the division of labor will disappear entirely, completely? Is he suggesting that more than just specialization is to be overcome?

60. *Poverty of Phil.*, p. 144; *MEW*, 4: 157. Marx does not suggest that groups of workers might complete the entire product and still maintain the same level of efficiency, thus actually overcoming, to some degree, the division of labor. Instead, Marx's model is the exchangeability of function.

61. Schiller, too, wanted to end class division of labor and to have exchangeability of function within the work process (see above, Chap. 1, Sec. 3). The ability to change jobs frequently would require a great deal of education. Schiller's view seemed to be that an aesthetic education would be acquired by the noble man, at least in the beginning, in leisure. When he returned to his work he would be able to transform it (see above, Chap. 1, n. 59). Marx would not be willing to accept this much of a separation between labor and leisure. The tenth demand (at the end of sec. 2) of the *Communist Manifesto* suggests that education—technical education I suspect—would be combined with work rather than separated from it (*Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 112; *MEW*, 4: 482).

greater development of the powers and capacities of the individual. It would even make room for both physical and mental development, but does this necessarily lead to the unification of labor and enjoyment? The overlooker of machines certainly has a broader view of the whole. He can move from job to job; he will develop himself. But will this sort of labor necessarily be enjoyable? It is not obvious how it would be. In a passage from the *German Ideology*, after a discussion of labor as enjoyment,[62] Marx offers the following:

> It was not their view, as Sancho imagines, that each should do the work of Raphael, but that anyone in whom there is a potential Raphael should be able to develop without hindrance. . . . The exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of division of labour; . . . with a communist organization of society, there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the artist, to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc., the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities.[63]

This quotation very nicely points out the goals of communist society. It is not assumed that all will become Raphaels; it is simply that society will ensure such conditions that each will be able to develop to the fullest whatever capacities he may have. There is also something else interesting (and quite problematic) in this section of the *German Ideology*. We are easily able to imagine a unification between the fullest development the individual is capable of and activity as enjoyment, but one suspects that this unification is so easily imaginable simply because the activity described in this passage is creative in an artistic sense. We are thus encouraged to wonder if the model for humanized labor is that of the artist. Marx does speak of the labor of the medieval artisan as partially artistic.[64]

I am not suggesting that the individual's creativity, alone and of itself, could humanize work. Marx says that the artistic and engaging

62. *GI*, pp. 439–40; *MEW*, 3: 375–76. See also *GI*, p. 238; *MEW*, 3: 199.
63. *GI*, pp. 441–43; *MEW*, 3: 377–79.
64. *GI*, p. 68; *MEW*, 3: 52. See also *Grundrisse*, p. 612; *GKPO*, p. 505.

character of the medieval artisan's work, in fact, increased its slavishness. The medieval artisan was incapable of the indifference to his work that characterizes the modern laborer.[65] To make basically oppressive work engaging only increases the worker's slavery. If artistic engagement is to be liberating, the work must already have been transformed. The worker must already be self-determined; he must be in control of his product, his own labor, and the production process. Given these presuppositions, we can go on to ask what transforms labor into enjoyment.

The question before us is how all activity, all labor, can be made enjoyable. Could all tasks in the factory be reorganized in such a way that they became artistically creative, even if they did not result in the creation of art objects? This is not likely. Could enjoyment, then, depend upon one's own creative potential, rather than on the character of the work itself? But all individuals are not equally creative. Will those who are not potential Raphaels find enjoyment in their work?

At least in certain passages of the *1844 Manuscripts* the model seemed to be very different. It seemed to be based upon the spectator or appreciator of beauty rather than upon the artist. One would not need to possess artistic capacities, nor would one need to find the work itself artistically creative, in order to achieve the aesthetic condition. To contemplate oneself in the object, one need only be actively engaged in one's work so that it and the product are under control; one must not be driven by need in such a way that one is related possessively to the object; and the work must directly develop the individual as well as the species. In other words, labor must be self-determined; beyond this, one's mental and physical capacities must be active and in harmony.[66]

If work were artistically creative, then it would be quite clear that it would be enjoyable as an end in itself. But it seems utterly fantastic to expect all labor to be transformed into artistically creative activity, even if we were to return to the individual (but liberated) labor of

65. *GI*, p. 68; *MEW*, 3: 52.

66. The aesthetics of Schiller and Hegel, which we have considered, were based primarily upon the appreciator model. In large part, so was Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. Schelling's aesthetic theory, on the other hand, was based upon the creative-artist model (see *System of Transcendental Idealism*, esp. pp. 365ff.; *Werke*, 2: 616ff.).

the medieval artisan or to the Epic Hero. On the other hand, the appreciation model, while perhaps not quite as fantastic, still presents difficulties. Like the creative-artist model, it is not intended as the means to transform the character of labor involved in production, but rather presupposes for its very possibility self-determined labor. Can we believe that all such labor can further be made enjoyable as an end in itself, that in all or almost all cases physical and intellectual capacities will be in harmony? It does not seem so. The very notion of exchangeability of function is at odds with this. It implies that not all jobs will be developing, let alone enjoyable. A given series of jobs can become developing. Is this enough to make them enjoyable? Can we develop an aesthetic relation to our world in some small part of the work we do, or perhaps outside of work, which attitude we then carry back with us to that work that is not intrinsically enjoyable? This would be to slip back toward the aesthetic-education model, toward Schiller's noble man. Instead, enjoyment must arise out of the specific task itself. The worker will objectify himself in his object in the very way in which he is active during labor.[67]

Suppose that human beings have the following relation to their world. They understand that the world is the result, the objectification, of their own labor; they find themselves in control of it, confirmed by it, nonpossessively related to it; and they derive from this a real satisfaction. Yet at the same time they find labor, while not at all oppressive or inhuman, something of a sacrifice. Perhaps the feeling of satisfaction outweighs the sacrifice and even carries over, to a certain extent, into the labor process. A perfected society could well be conceived in this way; in fact, I will argue that Marx himself comes to do so in the *Grundrisse*. Nevertheless this model is quite different from the one we find in the *1844 Manuscripts*, where enjoyment and an aesthetic relation to the object must arise out of the labor of material production itself.

Many activities, or at least series of them, may well be developing due to exchangeability of function, yet not intrinsically enjoyable. Enjoyment, whether on the creative artist model or on the appreciator model, seems to be a big step beyond the exchangeability of function and would require extended explanation dealing especially with the transformation of technical details of work.

67. "Comments on Mill," pp. 281–82; *MEW*, supp. 1: 463.

In the passage quoted above, Marx suggests that in communist society there will be no painters, but only people who engage in painting among other activities. We are led to wonder whether most of these activities will be pursued during labor time, as part of the sphere of material production, or whether some or most will be pursued only in leisure time. If communist society were able to reconcile development and enjoyment, could it do so within labor? These are difficulties Marx gave further thought to at a later point.

István Mészáros suggests that there are three aspects to Marx's notion of freedom: man's freedom from natural necessity, man's freedom in relation to other men, and the freedom of man to realize all of his essential powers.[68]

Absolutely central to each of these is the concept of unalienated labor. Man achieves the first form of freedom through his productive activity; he works upon nature, subordinates it to his own purpose, controls it, and turns it to the satisfaction of his needs. This progressively breaks his bondage to nature. Next, man must be concerned with how the results of the first form of freedom are distributed among men. The laborer must remain in control of his object. If it belongs to another or to an abstract realm, there is a loss of freedom. With this sort of alienation, at the same time that the worker gains mastery over nature he falls under the mastery of other men and the market. Exchange and class division of labor must be abolished. Work must be self-determined toward a universal end, by and for the species. So far, this is a rational, or Kantian, sort of freedom—self-determination through the subordination of nature to human will consciously directed to a universal end. If this has been accomplished, then, Marx thinks, the third dimension of freedom is possible. Man can begin to develop all of his essential powers. This is expressed in the concept of the exchangeability of function and of labor as an enjoyable and fulfilling activity, an activity that leads to the unfolding of all the powers of the individual. With man in control of his object and of his own activity, he can be related to these as ends in themselves. He can begin to appreciate the beauty of the object. This is an aesthetic model, aesthetic freedom of the Schillerian sort. If we compare to

68. *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, pp. 153–54.

this schema the views that Hegel and Schiller held of the modern world or of future society, we notice that Schiller's views, with the exception that he does not reject exchange, are in rough agreement with all three of these aspects, while the mature Hegel would agree with the first, definitely not the second, and, as I have argued, fails to realize the third.

III

Let us now consider Marx's view of the state. Before the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and "On the Jewish Question," Marx did not hold the view that there existed a radical opposition between civil society and the political state that had to be overcome. His goal in 1842 was very close to the Hegelian state, the very state, which in 1843, he would reject.[69] In 1842 Marx observes that "even the state educates its members by making them take part in the state, by transforming the aims of the individual into universal aims, by transforming raw impulse into ethical inclination, by transforming natural independence into spiritual freedom, and by the individual finding his satisfaction in the life of the whole and the whole in the life of the individual."[70] Here, as with Hegel's state of the *Philosophy of Right* and Schiller's monarchical state of "On Grace and Dignity," there is agreement between duty and inclination, between citizen and state,

69. Cornu also argues that Marx's early notion of the state is Hegelian (*Marx et Engels*, 2: 17, 74, 340). Hess also points this out: "The young Hegelians, paradoxical as it may sound, continue to be enmeshed in the theological consciousness; for although they have renounced the Hegelian 'Absolute Spirit' . . . they nevertheless continue to set up the universal or 'State' against the individual" ("The Philosophy of the Act," in *Socialist Thought*, ed. A. Fried and R. Sanders [Garden City: Anchor, 1964], p. 264; for the German, *Moses Hess*, p. 219). The 1843 notion of overcoming the split between state and society was influenced by Hess. However, in 1842 Marx specifically rejected this criticism by Hess (see "The Centralization Question," in *WYMPS*, pp. 106–8; *MEW*, supp. 1: 379–80). Engels also points out that Saint-Simon had talked about the abolition of the state (*Anti-Dühring*, trans. E. Burns [New York: International, 1939], p. 283; *MEW*, 20: 241).

70. "The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*," in *WYMPS*, p. 120; *MEW*, 1: 95.

but it is the state that determines the citizen and not the citizens the state. This is the rational state. According to Marx, modern philosophy "considers the state as the great organism in which legal, ethical, and political freedom has to be actualized and in which the individual citizen simply obeys the natural laws of his own reason, human reason, in the laws of the state."[71]

Marx begins with a state much like Hegel's but moves toward a state more like the later Schiller's. In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* Marx says that only in democracy do we have the self-determination of the people. In democracy the citizen is no longer related to the state as an accident to its substance, as in Hegel's rational state. The citizen no longer finds his essence separated from him and lost to him at the abstract level of the political state. In democracy essence and existence have been reconciled. Essence is returned to its actual ground, to actual man. The constitution is the people's own work, the free product of their activity. The realization of one's essence is found in and through this very activity. The state appears as the objectification of man, much as for Schiller.[72]

In democracy, the formal principle (the governing or forming element) is the same as the material principle (the formed element, the people).[73] Universal and particular interest are reconciled as they were in the ancient world: "As in Greece, the *res publica* was the real private concern, and the private man was slave, that is, the political state as political was the true and sole content of the citizen's life and will. . . ."[74] As Schiller said of the ancient state, the spontaneous free

71. "Leading Article," p. 130; *MEW,* 1: 104. At this point, Marx is not even especially opposed to monarchy (see "Marginal Notes to Accusation of Ministerial Rescript," in *MECW,* 1: 363; *MEW,* supp. 1: 422).

72. *CHPR,* pp. 29–30; *MEW,* 1: 230–31. Also see above, Chap. 1, Sec. 4.

73. *CHPR,* p. 30; *MEW,* 1: 231.

74. *CHPR,* p. 32, *MEW,* 1: 234. Axelos argues that we must be able to conceive an original unalienated condition that we have become alienated from (*Alienation, Praxis, and Technē,* pp. 217–18). There is a problem here in that for Marx there never was a time when men were not alienated (ibid., pp. 130, 217). But Marx does not discuss alienation in this way, nor need he. Alienation does not refer to an aloneness, a strangeness, a loss of an original condition. Instead, one's action results in an abstract independent reality that comes to dominate one. One loses control or freedom. All that is needed is a concept of freedom, not a concept of an original unalienated condition. On the other hand, for Marx, not all forms of alienation were present in all past periods. There was no political alienation for the citizen of the Greek *polis,* and where

participation of the citizens determined the form of the whole. As Hegel put it, the state in the ancient world appeared as the product of the citizen's own energies. Marx's perfected state overcomes the opposition between man and state, overcomes the opposition between public and private interest, through democracy, the self-determination of the people. The constitution appears as the free product of man. The citizens determine the whole. This is not the rational but the aesthetic state. Its goal is to regain the substantial unity of the ancient Greek state.

Exactly how is the opposition between man and the state to be overcome? Marx deals with this in a complicated and ambiguous discussion of representation and voting. The issue turns upon how the individual member of civil society might be related to the political state. Do all individuals take a direct part in decision making or do they do so through representatives?

The demand that all individuals should share in deciding matters of general concern arises, Marx says, from the fact that civil society is separated from the political state. Thus the drive of all to participate in the legislature is the drive to actualize one's political existence.[75] It is understandable that all would want to participate in the legislature. Nevertheless, that is impossible, because "civil society would abandon itself as such if all members were legislators; on the other hand, the political state which stands over against it can tolerate it only if it has a form suitable to the standards of the state."[76]

What about the case in which civil society is no longer separated from the political state; should all be legislators there? The answer is no. Marx says that it would be "nonsense to make a claim which has resulted precisely from a notion of the political state as an existent separated from civil society. . . ."[77] This claim disappears, it seems, as soon as civil society and the political state are no longer separated. What occurs then?

> In this situation, legislative power altogether loses the meaning of representative power. Here the legislature is a representation in the same sense in

there has been no market, there has been no alienation in exchange. These periods can serve as models of disalienation, if such models are needed.

75. *CHPR*, p. 118; *MEW*, 1: 323–24.

76. *CHPR*, p. 119; *MEW*, 1: 325.

77. Ibid.

which every function is representative. For example, the shoemaker is my representative in so far as he fulfills a social need, just as every definite social activity, because it is a species-activity, represents the species: that is to say, it represents a determination of my own essence the way every man is the representative of the other. Here, he is representative not by virtue of something other than himself which he represents, but by virtue of what he is and does.[78]

What does this mean? When Marx says that "legislative power altogether loses the meaning of representative power," is he saying that there are no longer to be either representatives or a legislature, or is he saying that there is to be a different sort of legislature that represents differently?

There seem to be three possible relationships. First, civil society and the state could be opposed, and thus the legislature would stand over society. This possibility is obviously being rejected. Second, there could be a legislating, or governing, body of some sort that did not stand over society; this body would represent the citizens much differently than would an ordinary legislature. It would represent them in the sense of performing a direct and specialized function just like any craftsman, and like the craftsman it would serve the citizen rather than control him. This would be much like the relationship that Rousseau advocated between the sovereign and the government.[79] Third, there might not be any specialized governing body at all. All individuals as individuals would simply decide general concerns in their everyday life—this is the anarchist view. The last two of these possibilities both require that the opposition between state and society be overcome, but in different ways. The third possibility would do away with *any* form of state, or governing body. The second would only do away with the *political* state—a small body standing above and dominating society.

Marx is not clear as to which of these last two possibilities he prefers.

It is not a question of whether civil society should exercise legislative power through deputies or through all as individuals. Rather, it is a question of the

78. *CHPR*, pp. 119–20; *MEW*, 1: 325.

79. J.-J. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950), pp. 54–55; for the French, *The Political Writings of J.-J. Rousseau*, ed. C. E. Vaughan, 2 vols. (New York: Wiley, 1962), 2: 64–65.

extension and greatest possible universalization of voting. . . . The vote is the actual relation of actual civil society to the civil society of the legislature, to the representative element. In other words, the vote is the immediate, the direct, the existing and not simply imagined relation of civil society to the political state. It therefore goes without saying that the vote is the chief political interest of actual civil society. In unrestricted suffrage, both active and passive, civil society has actually raised itself for the first time to an abstraction of itself, to political existence. But the full achievement of this abstraction is at once also the transcendence of the abstraction. In actually establishing its political existence as true existence civil society has simultaneously established its civil existence, in distinction from its political existence as inessential. And with the one separated the other, its opposite, falls. Within the abstract political state the reform of voting advances the dissolution of this political state, but also the dissolution of civil society.[80]

In one part of this quotation the goal seems to be unrestricted voting for representatives in the legislature. Here Marx seems to assume that there is a governing body. But in the first few lines Marx seems to leave open the question of whether decisions ought to be made by all or by deputies. It is only the universalization of voting that matters. In talking of Hegel's state two pages later, Marx notes that "this conclusion could only be drawn if the electors had the option of deliberating and deciding themselves about public affairs or of delegating definite individuals to discharge these things. . . ."[81] Here again there are two possibilities. But then Marx seems to suggest that the relationship between the voter and his deputy should be a direct mandate: "The separation of the political state from civil society appears as the separation of the deputies from their mandators."[82] And he complains that, for Hegel, "the deputies are supposed to be something other than agents with a direct commission or specific instructions. . . ."[83]

It is not clear exactly how the individual is to be raised to political existence. That this is the goal and that it requires a universalization of voting, however, is clear.

In "On the Jewish Question" Marx says that the political state represents man's species life, his communal life.[84] This is the realm in

80. *CHPR*, pp. 120–21; *MEW*, 1: 326–27.
81. *CHPR*, p. 123; *MEW*, 1: 328.
82. *CHPR*, p. 123, *MEW*, 1: 329.
83. *CHPR*, p. 122; *MEW*, 1: 328.
84. "Jewish Question," p. 225; *MEW*, 1: 354–55.

which man deals with the universal concerns and goals of the whole, of the species. The political state (as for Schiller)[85] is the expression of what men should be like, of their essence. But in the modern state this realm is abstract and unrealized; it is only imaginary.[86] On the other hand, man in civil society—actual man in his sensuous, individual, and material existence—is fragmented and isolated. His concerns are not for the whole, the universal, but only for the particular:[87] "Only when the actual, individual man has taken back into himself the abstract citizen and in his everyday life, his individual work, and his individual relationships has become a species-being, only when he has recognized and organized his own powers as social powers so that social force is no longer separated from him as political power, only then is human emancipation complete."[88] Marx is much closer to Schiller than to Hegel when he says that man must determine his powers as social powers so that social force is no longer separated from him as political power. As Hook points out, the state for Hegel is primary, the condition; society is secondary, the conditioned.[89] This is not true for Schiller or Marx. For Schiller the state grows out of, and is conditioned by, society. Society, as division of labor developed, brought about a change in the state; when individuals in society become whole again, overcome the effects of the division of labor, the state will again be changed.[90] Marx, too, makes it clear in the above quotation that power is conceived of as belonging to individuals in society. Part of this power can become separated from them, or they can bring this power together into a unity and then find a wholeness and freedom in their everyday life. Changes at the level of society, at the level of concrete individuals, make for changes at the level of the state.

As Marx's political views develop, he comes to propose a two-stage transition from the existing estranged state to the ultimate overcoming of estrangement between state and society, to what Engels later called the "withering away" of the state. Stage 1, the transitional stage, Marx

85. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 4.
86. "Jewish Question," pp. 225–26; *MEW*, 1: 355.
87. "Jewish Question," pp. 227, 239; *MEW*, 1: 356, 368–69.
88. "Jewish Question," p. 241; *MEW*, 1: 370.
89. *From Hegel to Marx*, p. 21.
90. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 4.

called the dictatorship of the proletariat—it has also been called the socialist stage. Stage 2 is full communism, the state having withered away. Although this distinction is made most clearly many years later in the *Critique of the Gotha Program,* of 1875,[91] it can already be found, if one reads carefully, in the *Communist Manifesto.*[92]

What interests us here is that the relationship between state and society, and thus the extent to which estrangement between state and society would be overcome, is not the same in both stages. Stage 1, the society described by the ten demands at the end of Section 2 of the *Manifesto,* is clearly an exchange economy, though a controlled or modified one. There is still an income tax; there would obviously then be incomes to tax and commodities to exchange income for. There are also rents to be paid on land.[93] As I have tried to show, in Marx's earlier writings exchange necessarily implied alienation and estrangement.[94] To overcome estrangement, the abolition of exchange was required.

In light of the society described by the ten demands, we are encouraged to wonder whether the restriction or control of exchange would reduce alienation and estrangement. In the *Poverty of Philosophy,* Marx says that in early periods of history one can find societies with limited means of production and exchange within very restricted bounds. Here, we might speculate, before exchange has had a chance to develop, its consequences might not be so harmful. Let us suppose that alienation and estrangement would be much reduced. Would it be possible to pattern socialist society after this model? Marx, it seems, would say no. Large-scale industry that has developed in the modern world together with individual exchange, he says, produces misery. Since it would be impossible and utopian to return to a condition of limited means of production, the only other solution for the modern world is to keep the present productive forces but eliminate exchange.[95] If one wants to end alienation and estrangement, then developed productive forces are incompatible with exchange.

Nevertheless, what we have in the *Manifesto* is a controlled exchange

91. Ed. C. P. Dutt (New York: International, 1938), pp. 8–10; *MEW,* 19: 19–21.
92. *Birth of the Manifesto,* pp. 111–12; *MEW,* 4: 481–82.
93. *Birth of the Manifesto,* p. 111; *MEW,* 4: 481.
94. See above, Sec. 1 and n. 36 of this chapter.
95. *Poverty of Phil.,* p. 68; *MEW,* 4: 97–98.

economy. Is there, then, alienation and estrangement in this transitional society? There is. This program could not be "effected except by despotic inroads" on the conditions of bourgeois production. There would be a state, the proletariat organized as the ruling class. This state would have an exclusive monopoly on credit and capital. Communication and transportation as well as any extension of factories and instruments of production would be centralized in the hands of the state.[96] The state would stand over society; it would be in a despotic and hostile relationship to it. The state would have a political character; it would be the organized power of one class for oppressing another class.[97] Certainly the goals this state pursues would be more humanitarian and desirable than those of the capitalist state it replaces. Nevertheless, only at a later period, Stage 2, when "class distinctions have disappeared and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation," will "the public power lose its political character,"[98] its hostile, dominating, class character. This regulation from above would be necessary, it seems, as long as classes and individual exchange continue.

What specifically is the cause of this estrangement? Is it that to control exchange and the sort of estrangement produced by the market we need a powerful state, and that in reducing economic estrangement we end up with political estrangement? In the early writings there is no evidence that Marx thinks that alienation in exchange can be reduced or overcome short of abolishing exchange. There is both economic and political estrangement in Stage 1. A powerful state is required due to the resistance of society, the tendency of the market, and the continuing pressure of class interest to reestablish capitalism.

Two years earlier, in the *German Ideology*, Marx himself admitted that there would be estrangement as the proletariat first came to power.

> Further, it follows that every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself, must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as

96. *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 111; *MEW*, 4: 481.
97. *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 112; *MEW*, 4: 482.
98. Ibid.

the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do. Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal interest . . . the latter will be imposed upon them as an interest "alien" to them, and "independent" of them, as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general" interest. . . . On the other hand, too, the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention necessary through the illusory "general interest" in the form of the state. The social power . . . appears to these individuals . . . as an alien force. . . . This "estrangement" . . . can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises.[99]

The overcoming of the estrangement of state from society must wait for its realization until Stage 2.

IV

There are scholars who hold that in and after the *German Ideology* Marx ceased to employ the concepts of alienation and estrangement.[100] It has been said that Marx rejects or dissociates himself from the notion of estrangement when he writes that "this *'estrangement'* (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises."[101]

In the *Manifesto's* attack on "True Socialism," Marx also says, "It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic Saints over the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German *literati* reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance beneath the French criticism of economic functions of money, they wrote 'alienation of Humanity'. . . ."[102]

But the quotation from the *German Ideology* speaks, in fact, of abolishing estrangement, and just a page before this passage Marx employs

99. *GI*, p. 46; *MEW*, 3: 34.

100. See Mönke, pp. 118, 123. See also Hook, pp. 5ff. Also D. Bell, "The Meaning of Alienation—II," *Thought* 11 (Sept. 26, 1959): 12. Also L. S. Feuer, *Marx and the Intellectuals* (Garden City: Anchor, 1969), pp. 4, 73, 84.

101. *GI*, p. 46; *MEW*, 3: 34. See also *GI*, p. 86; *MEW*, 3; 69.

102. *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 117; *MEW*, 4: 486.

the concept of estrangement though not the term.[103] We can also find passages, later in the *German Ideology*, where Marx employs both the concept and the term.[104] In one passage Marx distinguishes between an acceptable and an unacceptable use of estrangement: "Hence (instead) of the task of presenting (actual) individuals in their (actual) alienation [*Entfremdung*] and in the empirical conditions of the alienation [*Entfremdung*], we are here confronted [by Stirner] with the (substitution) of the (mere idea) of alienation [*Entfremdung*], of the Alien, of the Holy. . . ."[105] The rejection of the concept of estrangement can mean only the rejection of estrangement as it was used by people like Stirner and the True Socialists, estrangement understood idealistically. As we shall see in the next chapter, Marx continues in the writings after the *German Ideology* to speak of estrangement in an actual or empirical context.

What Marx does reject in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and in the *German Ideology* is the concept of human essence as species-being. "To view the essence of man merely as 'species', as the inner dumb generality which unites the many individuals naturally," is now unacceptable for Marx. "The essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships."[106] Also, the "sum of productive forces . . . and social forms of intercourse . . . is the real basis of what philosophers have conceived as 'substance' and 'essence' of man."[107] There is no such thing as a human essence; there are only social relationships and social activity. Again Marx says, "Men can be distinguished from animals

103. *GI*, pp. 44–45; *MEW*, 3: 33–34.

104. *GI*, p. 270; *MEW*, 3: 227.

105. *GI*, p. 310; *MEW*, 3: 262–63. See also *GI*, p. 324; *MEW*, 3: 275.

106. "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 402; *MEW*, 3: 6.

107. *GI*, p. 51; *MEW*, 3: 38. In defending the view that the later Marx retains the concept of a historically determined human essence, Fromm argues that in the quote from the "Theses on Feuerbach" Marx does not say that "there is no human nature," but only that the "essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual" (*Marx's Concept of Man*, p. 78). But Marx is clearly rejecting the concept of human essence as species-being in this quote. In the related quote from the *German Ideology* Marx does not appear to equate human essence with "the ensemble of social relationships" as in the quote from the "Theses." He seems to be saying that what philosophers have understood as human essence should instead be understood as the sum of productive forces. This quote can more easily be read as a denial of human essence (see also n. 109 of this chapter).

by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like." In other words, distinguishing characteristics of this type—which traditionally have pretended to identify the human essence and which Marx himself employed in the *1844 Manuscripts*—are irrelevant. Instead, men "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence."[108] The distinguishing characteristic of human beings is a certain form of socioeconomic activity.

This does represent a fundamental change. If the concept of human essence as species-being has been dropped, then we can no longer speak of alienation from the species, which was, after all, the central form of alienation in the *1844 Manuscripts*. We can no longer speak of a purposive goal, a norm, from which species development has been cut off. It can no longer be argued that existing conditions are out of accord with human essence. Social theory can no longer take the form of arguing for an end to obstacles that frustrate the development of true species life.[109]

108. *GI*, p. 31; *MEW*, 3: 21. See also *GI*, p. 259; *MEW*, 3: 217–18. See also Mönke, p. 105.

109. Some scholars deny that Marx rejects the concept of a human essence. They often argue that Marx rejects only the notion of an asocial, static, or abstract human essence, but not an essence understood as historically conditioned and changing (see Fromm, pp. 24–25; also, M. Evans, *Karl Marx* [Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1975], p. 94). They often cite the following passage from *Capital:* "To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch" (*Capital*, 1: 609n.; *MEW*, 23: 636–37n. See also *Capital*, 3: 820; *MEW*, 25: 828). We must distinguish between the concept 'human nature' and the concept 'human essence as species-being'. 'Human nature' can imply as little as that certain general attitudes, certain needs, patterns of behavior, and so on, characterize humans. These may well change historically. None of this implies a philosophical conception of 'human essence as species-being'. The latter concept commits one to the notion that there is a norm or end (not, of course, a static one) that the human species must realize. Existing conditions must be transformed to accord with human essence (see above, Sec. 1 of this chapter). This latter view is not suggested in the passages from *Capital* and indeed is never suggested in the later writings; whereas it certainly was in 1844. O'Malley, on the other hand, distinguishes between two aspects of Marx's notion of human nature. First, human nature is understood as man's mode of life, which undergoes transformation historically as man's production and social organization are transformed. This, I would call 'human nature'. Second, as in Aristotle, human nature implies an orienting of human activity. This is explained by the development of new

On the other hand, estrangement from the product, in the process of production, in exchange, and of the state from society still remain meaningful concepts. Without referring to essence, or without arguing that alienation from the species is produced, alienation and estrangement simply mean domination by an abstract, impersonal, and mechanical power, which resulted originally from human activity, which is now beyond the control of human beings, and which has become independent and objective. We will see a very clear example of this in Chapter 1 of *Capital,* the fetishism of commodities.

If the concept of species-being has been dropped, there no longer exists an end that determines the direction of human development. What, then, leads us to socialism? Why not any other form of social organization? The new doctrine of historical materialism, I suggest, serves this purpose. To explain historical materialism thoroughly would require a book in itself and would take us far from our theme. Suffice it to say that we are led to socialism because contradictions arise in capitalist society between the forces and the relations of production, contradictions that can be overcome, Marx argues, only by a transition to socialism. These contradictions give rise to a polarization of classes and an impoverishment of the proletariat. This development will thrust the proletariat toward revolution.[110] The transition to socialism is no longer founded upon a basically moral argument—the concept of alienation from one's essence and the need to transform existence in order to realize one's essence. Instead, this necessity is discovered through a scientific, socioeconomic investigation. A social contradiction, whose only solution is socialism, is found as an objective fact growing out of the dynamic of existing material forces.

We might also ask why this factual dynamic would necessarily lead to a form of society that would be more desirable, more valued. This

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needs through production and by man's tendency toward true human life understood as species-being (see J. O'Malley, "History and Man's Nature," *Review of Politics* 28 (1966): 508–27). This second form includes the concept 'human essence as species-being'. In my view Marx retains all of this—except the concept of species-being—in his later writings. Human nature, as mode of life transformed by changes in material conditions, and man's orientation, brought about by the development of needs, remain and are bolstered not by the concept of species-being but by the doctrine of historical materialism.

110. *GI,* pp. 46–47; *MEW,* 3: 34–35. See also Marx, *Critique of Political Economy,* ed. M. Dobb (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), pp. 20–21; *MEW,* 13: 8–9.

is due, Marx argues, to the fact that these same contradictions drive social organization toward increasing complexity, universality, and interdependence. They themselves thus require developed, and thus enriched, individuals with the ability consciously and cooperatively, and therefore freely, to control this social organization.[111]

111. *GI*, pp. 84–85; *MEW*, 3: 67–68. In arguing that Marx does not fully abandon his early conception of human nature, Evans suggests that the later Marx needs a "normative conception of human personality and its capacities not given in experience" in order for alienation to be seen as a problem at all (*Karl Marx*, pp. 95, 107–8). Marx does not need this. For alienation to make sense Marx needs only a conception of human freedom (see n. 74 of this chapter), not a concept of human essence as species-being. The doctrine of historical materialism is capable of explaining the necessity and direction of human development. Nevertheless, there is something to what Evans says. I will argue that Marx does slip back to this moral ideal, though his method should not permit it (see below, Chap. 4, Sec. 3). As Evans develops this argument, he finally claims only that one can draw moral implications from the economic views of the later Marx (pp. 107–8). This is quite a different claim. The question is whether or not Marx's views must rely on a moral argument. This has not been shown. The unfolding of human powers and capacities and the ultimate freedom of a communist society may well be seen as morally desirable even by Marx. This does not mean that a moral argument, or an argument based on human essence, is necessary to explain how to achieve this goal. Marx argues that the given socioeconomic organization will give rise to needs and wants that at a certain point it will no longer be able to satisfy. A new, rationally directed society will be necessary to meet these needs and desires and to handle their further development. Certainly needs and desires can be understood without the philosophical or moral concept of human essence as species-being—or Marx at least thinks so. But at times he seems to slip back to this notion (see below, Chap. 4, Sec. 3).

IV

Marx (1849–83)

IN THIS CHAPTER I will argue that Marx shifts his position on several of the issues we have been investigating. Most importantly he alters his views concerning the possibility of overcoming alienation in the process of production, and he changes his mind concerning the way in which alienation in exchange can be overcome. Consequently, he modifies the very optimistic position he held in 1844 concerning humanized labor. On the other hand, he works out some of the problems connected with his view of the socialist state, though other problems develop. If we were able to say that before 1848 Marx's views were closer to Schiller and to the ancient Greek condition than to the mature Hegel, we can say that after 1848 he is in many respects closer to the mature Hegel than to Schiller.

In Marx's earlier writings, his conception of alienation and estrangement developed in the following way. He first accepted Feuerbach's account of religion. Man alienates himself from himself, projects his essence onto God, who then stands as an estranged reality against man. Then Marx extended these concepts into the political sphere. The state, the realm of man's true communal being, his species essence, like heaven, appeared as the result of an alienation on the part of man in civil society. Once this alienation had taken place, the state came to be estranged; it stood over and dominated civil society as an independent and hostile power.[1] Next, Marx extended this Feuerbachian notion even further, into the realm of exchange and money,

1. This occurred in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and in "On the Jewish Question."

in his "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*." As in religion, here again in exchange, we find an estranged realm of things, a market, above and beyond man. This notion was enriched in the *1844 Manuscripts,* where Marx discussed in greater detail the relationship between the worker and his product. The world of products, nature transformed through labor, like the religious realm, came to be separated from man and to dominate him.[2] Finally, along with this last element, Marx spoke of alienation in the process of production. The worker's life activity was not enjoyable or developing; his activity was not an end in itself, but merely the means to gain a wage and to provide for bare existence. All of these forms that alienation and estrangement took also resulted in an estrangement from the species.

Human freedom required the overcoming of alienation and estrangement. First, through his own labor man had to control the natural world. Second, he had to do this within a social organization that did not result in domination by other men or by a market. He had to produce consciously, purposefully, and collectively for the species. Third, given these conditions, he would be able, within labor itself, to achieve his fullest actualization, development, and enjoyment as well as a free aesthetic relationship to his object.

In the *German Ideology* the concept of human essence as species-being was dropped. The other forms of alienation and estrangement remained, but were no longer understood as producing estrangement from one's essence or estrangement from the species.

After 1848 Marx modifies his views concerning the third and highest dimension of freedom. We will first take up his change concerning the degree to which human actualization and the overcoming of alienation are possible within the process of production. Later, in conjunction with his theory of the socialist state we will consider his different treatment of the way in which alienation in exchange can be overcome.

I

In the writings after the *German Ideology*, though species-being has been dropped,[3] the concepts of alienation and estrangement are still

2. Here I am pointing out how the general development of alienation and estrangement follows Feuerbach. Marx was also deeply influenced by Hegel, as I argued in the last chapter.

3. Marx does once in a while use the term "species-being" in later writings, but its earlier signficance is never mentioned (see, for example, *G,* pp. 243, 496; *GKPO,* pp. 154, 395.

to be found, and they still retain the core of their earlier meaning. In some places only the concepts appear; in other places we find both the concepts and the terms. This is the case in the *Grundrisse,* in the *Critique of Political Economy,* and in *Capital.*[4] But let us focus specifically upon alienation in the process of production.

In *Wage-Labor and Capital,* Marx describes alienation and estrangement in the process of production without using the terms.

> His life-activity, therefore, is but a means of securing his own existence. He works that he may keep alive. He does not count the labour itself as a part of his life; it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity that he has auctioned off to another. The product of his activity, therefore, is not the aim of his activity. . . . Life for him begins where this activity ceases, at the table, at the tavern seat, in bed. The twelve hours' work, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, boring, and so on, but only as earnings, which enable him to sit down at a table, to take his seat in the tavern, and to lie down in a bed.[5]

In *Capital* we find both the concept and the term.

> All means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they distort the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour-process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut.[6]

There are also extended sections of *Capital* where Marx, usually without using the term, discusses alienation in the process of production. His description of the capitalist's appropriation of surplus

4. *G,* pp. 162, 307, 454, 462–63, 541–42, 831–32; *GKPO,* pp. 79–80, 214, 358, 366–67, 440, 715–16. Also, *CPE,* pp. 42–43; *MEW,* 13: 29–30. See also *Capital,* 1: 432; *MEW,* 23: 455. Also *Capital,* 3: 85–86, 264, 824; *MEW,* 25: 95–96, 274, 832.

5. (New York: International, 1933), p. 19; *MEW,* 6: 400–401.

6. *Capital,* 1: 645; *MEW,* 23: 674.

labor is an example of such alienation.[7] The drive of the capitalist to appropriate surplus labor leads to the most miserable of working conditions.[8] This is overcome in communist society because surplus labor is regulated rationally and in common.[9] Marx also describes the crippling effect of the division of labor[10] and of machinery[11] in the process of production. In communist society this is overcome through exchangeability of function.[12]

Alienation in the process of production, insofar as this means painful, miserable, and inhuman working conditions, will be completely overcome in communist society. Labor will be remade into the sort of activity in which the worker will be able to develop his powers and capacities.[13] So far this is the same view that Marx held before 1848. But is labor still expected to become the highest form of human activity, an end enjoyable in itself, the realm of man's fullest development? The answer now, I will argue, is no.

In the first place, it is no longer Marx's goal for future society to do away with the difference between labor and leisure. In the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital,* Marx makes it clear that labor time and leisure time are to constitute two separate realms. He writes in the *Grundrisse*: "The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them."[14] He also tells us in the same text that it will no longer be labor time that constitutes the measure of wealth, but the amount of free or disposable time that society is able to produce.[15] In *Capital* he says, "the time which society is bound to devote to material production is shorter, and as a consequence, the time at its disposal for

7. *Capital,* 1: 217, 235; *MEW,* 23: 231, 249.
8. *Capital,* 1: 236–302; *MEW,* 23: 250–320.
9. *Capital,* 1: 235; *MEW,* 23: 249.
10. *Capital,* 1: 349–68; *MEW,* 23: 370–79.
11. *Capital,* 1: 395ff., 422ff., 463ff.; *MEW,* 23: 416ff., 445ff., 490ff.
12. *Capital,* 1: 421, 487–88; *MEW,* 23: 443–44, 511–12.
13. *Capital,* 1: 488; *MEW,* 23: 512.
14. *G,* pp. 706, 612n.; *GKPO,* pp. 593–94, 506n.
15. *G,* p. 708; *GKPO,* pp. 595–96.

the free development, intellectual and social, of the individual is greater. . . ."[16]

Since labor and leisure will be separate, even under communism, we must consider what qualities Marx attributes to each. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx writes that economizing consists in reducing work time through increases in productivity: "Economising does not mean abstinence from pleasure, but rather the development of power, of capabilities of production, and hence both the capabilities as well as the means of enjoyment."[17] Is this to say that labor itself will be enjoyable, or only that labor produces the conditions that make enjoyment possible in leisure time? Marx is holding the latter position: "The capacity for enjoyment is a condition for enjoyment, hence its primary means, and this capability is the development of an individual's potential, a force of production. The saving of labour time is equal to an increase of free time, i.e., time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest productive power."[18]

The development of the productive forces makes possible the economizing of labor time and thus creates free time, in which individuals find enjoyment and their most complete development. Such individuals are then more productive during labor time. On the other hand, increased productivity means that the material means for enjoyment in leisure are enriched. Also, the individual's subjective capacity for enjoyment in leisure is enlarged in two ways: first, due to the developmental activities in which the individual engages during leisure time; second, as Marx says in several places, due to qualitative improvement in products themselves. We will consider this latter issue at another point. At this point we must enquire about enjoyment within labor itself. Marx rejects the view of Fourier (which is like the view of Schiller): "Labour cannot become play, as Fourier would like."[19]

16. *Capital*, 1: 530; *MEW*, 23: 552. Also *Capital*, 3: 820; *MEW*, 25: 828. See also *Theories of Surplus Value*, trans. E. Burns, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1963), 1: 218; *MEW*, 26, pt. 1: 189. Also *TSV*, 3: 256–57; *MEW*, 26, pt. 3: 252–53. Engels makes this point also (*Anti-Dühring*, p. 201; *MEW*, 20: 169).

17. *G*, pp. 711–12 (translation altered); *GKPO*, p. 599. For another translation see *Marx's Grundrisse*, trans. D. McLellan (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 148.

18. *G*, pp. 711–12 (translation altered); *GKPO*, p. 599. See also the McLellan ed., p. 148.

19. *G*, p. 711–12; *GKPO*, p. 599.

Marx no longer thinks that labor can be made intrinsically enjoyable in itself. Instead, the individual's leisure development will have an effect upon the quality of labor in material production.

> Free time—which is both idle time and time for higher activity—has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and, at the same time, practice, experimental science, materially creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society.[20]

This is a striking parallel to Schiller's noble man, who because of his own subjective character and personal development was able to transform, improve qualitatively, the conditions of his occupation.[21] In the first chapter I argued that this was a rather naive view on Schiller's part and that the noble man would not be able to make work in the factory enjoyable. Marx, however, is not arguing that leisure development will transform labor into an end enjoyable in itself. His argument is simply that the individual will be able to put his development to use in material production and to develop further. This assumes that the labor process has already been transformed and is no longer oppressive or dehumanizing. The individual will find in labor a discipline or a practice. He will find some development of his existing powers and capacities, but not, however, his fullest development, which occurs only in free time.[22]

The sort of development that does occur within labor depends upon the transformation of the labor process and upon the development of technology. As industry develops, production comes to depend more upon technology than upon individual labor. The laborer is transformed into someone who merely watches, supervises, and directs machinery. He "steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor."[23]

20. *G*, pp. 711–12; *GKPO*, pp. 599–600.

21. See above, Chap. 1, Sec. 3.

22. At some points Marx does speak of full development in labor (see *G*, p. 325; *GKPO*, p. 231). His general view, however, seems to be that full development occurs only in leisure. For an interesting discussion of leisure and work, see A. Gorz, *Socialism and Revolution*, trans. N. Denny (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp. 199–203.

23. *G*, p. 705; *GKPO*, p. 593.

Given this development of technology, social wealth is increased by science and human knowledge more than by direct physical labor. This gives rise to a certain freedom. Industry is transformed into an organ that subordinates nature to human will, an organ "of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge objectified." This development shows to what extent "general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and have been transformed in accordance with it."[24]

Labor becomes less physical and more intellectual. The worker, no longer subordinate to the machine, comes to exist beside it. His work becomes scientific and rational. Under these conditions individuals are not only in a position to develop freely, but, because of the role that scientific knowledge comes to play, they must so develop to be capable of directing the productive forces. These conditions also make for more humane working conditions.

The worker controls nature, the production process, and his social existence through his own knowledge. He thus takes the first step toward freedom. But how much further does he go? If labor is not an end enjoyable in itself, yet does involve the development of human powers and capacities as well as a certain degree of freedom, how are we to characterize, more specifically, the *Grundrisse*'s model for humanized labor? The answer is made clear in a passage where Marx begins by objecting to Adam Smith's identification of liberty and happiness with rest. It has not occurred to Smith, Marx says, that the individual

> needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquility. Certainly, labour obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity—and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits—hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely labour.[25]

24. *G*, p. 706; *GKPO*, p. 593.
25. *G*, p. 611; *GKPO*, p. 505. See also *Capital*, 1: 46–47n.; *MEW*, 23: 61n.

This is freedom as self-determination in the face of nature. But further, this freedom will give rise to a certain form of satisfaction or attractiveness. The conditions must be created,

> in which labour becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization, which in no way means that it becomes mere fun, amusement, as Fourier, with *grisette*-like naïveté, conceives it. Really free working, e.g., composing music, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion. The work of material production can achieve this character only (1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time general character, not merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature.[26]

In this passage we take the second and last step toward human freedom within the labor process. This is not the aesthetic model of freedom that we found in the writings of 1844. Here the model is rational rather than aesthetic. In other words, freedom does not go beyond the second of the three dimensions of freedom discussed earlier. This freedom amounts to self-determination by the workers. They establish their own purposes and overcome the obstacles to these purposes. The laborers must first control nature so as not to end up subordinate to it. This requires real effort; it is not a mere game. But it is not mere toilsome effort as a harnessed natural force. Secondly, work must have some scope to it, it must have a scientific, a rational, character. It must also be social; the producers must be freely associated and self-determined by their own social purpose. They cannot be subordinate to another person, to a class, or to a market.

It is true that Marx speaks of attractive labor. One might argue that this is the third dimension of freedom. But attractive labor means something quite different from what Marx meant in 1844 by calling labor enjoyable as an end in itself. "Enjoyment," "attractiveness," and "satisfaction" are vague and ambiguous terms. The way to distinguish the present views from those of 1844 is to understand that man's highest activity is to be found in free time rather than in labor time.[27] Labor is not miserable; it is attractive. But within labor time there is

26. *G*, pp. 611–12; *GKPO*, p. 505.
27. *G*, pp. 711–12; *GKPO*, pp. 599–600.

to be found only a lesser and different form of satisfaction or attractiveness, that of realizing one's rational purpose. Labor is attractive in the sense that the worker is rationally self-determined, and not because of the aesthetic character of the labor. In a passage written a few years after the *Grundrisse*, Marx notes that

> labour time, even if exchange-value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of production. But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity—which unlike labour—is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfillment of which is regarded as natural necessity or a social duty, according to one's inclination. It is self-evident that if labour-time is reduced to a normal length and, furthermore, labour is no longer performed for someone else, but for myself, and, at the same time, the social contradictions between master and men, etc., being abolished, it acquires a quite different character, it becomes real social labour, and finally the basis of disposable time—the labour of a man who has also disposable time must be of a much higher quality than that of a beast of burden.[28]

Labor cannot be an end in itself if it is dominated by an external purpose. Man can, as we saw in an earlier quotation, transform these external purposes so that they no longer appear as mere natural urgencies or necessities.[29] He can establish them as his own purposes; he can accomplish goals he himself sets. Thus, although he no longer is determined merely or solely by natural necessity, there nevertheless is still a necessity imposed upon him, with which he now combines his own purpose. He must subordinate his will to this purpose.[30] Labor can at best be a social duty.

Marx reasons something like this: Why does anyone work? The answer in capitalist society is that one is forced to do so. In order to live one must sell one's labor power to the capitalist. This is coercion. Why would one work in communist society? One works because one

28. *TSV*, 3: 257; *MEW*, 26, pt. 3: 253.

29. *G*, p. 611; *GKPO*, p. 505. In another passage Marx says that with this improved form of labor "natural necessity has disappeared in its direct form" (*G*, p. 325; *GKPO*, p. 231). This is not to say that natural necessity has completely disappeared (which would contradict *TSV*, 3: 257; *MEW*, 26, pt. 3: 253); it is only to say that the *direct* form of such necessity has disappeared.

30. *Capital*, 1: 178; *MEW*, 23: 193.

has to. But the worker is not forced to work by another and under conditions determined by another. He must, as in all forms of society, work to satisfy his natural needs, but here he works for himself and his society. Thus the activity of labor is a *means* toward the satisfaction of natural needs and of ends the workers establish for themselves. Because it is they themselves that set these goals and work toward them, they are self-determined.

These goals may be very important, perhaps even ends in themselves. They are fully enjoyed only in leisure, however, and in themselves do not make labor—the worker's activity that achieves these goals—an end in itself. Labor is primarily a means. It might be argued that labor can be both an end and a means, an end to the extent that it is attractive, but certainly not the worker's highest end. The realm in which man is primarily related to ends in themselves, where he finds his fullest development—man's "true realm of freedom"—is found only in free time. Labor time is basically a realm of necessity: this point is made most clearly in Volume 3 of *Capital*:

> In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. . . . Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite.[31]

In this passage we see clearly the difference between two sorts of freedom. The kind of freedom that can be found in material production, the realm of necessity, is a secondary sort of freedom on the rational model. It requires that the workers be freely associated and

31. *Capital*, 3: 820; *MEW*, 25: 828.

that they control nature rationally and scientifically, rather than being dominated by it. They must do this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions worthy of their human nature.

This is not the 1844 model.[32] What attractiveness, satisfaction, or enjoyment there is does not arise out of the given task itself. The satisfaction that one finds in the labor of material production is in large part brought to it from outside. The individual who has been developed in leisure is a different individual when he reenters the process of production. There he finds an arena for the exercise of his powers and capacities. Satisfaction is achieved more through the results than through the activity of labor—through rational control of nature and society, and due to the fact that this production is the basis for one's leisure development. Though some development does occur in the work process, it is quite possible for all of this to take place when the specific task is not enjoyable. Man's highest development and enjoyment do not occur in the labor process, nor does this activity give rise to an aesthetic condition.

Real freedom takes place outside of material production, in free time. It requires the shortening of the work day. This is freedom on the aesthetic model, the realm in which man finds the sort of activity that is an end in itself.[33] Marx has not given up the aesthetic model of freedom, but he has transferred its realization to the realm of free time.

What, then, will produce the aesthetic attitude in leisure time? In part it will be due to the type of activities the individual is free to engage in, activities he finds personally satisfying. In part it will be due to the education he receives, for example, in the arts and sciences—activities traditionally thought to be ends in themselves. So far

32. Bottomore quotes this passage from *Capital* and tends to agree with my interpretation. He says, "It may be that [Marx's] confidence in the possibility of making industrial work inherently interesting and satisfying had diminished" (*Marx: Early Writings*, p. ix). On the other hand, Avineri refers to this passage but believes that it does not contradict any of Marx's earlier views (*Social and Political Thought of Marx*, pp. 236–37). Fetscher agrees with Avineri (*Marx and Marxism*, p. 166). Löwenstein holds, not that Marx has changed his mind, but that he is in contradiction with his earlier views (J. I. Löwenstein, *Vision und Wirklichkeit* [Basel: Kyklos-Verlag, 1970], pp. 92–94). Engels even at a much later date still speaks of labor becoming a pleasure instead of a burden (*Anti-Dühring*, p. 320; *MEW*, 20: 274).

33. Marcuse, too, holds the view that free development and enjoyment occur in leisure (*Eros and Civilization*, pp. 138–43).

the aesthetic condition will depend to a considerable extent upon the individual himself. But also, in large part the aesthetic attitude will be created by production itself. In the *Grundrisse,* Marx discusses the dialectical relationship that exists between production and consumption. He argues, much as in the *1844 Manuscripts,* that production not only provides the objects consumers need, but that it creates the very quality of the need. As production develops, it transforms the consumer's sensitivities, his very perception of, and attitude toward, the object.

> The object is not an object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in a specific manner, to be mediated in its turn by production itself. Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail, and tooth. Production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only objectively but subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer. . . . Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material. . . . The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art—like every other product—creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.[34]

As in the *1844 Manuscripts,*[35] human need comes to be qualitatively transformed. Hunger as a need is satisfied in radically different ways at different periods of development. In the first place, needs become more specific. The starving man needs food in general; raw meat will do. When man becomes more refined and is in a better position to satisfy need, a specific food prepared in a certain way becomes a need. In the second place, the primitive, or starving, man wants only to end his hunger. The developed individual can enjoy his need; he can enjoy being hungry and satisfying it in a certain way. If the quality of need has been transformed far enough, it can cease to be grasping need; it can be enjoyed for its own sake. At this stage, the goal would be to produce as many needs as possible, each of the highest quality—for example, the need for art. This would be to produce the "rich human being . . . in need of a totality of human manifestations of life—the

34. *G,* p. 92; *GKPO,* pp. 13–14.
35. *EPM,* pp. 139–41; *MEW,* supp. 1: 540–42.

man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need."[36] If, in communist society, the quality of production were consciously directed, we can see how the aesthetic attitude could be created in the realm of consumption or free time. Indeed, Marx still thinks, as in 1844, that the senses can be emancipated, but only in free time.

The conflict, noticed in the previous chapter, between either the creative artist or the appreciator model, on the one hand, and the conditions of labor, on the other, no longer arises.[37] Since enjoyment, the realm of ends in themselves, and an aesthetic attitude occur in leisure, either model can apply, depending on the given individual. Or, indeed, the individual could alternate between these models. An aesthetic attitude created in the consumer by production fits with the appreciator model. The individual's leisure activity and education could well take on characteristics of the creative artist model, depending upon the nature of the activities and the character of the individual.

Another essential aspect of the worker's development within the labor process is the need for exchangeability of function. In *Capital,* Marx elaborates:

> Modern Industry . . . through its catastrophes imposes the necessity of recognizing, as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the laborer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudes. . . . Modern Industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of different labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers.[38]

36. *EPM*, p. 144; *MEW*, supp. 1: 544. See also W. A. Weisskopf, *Alienation and Economics* (New York: Dutton, 1971), pp. 175–76, 181–83.

37. See above, Chap. 3, Sec. 2.

38. *Capital*, 1: 487–88; *MEW*, 23: 511–12. See also *Capital*, 1: 421, 421n., 487n.; *MEW*, 23: 443–44, 444n., 511–12n. Engels also speaks of the exchangeability of function (see *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 321–23; *MEW*, 20: 274). The tension, noticed earlier (see above, Chap. 3, Sec. 2), between labor as enjoyment and the implications of the exchangeability of function has been resolved. The exchangeability of function allows work to become developing and contributes to the achievement of a certain rational satisfaction and freedom. Enjoyment occurs in leisure.

Exchangeability of function will provide for the further development of the powers and capacities of the individual within the labor process. The production process of the future requires this fully developed individual and gives him a place to exercise his powers. This will require "technical instruction, both theoretical and practical."[39] It is left unclear whether this will take place during free time, or in combination with production. In the *Grundrisse* Marx suggests that the worker would be educated in his expanded leisure time and then return to material production.[40] In the *Manifesto* he proposed that education be combined with production.[41] It is possible that Marx envisions technical education combined with production and a humanistic or general education in leisure time.

A slight shift has taken place in Marx's understanding of the exchangeability of function. In the *German Ideology*, jobs were changed "just as I have a mind"; the emphasis was on the subjective preference of the individual.[42] In *Capital* the needs of production are emphasized. They seem to be the primary factor that requires and, one imagines, determines the variety of work.[43] In both versions there would be a development of the individual, but this development is not likely to be as extensive in the second. Thus leisure time would become a necessity if one were to achieve all-around development.

On the other hand, hierarchical division of labor in the form of classes is overcome—as before 1848—totally. In communist society, "work is more and more evenly divided among all the able-bodied members of society," and "a particular class is more and more deprived of the power to shift the natural burden of labor from its own shoulders to those of another layer of society."[44]

There is another form of the hierarchical division of labor that Marx deals with, that of managers or supervisors. Marx's view is that there are two reasons why one needs a supervisor. First, all complex

39. *Capital*, 1: 488; *MEW*, 23: 512.

40. *G*, pp. 711–12; *GKPO*, pp. 599–600.

41. *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 112; *MEW*, 4: 482.

42. *GI*, p. 45; *MEW*, 3: 33.

43. Engels in his earlier description of the exchangeability of function had been more careful in this respect. For Engels a change of functions was to be determined either by the needs of society or the inclination of the individual (see "Principles of Communism," in *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 184; *MEW*, 4: 375–76).

44. *Capital*, 1: 530; *MEW*, 23: 552.

cooperative labor requires unity and coordination. Second, a supervisor is required whenever the producers are laborers who do not own the means of production.[45] In communist society the second form of supervision will be changed; the first will not. The supervisor will no longer own the means of production. Indeed, in many cases the capitalist himself no longer acts as his own supervisor, but hires someone to do this. Production can easily proceed without the capitalist.[46] Just as an orchestra needs a conductor, so a factory needs a supervisor, but as Marx says, "an orchestra conductor need not own the instruments of his orchestra, nor is it within the scope of his duties as conductor to have anything to do with the 'wages' of the other musicians." Thus "in a co-operative factory the antagonistic nature of the labour of supervision disappears, because the manager is paid by the laborers instead of representing capital counterposed to them."[47]

This may overcome division of labor due to classes, but it could lead to the perpetuation of certain forms of specialization. Marx does not suggest that the principle of exchangeability of function be applied to the function of supervising, that is, that the job of supervision be rotated among the workers. It is suggested that the supervisor, like an orchestra conductor, be a specialist. If the level of education were high enough in communist society, could the principle of exchangeability of function be applied to the function of supervisors and thus work to overcome this form of specialization also? In his essay "On Authority," Engels suggests that questions would be decided in the production process by the decision of delegates or if possible by a majority vote.[48]

Why does Marx make the shift he does? One explanation is that as he grew older he developed a deeper and broader understanding of economics, and thus a grasp of real possibilities within the labor process. In 1844 he had just begun to study economics. By the time of the *German Ideology* and the *Poverty of Philosophy* he knows more about real economic conditions. Here we find the first clear and sharp treat-

45. *Capital*, 3: 383–84; *MEW*, 25: 397.
46. *Capital*, 3: 386; *MEW*, 25: 400.
47. *Capital*, 3: 386–87; *MEW*, 25: 400–401.
48. In *Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. R. C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 663; *MEW*, 18: 306.

ment of the division of labor (the distinction between totally overcoming class division of labor and overcoming only specialization through exchangeability of function). Marx's growing knowledge of economics, gained through living and studying in the most highly developed of capitalist countries—England—forces him to make major modifications in early early views, which, one might argue, were based more on philosophical or aesthetic notions than on economic ones.

For example, the 1844 notion of contemplating oneself in one's object is especially incompatible with a clear understanding of what is necessarily involved in the division of labor. In 1844, when Marx discusses labor in communist society, he seems to envision a situation in which the individual producer is directly and completely responsible for his product, almost as if there were no division of labor involved in production. Let us look back at a passage from Marx's "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*":

> Suppose we had produced things as human beings. . . . In my production I would have objectified my *individuality* in its *particularity*. . . . in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing *my personality* as an objective, *sensuously perceptible*, and indubitable power. . . . In your satisfaction and in your use of my product *I* would have had the *direct* and *conscious* satisfaction that *my* work satisfied a human need. . . . In my *individual* life I would have *directly* created your life. . . .[49]

The ideal of labor expressed in this passage assumes that far more than just exchange has been overcome. It presupposes a form of labor in which one individual himself completes totally, and is entirely responsible for, the produced article. The worker oversees the entire production of the article as if there were no division of labor in the production process, as if he were a medieval artisan or an Epic Hero. This goes far beyond the mere elimination of specialization by exchangeability of function. Marx is either not fully aware of the implications of the division of labor at this point or he has overlooked them. This passage also presupposes that each producer deals directly with the consumer. It is as if Marx were assuming, not just that there

49. *WYMPS*, p. 281 (my emphasis); *MEW*, supp. 1: 462–63. Fetscher believes, wrongly, that this passage describes an ideal that Marx retains in his later writings (*Marx and Marxism*, pp. 36–38).

is no commodity exchange, but that distribution is occurring at a stage of very low economic development, where producers always come into direct contact with consumers. It is only with this set of assumptions that the producer could objectify his "individuality in its *particularity*" in the product. Only on these assumptions could the worker view his *own* personality in the object. Only in this way could he have the *direct* (not indirect) and *conscious* satisfaction that his work satisfied a human need of the consumer. Only in this way could the worker *directly* create the other person's life. I suggest that these same presuppositions would have to be operative in the *1844 Manuscripts* where Marx speaks of the worker (if he still means an individual worker) contemplating himself in a world he has created.[50]

This does not mean that the concept of objectification must be abandoned, as indeed it is not. In the later writings the product is still seen as the objectification of the powers and capacities of the *collective* workers. Through this objectification they actualize their powers, realize their will in nature,[51] and further develop in interaction with the object. The only aspect that must now be rejected is that the individual will be able to contemplate himself in this objectification. In other words, an aesthetic condition cannot result directly from it.

Marx makes it clear in the *Grundrisse* that the total production of a whole factory involving socially organized and combined labor is a great deal more than what the aggregate of the individual workers taken separately could accomplish.[52] This would be true of any complex production process, capitalist or communist. This would be especially true in an advanced stage of production, where labor means the overlooking of machines and where the labor of the individual becomes almost insignificant. Granting the possibility of exchangea-

50. *EPM*, p. 114; *MEW*, supp. 1: 517.

51. *G*, pp. 462, 711–12; *GKPO*, pp. 366, 599–600. Marx does at times talk about man's realizing his will in nature (see *G*, p. 706; *GKPO*, pp. 593–94). This must be understood in the sense simply that men collectively bring nature under their control and make it serve their purposes. The individual could not realize his particularity in the object and then contemplate it. This could happen only in leisure time where a one-to-one relationship to the object is possible. This, perhaps, is one reason why Marx introduces leisure time. He does, however, speak of objectifying oneself in the object as possible in early history (see *G*, pp. 221–22; *GKPO*, p. 133).

52. *G*, p. 470; *GKPO*, p. 374.

bility of function, there will still be a complex division of functions. No one individual will perform them all or even a large number of them. Given these conditions, how will the individual worker know what he as an individual has been responsible for producing? What will he point to as his own?[53] How will the individual laborer be able to objectify and then contemplate his *particularity* in the product? Maybe the associated workers as a whole can do this, but the individual himself cannot. The product is not the result of one individual, but of the whole, of the associated workers and machines, and of a complex division of labor. This is much like Hegel's view in the *Aesthetics*, where it is not the individual who is responsible for what is accomplished in modern society, but society as a whole.[54]

Nor, for Marx, can the individual worker have a *direct* and *conscious* satisfaction that his work satisfies the need of another. This satisfaction could be only indirect; the worker will most likely never see the consumer of his product. The relationship between producer and product as well as between producer and consumer will be, to a certain extent, impersonal. There is no return to an earlier, less developed economic condition. It must be said, however, that production will be production of useful things, things that satisfy and develop real needs. The worker's relation to the product will not be as impersonal as under capitalism. He can be conscious that his product will satisfy and perhaps develop the real human need of another and that this is the specific reason, the ultimate reason, why it is being produced. It is just that the worker may never see the person whose need he has satisfied.

Reconciliation no longer requires an objectification in which one's relation to the object, in this case another person, must be direct, perceptible, and immediately self-confirming. Reconciliation seems, more than before, to take place in thought. Marx is moving a bit closer to Hegel in this regard. The worker knows that the product has a human value for others and that this is why it is being produced, but he does not directly experience the product's value for the other nor through this his own relation to the other.

In the conditions of production envisioned by Marx after 1848, it would not only be impossible to contemplate one's individuality in the object, but the contemplative attitude itself would be impossible. It

53. Engels makes this point also (*Anti-Dühring*, p. 294; *MEW*, 20: 250–51).
54. *Aesth.*, 1: 181–85; *SW*, 12: 251–55.

would not be compatible with the necessary subordination of the worker's will to the purpose that guides his work. The work process, under any social organization,[55] demands that the "workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be."[56] Given the working conditions we have been led to expect from the *Grundrisse, Theories of Surplus Value,* and *Capital,* the worker's imagination would not have room for the free play required by the aesthetic attitude. Instead of an aesthetic play between the sensuous and intellectual faculties, the model for Marx is the subordination of nature—both in the form of external objects and in the form of the worker's own sensuous faculties—to rationality, to the worker's own rational purpose.

II

The model for humanized labor is no longer like the Greek condition or the labor of the Epic Hero. Marx, in the *Grundrisse,* makes it clear that the ancient world is an ideal of the past that will never return: "Why should not the historic childhood of humanity, its most beautiful unfolding, as a stage never to return, exercise an eternal charm?"[57] Similarly, the whole individual of the ancient world will never return: "In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill."[58] At this point Marx certainly sounds more like the mature Hegel than like Schiller. The ancient world is an ideal, but one that remains in the past, one that cannot be realized in the modern world.

55. *Capital,* 1: 177; *MEW,* 23: 192.

56. *Capital,* 1: 178; *MEW,* 23: 193.

57. *G,* p. 111; *GKPO,* p. 31. On Marx's view of the ancient world, see Lifshitz, pp. 71ff. Lifshitz argues that Marx's view of the antithesis between the ancient and the modern world was "inherited from classical philosophy and aesthetics, and he never renounced his inheritance."

58. *G,* p. 162; *GKPO,* p. 80.

In his views on Greek art, Marx comes even closer to Hegel, who had argued that the independent self-subsistence of the Epic Hero was incompatible with subordination of the individual to the division of labor, with factory production, a scientific outlook, and the separation of modern man from nature.[59] Marx, too, takes the view that Greek art (especially the epic) and the Epic Hero are incompatible with highly developed social conditions.[60] The aesthetic unity between the individual and his world, which was necessary for the epic and the Epic Hero, is possible only in an undeveloped society. Such a society allows of mythology, the predominance of the imagination. Only here is an aesthetic unity between nature, society, and the imagination of the individual possible.

It is well known that Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek art but also its foundation. Is the view of nature and of social relations on which the Greek imagination and hence Greek mythology is based possible with self-acting mule spindles and railways and locomotives and electrical telegraphs? What chance has Vulcan against Roberts & Co., Jupiter against the lightening-rod and Hermes against the Crédit Mobilier? All mythology overcomes and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in the imagination and by the imagination; it therefore vanishes with the advent of real mastery over them. What becomes of Fama alongside Printing House Square? Greek art presupposes Greek mythology, i.e., nature and the social forms already reworked in an unconsciously artistic way by the popular imagination.[61]

Further, the relationship between ancient art and the modern world is in certain ways much like the relationship that existed for Hegel between classical and romantic art and for Schiller between the naive and the sentimental.

But the difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm and as an unattainable model.

A man cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does he

59. See above, Chap. 2, Sec. 4.

60. *G*, pp. 110–11; *GKPO*, pp. 30–31.

61. *G*, p. 110; *GKPO*, pp. 30–31. Marx's views here, especially on the relationship of Greek art to mythology, are much like the views of Herder (see *Reflections*, pp. 180–81); *Sämtliche Werke*, 14: 107–8.

not find joy in the child's naiveté, and must he himself not strive to reproduce its truth at a higher stage? Does not the true character of each epoch come alive in the nature of its children? Why should not the historic childhood of humanity, its most beautiful unfolding, as a stage never to return, exercise an eternal charm? There are unruly children and precocious children. Many of the old peoples belong in this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm of their art for us is not in contradiction to the undeveloped stage of society on which it grew. It is its result, rather, and is inextricably bound up, rather, with the fact that the unripe social conditions under which it arose, and could alone arise, can never return.[62]

There is no description here of modern sentimental or romantic art. But it is clear that ancient art, even though childlike, is the highest, the most beautiful art. As with Schiller, this art is in certain respects the standard and model to be striven after; one must strive to reproduce it on a higher level. Yet this is only a wish; it is beyond attainment. Marx takes Hegel's view that Greek art belongs to the past and will never return.[63] The modern world is at a higher level than the ancient

62. *G*, p. 111; *GKPO*, p. 31.

63. Lifshitz takes a very different view of these passages. He argues that, for Marx, art and culture will reach even greater heights in communist society than were reached in the ancient world (*Philosophy of Art of Marx*, pp. 82–89. See also, Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, p. 129). This interpretation is mistaken. It derives from misunderstanding a passage in the *Theories of Surplus Value*, where Marx says that art must be understood in its historical forms of social development. If one combines this with the passages from the *Grundrisse* just noted, one might conclude that a higher form of social development means a higher form of art. One might also derive this from the doctrine of historical materialism. But Marx never says this. In the *Theories of Surplus Value* Marx next points out that capitalism is hostile to art and thus that the view, held by some in the nineteenth century, that a modern epic might be possible again, is a mere illusion. From this Lifshitz concludes that since communism will not be hostile to art and because it will be a more advanced society, its art will be higher than that of the ancient world. But Marx never suggests this (see *TSV*, 1: 285; *MEW*, 26, pt. 1: 257). In the *Grundrisse*, Marx makes it clear that Greek art, the highest art, is not just impossible in capitalist society, but that it will not return in any complex society of the modern world. In fact Greek art was due to undeveloped social conditions (*G*, pp. 110–11; *GKPO*, pp. 30–31). Lifshitz is forced to argue that these passages are incomplete and that Marx was about to take back what he had said. But Marx had said a bit earlier that categories can predominate and appear more fully expressed in earlier, less developed periods (cf. *G*, pp. 102–3 and p. 111; *GKPO*, pp. 22–24 and p. 31). The parallel between the above passages from the *Grundrisse* and Hegel's view as to why the epic and ancient art are impossible in the modern world is striking. This is the key to what Marx means. Modern science and industry are incompatible with ancient man's unity with nature

world, but the Greek period was the period of the highest development of art and in certain ways of the individual.

According to Marx, it was ancient man's unity with nature that made Greek art possible, and it is also clear that modern industry and technology make this childlike unity with nature impossible.[64] An aesthetic condition in labor would be possible only in an undeveloped economy like that of the ancient world, or perhaps like that presupposed by Marx in his "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*." A thorough understanding of modern economics, industry, and technology shows such an ideal to be impossible in a complex economy.[65] Marx's views on this issue are now closer to those of the mature Hegel.

I have already argued that enjoyment, the free play of the imagination, and the aesthetic condition would be impossible within labor time. The passages just quoted further suggest that the aesthetic condition that could be achieved in leisure would not have the same scope that it did in the ancient world. The unity of nature, society, the individual, and the imagination—such a total unity—is also incompatible with complex industry. The aesthetic condition that one may achieve in leisure, much like romantic art for Hegel or the sentimental for Schiller, may perhaps have more depth, but it will not achieve the same wholeness, scope, and unity as in the ancient world.

There is a passage in one of the drafts of Marx's letter to V. Zasulich where he suggests (in opposition, it might seem, to the passages concerning the ancient world just quoted) that modern society is tending toward a revival of ancient society: "In a word, the rural commune finds the modern social system in a crisis which will end only by its elimination, by a return of modern societies to an 'archaic' type of communal property, a form which—as an American author who is not at all suspected of revolutionary tendencies, supported in his work

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(see *Aesth.*, 2: 1053; *SW*, 14: 342–43). A. Sánchez Vásquez, on the other hand, argues that socialism will not necessarily bring a higher form of art (*Las Ideas Estéticas de Marx* [Mexico, D.F.: ERA, 1967], pp. 102, 158–60).

64. In an article written by both Marx and Engels it is made clear that modern industry makes impossible this childlike unity with nature (see *MEW*, 7: 202). In the *Dialectics of Nature*, however, Engels does not hold to this view. He argues that the sort of unity between man and nature that occurred in the ancient world will return again in the modern (trans. C. Dutt [New York: International, 1940], pp. 291–93; *MEW*, 20: 452–53).

65. See *Capital*, 1: 79; *MEW*, 23: 93. Also *G*, pp. 409–10; *GKPO*, p. 313.

by the government in Washington, says—'the new system' toward which modern society tends 'will be a revival in a superior form of an archaic social type'."[66] What will return, according to this passage, is communal property. Thus, ancient art, unity with nature, and the ideal of labor are lost, and only communal property will return. We must also ask, as we proceed, whether or not the ideal state, patterned after the ancient Greek state, will return in a future society.

In 1844 Marx's view of labor was like the ideal of Schiller and of the young Hegel. Work in communist society was to resemble the work of Hegel's Epic Hero. For Marx and Schiller this was to be a model for a future society; for the mature Hegel it was only a model of the past. After 1848, Marx changed his mind. In *Capital*, the *Theories of Surplus Value*, and the *Grundrisse*, it is clear that labor can be understood neither as Schiller envisioned it, nor as Marx himself did in 1844, nor as Hegel saw it for the ancient Hero.

Hegel came to see that the labor of the ancient world was incompatible with modern conditions. This incompatibility between the ancient and modern worlds produced a tension in Hegel's thought that ran throughout his later work. This tension could be described as a conflict between Hegel's mature view of the modern world and Schiller's ideal view of the ancient world and its relevance for the modern (with which Hegel agreed in his youth). But what is even more interesting is that we seem to find a very similar shift in Marx himself.

Like Schiller, Marx fails to achieve the ideal at the level of material production. But unlike Schiller, he does not maintain the ideal as a goal to be achieved in the distant future. Nor does he drop the goal entirely, as Hegel had done. Instead, he abandons that part of the goal that cannot be realized.

Marx was forced to choose between a complex society with developed material production and an ideal society of harmony and unity (which he had come to see as possible only in an undeveloped society).

66. *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, ed. L. Krader (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. 86–87; for the German, *MEW*, 19: 386. It is true that this passage refers to a period before that of the Greek city-state. Nevertheless, Marx holds that ancient communal property still existed in ancient Greece (*GI*, p. 33; *MEW*, 3: 22–23. Also, *G*, pp. 474–76; *GKPO*, pp. 378–80). For a discussion of this passage and its relation to L. H. Morgan, and also for a general treatment of Marx's view of ancient society, see Krader's introduction to the *Ethnological Notebooks*, esp. pp. 86–87.

When forced to choose, he did so (unlike Schiller), but he chose only after very careful and detailed investigation, an investigation that allowed him to preserve as much of the ideal as was compatible with modern society.

III

From 1843 on, the goal of Marx's political writings was to overcome the estrangement of the modern state. His aim in proposing a radical form of democracy was to overcome the opposition and indeed the difference between civil society and the political state.[67] The state as an independent power should, as Engels put it, wither away.[68]

As Marx's political views developed, he came, in the *Communist Manifesto*, to propose a two-stage transition from the existing estranged state to the ultimate disappearance of the state.[69] In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* these two stages are more clearly developed.[70] Stage 1, the transitional stage, Marx called the dictatorship of the proletariat—it has also been called the socialist stage.[71] Stage 2 is full communism—the state having withered away.

In the *Gotha Program*, Stage 1 is a controlled, or modified, exchange economy. Goods are exchanged, the workers use certificates for contributed labor time to purchase these goods, and the workers earn these certificates in proportion to the work they contribute.[72]

In one passage, it is true, Marx denies that the workers exchange their products.[73] This is the case, he argues, because in a cooperative society individual labor is directly, not indirectly, a component part of the total labor.[74] In other words, there is no private production or exchange. Independent producers do not exchange with other independent and competing producers. Instead, distribution takes place within a cooperative society of producers who hold the means of

67. *CHPR*, pp. 29–33, 121; *MEW*, 1: 231–34, 326–27.
68. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 307; *MEW*, 20: 262.
69. *Manifesto*, pp. 111–12; *MEW*, 4: 481–82.
70. *Gotha*, pp. 8–10, 18; *MEW*, 19: 19–21, 28.
71. See "Principles of Communism," pp. 186–87; *MEW*, 4: 377–78. See also V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, in *Selected Works*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1970), 2: 354.
72. *Gotha*, p. 8; *MEW*, 19: 20.
73. *Gotha*, p. 8; *MEW*, 19: 19–20.
74. *Gotha*, p. 8; *MEW*, 19: 20.

production in common. All exchange is internal; it takes place *within* a cooperative unit, not *between* independent and competing units.[75] Nevertheless, one must admit that though modified and controlled, Stage 1 is still an exchange economy; Marx says that "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values."[76] Workers exchange earned certificates—money—for goods: "so much labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form."[77]

In the *Grundrisse* Marx distinguishes three separable properties of money.[78] First, it can function as an ideal measure, a measure of labor time.[79] Secondly, it can function as a medium of exchange or instrument of circulation.[80] Finally, it can become an end in itself, the goal of production.[81] In all economies—capitalist, socialist, or communist—we find, in somewhat different forms, the first function of money, the measure of labor time. Socialism and communism are especially concerned with the measure and apportionment of labor time according to a social plan.[82] Only in socialism and capitalism do we find the second form. Labor certificates (as well as measuring labor time) function as a medium of exchange within a cooperative economy, an economy with exchange for the purpose of consumption only. Labor certificates facilitate the conversion of equal amounts of labor time into equal amounts of products. Only in capitalism does money become an end in itself. This cannot occur in a socialist economy because there is no rent, interest, or profit: "nothing can pass into ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption."[83] In communism, of course, we find money neither as an end in itself nor as

75. *G*, pp. 158–59; *GKPO*, pp. 76–77.

76. *Gotha*, pp. 8–9; *MEW*, 19: 20.

77. *Gotha*, p. 9; *MEW*, 19: 20.

78. *G*, pp. 146, 187, 202–3; *GKPO*, pp. 64, 103, 117, 129. See also *Capital*, vol. 1, chaps. 3–4; *MEW*, vol. 23, chap. 3 and chap. 4, sec. 1. To confirm that these three properties can be separated, see *G*, pp. 192, 216; *GKPO*, pp. 107, 130.

79. *G*, pp. 140–44, 190–91; *GKPO*, pp. 59–62, 105–6.

80. *G*, pp. 192–93, 199; *GKPO*, pp. 107–8, 113–14.

81. *G*, pp. 146, 151, 201, 216, 224; *GKPO*, pp. 64–65, 69, 115, 130, 135. With regard to these last two forms Marx is following Aristotle's distinction between *oeconomic* and *chrematistic* (*Capital*, 1: 152n.; *MEW*, 23: 167n. See also *G*, pp. 223–26; *GKPO*, pp. 134–37).

82. *G*, pp. 172–73, 190; *GKPO*, pp. 89, 105–6.

83. *Gotha*, p. 9; *MEW*, 19: 20.

a medium of exchange. Goods are distributed not in proportion to contributed labor, but simply according to need.[84]

Thus Stage 1 in the *Gotha Program* is a modified exchange economy. In the *Manifesto*, Stage 1—the society described by the ten demands at the end of Section 2—was also an exchange economy. As pointed out earlier, rents were still paid on land, and there was an income tax.[85] If there was an income tax, there would be incomes to tax and goods to exchange income for. In Stage 2—full communism, according to the *Gotha Program*—there would be no exchange and no money (except as an ideal measure), since goods would be distributed simply according to need.

As I argued earlier, if there is exchange, there should be estrangement. As early as the "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*"[86] and as late as *Capital*,[87] it is not just capitalism, but exchange itself,

84. *Gotha*, pp. 9–10; *MEW*, 19: 20–21. Communism abolishes buying and selling (*Manifesto*, p. 106; *MEW*, 4: 476).

85. *Manifesto*, p. 111; *MEW*, 4: 481–82.

86. See above, Chap. 3, Sec. 1, and n. 36. In the *Critique of Political Economy*, Marx shifts his position on this issue just a bit: "*All* social forms of labour positing exchange-value" result in relations of production that "appear as something existing apart from the individual human being, and the distinctive relations into which they enter in the course of production in society appear as the specific properties of a thing" (*CPE*, p. 49, also p. 34; *MEW*, 13: 34–35, 21). This is alienation; it is what in *Capital* Marx will call fetishism. For Marx, the very existence of exchange value presupposes alienation (see *CPE*, pp. 42–46; *MEW*, 13: 29–33). Marx goes on to say that barter is only the "beginning of the transformation of commodities into money. Exchange-value does not [here] acquire an independent form, but is still directly tied to use-value." Thus barter, which begins on the borders of the primitive community, since it does not really give rise to exchange value, would not—now contrary to the "Comments on Mill"—give rise to alienation or fetishism. But "the gradual extension of barter" leads "to the further development of the commodity as exchange-value . . . and consequently has a disintegrating effect on direct barter" (*CPE*, p. 50; *MEW*, 13: 35–36. See also *Capital*, 1: 87–88; *MEW*, 23: 102–3). Alienation arises not with barter but only with its extension and disintegration, at any rate long before capitalism. Extensive exchange gives rise to alienation. Capitalist exchange is not necessary to produce it.

87. Chapter 1 of *Capital* begins with the analysis of a commodity. The commodity is, of course, the key to understanding capitalist economy, but we find commodities in other economies (see *Capital*, 1: 61; *MEW*, 23: 76. Also *Capital*, 3: 177; *MEW*, 25: 187. Also *CPE*, p. 50; *MEW*, 13: 35–36). For a product to become a commodity it is necessary that it be produced for exchange by independent producers; i.e., a division of labor is required so that private producers engage in different kinds of labor and exchange their products (*Capital*, 1: 41–42, 73; *MEW*, 23: 56–57, 87). These characteristics that

that produces estrangement. Earlier forms of noncapitalist exchange, even as simple as barter, were marked by estrangement. If in all earlier economies estrangement arose as soon as exchange became extensive, then there is good reason to believe that any form of exchange would cause estrangement. As soon as producers put their goods into a market, market laws would assert themselves and end up controlling the producers. Exchange relations, relationships between things, would dominate relationships between persons. Even if the means of production were collectively owned, even in a society with no rent, interest, or profit, still the laws of the market would to a certain extent, it seems, control the producers. Estrangement, which has been characteristic of all exchange economies, seems inevitable in Stage 1 because exchange has not been completely overcome.[88] Nevertheless, Marx now *denies* it. We must discover how and why.

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define a commodity are sufficient to produce fetishism (*Capital*, 1: 72–73; *MEW*, 23: 87). It is clear that any exchange economy with private production is sufficient to generate fetishism. This need not be a capitalist exchange economy, for several reasons. First, in Chapter 1 Marx discusses labor, but not wage labor. In fact, he specifically excludes it as not relevant to this stage of the discussion: "The reader must notice that we are not speaking here of the wages or value that a labourer gets for a given labour time. . . . Wages is a category that, as yet, has no existence at the present stage of our investigation" (*Capital*, 1: 44n.; *MEW*, 23: 59n.). Fetishism can occur without wage labor; capitalism, of course, cannot. Second, Marx discusses money in Chapter 1, but only as a medium of exchange or equivalent, not as an end in itself (*Capital*, 1: 57, 69–70; *MEW*, 23: 72, 83–84). We must notice that alienation can exist with money only as medium of exchange (*G*, p. 160; *GKPO*, p. 78). Third, Marx makes a distinction between different types of exchange only in Chapters 3 and 4, after having left the topic of fetishism. There Marx distinguishes two forms of exchange, characterized by the two formulas C–M–C and M–C–M (or M–C–M′). The second characterizes capitalist exchange, the first exchange simply for the purpose of consumption (*Capital*, 1: 148–49, 151; *MEW*, 23: 163–64, 166). This distinction was not necessary for the argument of Chapter 1. Exchange, capitalist or not, without wage labor, and without money as an end in itself, produces fetishism. Finally, Marx becomes explicit: "The mode of production in which the product takes the form of a commodity, or is produced directly for exchange . . . makes its appearance at an early date in history. . . . Hence its Fetish character is comparatively easy to be seen through" (*Capital*, 1: 82; *MEW*, 23: 97).

88. A. Gorz supports this view: "The socialism of scarcity and accumulation, although it abolishes exploitation, cannot, therefore, claim to put an end to alienation. It cannot do so because, during this phase, the relations of production cannot be wholly transparent to the producers, and also because the whole process of production is still governed by the laws of political economy, the science of rational allocation of scarce resources" (*Socialism and Revolution*, p. 186).

In Chapter 1 of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx describes the fetishism of commodities—which I have characterized as alienation in exchange. What he considers objectionable here is that we find a realm of exchange value separated from that of use value; that the use value of the product is unimportant to the producer, who is interested only in its exchange value; and that to be consumed a use value must first be realized as an exchange value.[89] This means that the realm of exchange value assumes a role of primary importance. It is an abstract realm, a realm of things, which has a life of its own that goes on over the heads of the producers.[90] There is estrangement here because the producer's "own social action takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them."[91] The producer is controlled by exchange relations—independent, uncontrolled laws of the market. This occurs, Marx argues, because production is private; products are the result of the "labour of private individuals who carry on their work independently of each other." Further, "the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products."[92]

Marx contrasts the form of society in which fetishism occurs to four other models free of fetishism or estrangement. In the first three (Robinson Crusoe on his island, the feudal economy of the Middle Ages, and the patriarchal industry of a peasant family) there is no

89. *Capital*, 1: 73; *MEW*, 23: 87. This in itself is an alienation. In the *Critique of Political Economy*, Marx says that a commodity must be alienated as a use value (i.e., realized in exchange as an exchange value) for it to be realized as a use value. He uses the terms *Entäusserung* and *Veräusserung* interchangeably to express this notion (see *CPE*, pp. 42–43; *MEW*, 13: 29–30).

90. *Capital*, 1: 72–73; *MEW*, 23: 86–87.

91. *Capital*, 1: 75; *MEW*, 23: 89. Fetishism is not fundamentally different from alienation in exchange as it was discussed in the "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*" of 1844. There, too, exchange gave rise to a realm of things that operated independently of human will and came to dominate man (see "Comments on Mill," pp. 266–67, 273–77; *MEW*, supp. 1: 445–47, 452–56. Also see above, Chap. 3, Sec. 1). Part of Althusser's argument for the existence of a *coupure epistémologique* is that Marx discusses fetishism without any reference to alienation from the species. This I agree with. But it does not follow that fetishism is totally different from alienation as it was discussed in 1844. It is just like alienation in exchange as it was understood in 1844. This shift does not amount to a *coupure epistémologique*. It is no more than a simple modification. Marx has abandoned the concept of alienation from the species, but has retained the concept of alienation in exchange (see *Reading Capital*, p. 17).

92. *Capital*, 1: 72–73; *MEW*, 23: 87.

fetishism simply because there is no exchange.[93] Individuals are concerned directly with use values, there is no realm of exchange value, and there are no relationships between things controlling the life of producers.

The problem comes with the fourth example of a society free from fetishism. What is it but a socialist exchange economy? Goods are distributed here, just as in Stage 1 of the *Gotha Program*, according to labor time contributed.[94] I assume that there would be labor certificates to exchange for goods. If there is exchange, why is there no estrangement? The answer, I suggest, is that exchange is not allowed to control the producers. The workers are associated,[95] production is not independent but cooperative,[96] and both production and distribution are consciously directed according to a social plan.[97] The workers consciously and collectively control their exchange relations instead of being controlled by them. Exchange is reduced to a rationally employed tool. It is now possible to have at least a controlled exchange economy free from estrangement. This is a shift from Marx's position before 1848. His disagreement with Hegel's view of exchange is no longer quite as sharp as it was.

How are we to explain this shift? It was true in 1844, and it is true in *Capital*, that exchange itself produces alienation and estrangement. In 1844 this required the abolition of exchange, but in *Capital* only the control of exchange is necessary.[98]

In 1844 the abolition of exchange was required because of the way in which Marx understood reconciliation through objectification. He held to a conception of human essence requiring for its realization that the individual be able to objectify and to contemplate himself in

93. *Capital*, 1: 76–78; *MEW*, 23: 90–94. Marx also mentions the primitive community as an example of a society free of fetishism.

94. *Capital*, 1: 78–79; *MEW*, 23: 93.

95. *Capital*, 1: 80; *MEW*, 23: 94.

96. *Capital*, 1: 78; *MEW*, 23: 92.

97. *Capital*, 1: 79, 80; *MEW*, 23: 93, 94. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx says that in a socialist economy individuals share in the general production of society not merely afterwards and through exchange but from the outset, before exchange, and do so in an active way involving the determination of general needs and purposes (*G*, p. 171; *GKPO*, p. 88). Thus exchange is subordinated to human will.

98. Nicolaus argues that as late as the *Manifesto* Marx saw the market as the "center of gravity of bourgeois society." Later he came to see production as the center and the market as "a dependent variable" ("Proletariat and Middle Class in Marx," p. 264).

the object. Given a market, the individual would not merely lack self-determination; his object would be lost to him, and he would be unable to find himself in it. An aesthetic relation to it would be impossible. To realize this form of objectification (I argued earlier), an almost total abolition of the division of labor and a society at a very low economic level would be required.

In the *German Ideology*, Marx abandoned the concept of human essence as species-being. He also realized that the only possibility beyond ending the division of labor between classes would be overcoming specialization. In the *Grundrisse*, the *Theories of Surplus Value*, and *Capital*, he further abandoned the notions of labor as enjoyment, of an aesthetic condition in labor, and of an individual contemplating himself in the object. Each would be incompatible with a developed economy. Instead, reconciliation within labor came to mean collective, rational, and scientific control of nature and the production process. This, we can now see, is the same model that is being applied to exchange. Reconciliation—the overcoming of alienation, estrangement, or fetishism—requires only subjecting the market to collective rational control, to a social plan. Contemplation of oneself in one's object, an aesthetic relation to one's product, let alone the objectification of one's essence, would still be impossible in a controlled socialist exchange economy; but it is impossible in any complex economy and is no longer expected. Reconciliation through objectification requires only collective and rational control of nature, of the production process, and of the market.

I have said that if the producers control their exchange relations, there will be no fetishism or estrangement at this level. But would this controlling require a powerful state standing over society to direct exchange? If so, there would be estrangement at the political level.[99] The *Manifesto* described such a state, and the *German Ideology* admitted that there would have to be political estrangement as the proletariat first came to power. Do we simply trade economic for political estrangement in Stage 1? The answer that Marx now wishes to give is no. If we read carefully, we find that the socialist stage in the *Manifesto* does not quite match our unalienated socialist society from *Capital*.

99. See "On the Jewish Question," in *WYMPS*, p. 225; *MEW*, 1: 354–55. Also *CHPR*, pp. 31–32; *MEW*, 1: 232–33. Also *GI*, pp. 44–46; *MEW*, 3: 32–34.

In the *Manifesto*, the regulation of society from above was to cease only in the communist stage, when class distinctions had disappeared and when the means of production were finally held in common.[100] In the socialist exchange society of *Capital* as well as in that of the *Gotha Program*, we find that the means of production are already held in common.[101] Further, in the socialist society of *Capital*, there are no classes. Marx says that this is a community of free individuals holding the means of production in common, in which the labor power of *all* is consciously applied and the share of each in the distribution of wealth is determined by labor time.[102] In the *Gotha Program* it is explicitly stated that society "recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else." Moreover, nothing is said in *Capital* of a state standing over society, and such a state is explicitly rejected in the *Gotha Program*.[103]

Marx has changed the views he held in the *Manifesto*. He has decided, here already in *Capital*, that a state standing over society is not necessary even in the transitional stage. Neither economic nor political estrangement exists in Stage 1. Later, in the *Civil War in France* and in the 1872 preface to the *Manifesto*, this change of views is made explicit. Drawing on the experience of the Paris Commune (the worker's government that lasted for little over two months in 1871 and that can be considered an example of Stage 1, or the dictatorship of the proletariat),[104] Marx argues that there need not be a state standing over society. He says, "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready made state machinery and wield it for its own purpose."[105] In this respect, say Marx and Engels, the program of the *Manifesto* has become antiquated.[106] Now, even as early as the transitional stage, state power is to be destroyed.[107]

100. *Manifesto*, p. 112; *MEW*, 4: 482.

101. *Capital*, 1: 78; *MEW*, 23: 92. Also *Gotha*, p. 8; *MEW*, 19: 19.

102. *Capital*, 1: 78–79; *MEW*, 23: 92–93.

103. *Gotha*, pp. 9, 17; *MEW*, 19: 21, 27.

104. Engels makes this claim in the 1891 introduction to the *Civil War in France*, in *Writings on the Paris Commune*, ed. H. Draper (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 34; *MEW*, 22: 199. Marx seems to waver on this question (see *MEW*, 17: 433. Also *MEW*, 35: 160).

105. *Civil War*, p. 70; *MEW*, 17: 336.

106. See the 1872 preface to the *Manifesto* in *Birth of the Manifesto*, p. 130; *MEW*, 18: 96.

107. *Civil War*, p. 74; *MEW*, 17: 340.

How one can have a dictatorship of the proletariat that would not be a state standing over and dominating society is not clear in Marx's own writings. A dictatorship seems to imply state domination and estrangement. In commenting on Marx's political views, Lenin, in *State and Revolution*, suggests a possible solution to this difficulty. Lenin argues that if the proletariat forms the majority of the population, then there would no longer be a state in the proper sense, the Marxian sense, of the word. There would be no state in the sense of an organized force (possessing a monopoly of the means of violence) for the suppression of a majority by a minority. If the workers form the majority, little force or suppression would be necessary. Government would be democratic, and the withering away of the state would already have commenced.[108]

This democratic character would be insured by institutions like those of the Commune. Marx describes these institutions in the *Civil War in France*. The Commune was a body of municipal councilors elected by universal suffrage, responsible, revocable at short terms, and bound by a *mandat impératif* (formal instructions of the constituents). The majority of these members were working men, and their political work was done at workmen's wages. The Commune was a working, not a parliamentary, body; it was executive and legislative at the same time.[109] Lenin interprets this as an increase in democratic control for the constituents over the governing body. In most governments things are done behind the scenes by executive agencies, over which the constituents have little or no control. Those whom the constituents do control—the legislators—merely talk. The overcoming of this division of labor gives the constituents increased democratic control over both the talking and the doing.[110] The Commune replaced the army with the National Guard, a citizen's militia with an extremely short term of service. Instead of a standing army, with its monopoly on the means of violence and attached to the government, there was a citizen militia that could defend the citizens[111] as well as prevent the government from coming to stand over and dominate

108. *Selected Works*, 2: 352–53.
109. *Civil War*, pp. 73–74; *MEW*, 17: 339–40.
110. *Selected Works*, 2: 319–20.
111. *Civil War*, pp. 73–74; *MEW*, 17: 339–40.

society.[112] Further, the police were stripped of all political attributes and made the responsible and revocable agents of the Commune. The same was done with all administrative officials.[113] What this accomplished, says Marx, was that

> the few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally mis-stated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal Constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society.[114]

This, as Marx had said in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, is to overcome the separation of civil society from the political state. If, in that text, it was not clear whether the transcendence of the political state meant that general concerns were to be decided by all as individuals or that there was to be an elected body of agents performing certain governmental tasks,[115] it has become quite clear what Marx's views are in the *Civil War in France*. Here, the Commune is a central body of elected agents who carry out certain governmental functions. In other words, the transcendence of the political state is not a transcendence of all government.

Marx goes on to describe a different form of representation, much as he did in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

> Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real

112. See the first and second drafts of the *Civil War in France*, in *Writings on the Paris Commune*, pp. 152, 199; *MEW*, 17: 543, 595–96.

113. *Civil War*, p. 73; *MEW*, 17: 339.

114. *Civil War*, p. 74; *MEW*, 17: 340.

115. *CHPR*, pp. 119–20; *MEW*, 1: 325. Also see above, Chap. 3, Sec. 3.

business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly.[116]

Representation, the relationship between the constituents and their agents, is like the relationship between an employer and his employee (this is like the relationship Rousseau advocated between the sovereign and the government)[117]—a direct, responsible type of representation. Like an employee, the member of the Commune is retained or fired depending on how he performs the job given him by his employer. It is ensured that representatives simply perform a direct necessary service like a shoemaker or any other employee. They do not control or stand over the citizens.

This way of overcoming political estrangement, however, raises as many difficulties as it settles. In his "Conspectus of Bakunin's Book *State and Anarchy*," written a few years after the *Civil War in France*, Marx seems to return to the view of the *Manifesto*. In the "Conspectus," Marx argues against Bakunin that in the transitional period, until there are no longer classes or class struggle (in this text, again, they will remain for a time), the government of the proletariat will be a "state in the now accepted political sense of the word."[118] It will dominate the old form of society and it will have a political character.[119] It will have to "employ coercive measures."[120] This political state would not disappear until classes disappear—until after the economic order had been remade.[121] Under communism this elected body would remain. Only then would it lose its political character.[122] This treatment of the transitional stage is like the treatment in the *Manifesto* and is contrary to that in the *Civil War in France*. How is this shift to be explained?

We must notice that in the "Conspectus" Marx acknowledges that in all countries of western Europe it is the peasants, not the proletariat,

116. *Civil War*, p. 74; *MEW*, 17: 340.

117. *Social Contract*, pp. 54–55; *Political Writings of Rousseau*, 2: 64–65.

118. In *Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism* (New York: International, 1972), pp. 147, 150; *MEW*, 18: 630, 634–35.

119. Ibid.

120. "Conspectus," p. 147; *MEW*, 18: 630.

121. Ibid.

122. "Conspectus," p. 150; *MEW*, 18: 634–35.

that constitute the majority.[123] Thus he argues, in line with Lenin, that if the proletariat is not the majority, it follows that it would be impossible to do without a dominating and coercive state apparatus—a state in the proper sense of the word. The state would not immediately begin to wither away, and it would not be democratic.

If in all of western Europe the proletariat were actually in the minority, how could Marx have argued, in the *Civil War in France*, that state power should be destroyed? Marx was not ignorant of the historical facts. He did not claim that the French proletariat were the majority in the Commune. In this text, too, he admitted that the peasantry were the majority in France.[124] He did, however, claim that within the city of Paris the workers formed the majority of the National Guard, and that the members of the Commune (elected through universal suffrage) were either workers or their acknowledged representatives.[125] But this is not the same as a national majority.[126] Marx seems to be giving us a somewhat distorted picture of the actual conditions. Furthermore, in the same text, Marx admits that the Commune had yet to uproot "the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes and therefore class rule."[127] How could the separation of state from society have been overcome while class rule persisted?

In the *Civil War in France* we find an actual historical treatment of the overcoming of the state; whereas in the *Gotha Program*, in Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of *Capital*, and in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* we are given an abstract theory of the overcoming of the state, an analysis of an ideal type. Despite the fact that the Commune was closer to class rule by a minority, Marx argues that it was democratic, that there was no state standing over and dominating society, and thus that it was unalienated. In whatever way one might decide to explain the actual presence or absence of these characteristics during the short two months of the Commune, the social conditions necessary

123. "Conspectus," pp. 147–48; *MEW*, 18: 630. Also *Gotha*, p. 16; *MEW*, 19: 27.

124. *Civil War* (second draft), p. 198; *MEW*, 17: 594.

125. *Civil War*, p. 73; *MEW*, 17: 339.

126. It should be noted that Marx did argue, rather naively perhaps, that given three months, the peasantry of France would have risen in support of the Commune (*Civil War*, p. 80; *MEW*, 17: 346).

127. *Civil War*, p. 76; *MEW*, 17: 342.

for their development, according to the *Manifesto*, the "Conspectus," and Lenin, were simply not present: Yet the characteristics correspond to the abstract theory. What is Marx doing in the *Civil War in France* but asserting his vision of what socialism will be, despite the fact that the necessary historical conditions are absent. What can we say but that the sort of state envisioned there is an ideal.

Without commenting upon it, I have frequently employed the term "ideal" in the sense of "utopian ideal," a sense Marx would object to. Nevertheless, it does seem that this ideal strain is present in Marx's thought. We find it in the 1844 notion of species-being (an essence that must be fulfilled), we find it in the early ideal of labor, and we also find it here in the treatment of the socialist state. This ideal strain appears again as soon as we begin to examine the reasons for moving from socialism on to communism.

If we can assume that where the proletariat does form a majority there will be no state standing over society in Stage 1, then, we might ask, what distinguishes Stage 1 from Stage 2? We have seen that there would no longer be estrangement in Stage 1 either at the political or the economic level. What, then, distinguishes the two stages? Marx describes Stage 2 in the following terms:

> In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of individuals under the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour, from a mere means of life, has itself become the prime necessity of life; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners; from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs![128]

As a prerequisite for Stage 2 the division of labor is progressively overcome, the individual achieves an all-around development, and the social production of wealth increases; all of this occurs in Stage 1. Why, when this development reaches the point where it is possible to provide for "each according to his needs," does something occur

128. *Gotha*, p. 10; *MEW*, 19: 21.

that demands the transformation of socialism into communism? The only characteristics still separating the two stages are modified exchange and labor certificates, which are yet present. But this seems to be an inessential difference, since these characteristics no longer produce fetishism. Do they, then, fetter the growth of the productive forces? Does this society give rise to needs that cannot be met within the existing social framework? No convincing argument of this sort is given. It seems that the slogan "to each according to his needs" could replace abstract bourgeois equality, which results inevitably in inequality because individual needs are different,[129] simply by establishing redistribution programs within Stage 2. What necessitates, what drives us on to, Stage 2?

Could an answer to our question be found in the line, "after labour, from a mere means of life, has itself become the prime necessity of life"? Is this the need that cannot be realized in Stage 1? Does this mean, despite the *Grundrisse*, the *Theories of Surplus Value,* and *Capital,* that Marx is still thinking about transforming labor into an end in itself? Is the model for humanized labor that was described in those texts intended to characterize only Stage 1? Could Marx perhaps be thinking that the reduction of labor time, the increased scientific character of the labor process, and the all-around development gained in leisure would slowly overcome the difference between work and leisure? Can this be what labor as the "prime necessity of life" means? If so, then one might be led to take the next step—to abolish the market—not to end fetishism, which long ago disappeared, but to encourage the development of an aesthetic condition or the scope of this condition. But all of this is speculation. We do not have the textual evidence to decide. If this is what Marx is thinking, then he has really slipped back toward a Schillerian ideal, impossible according to the analysis of the possibilities of production and so pushed off into the distant future. If Marx is not seeking labor as an end in itself, which seems more likely,[130] still the necessity for going on to communism

129. *Gotha*, pp. 9–10; *MEW*, 19: 20–21. For another view of these matters, see Heller, pp. 99–130.

130. The phrase "prime necessity of life" (the first life need, *erst Lebensbedurfnisse*) could be interpreted differently. It could mean that work will be no longer a mere means, but the most fundamental prerequisite, the prime necessity, for an improved life in leisure. This would be to say that it will not be an end in itself in the 1844 sense. However, see also Marx, "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International

remains unexplained; it appears merely as a desired state of affairs, an ideal.

Association," in *Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 380; *MEW*, 16: 12, where Marx says that labor will be carried out in future society with a "willing hand, a ready mind, and joyous heart."

V

Conclusion

IN 1844, Marx's views on labor were close to those of Schiller. Later they came to resemble those of the mature Hegel. Indeed, Marx's shift was in certain ways like the shift that Hegel himself made from youth to maturity.

But with respect to political institutions, Marx remains closer to Schiller. The major change in Marx's views on the state came in 1843. While there remain some difficulties with the theory of socialism, nevertheless, the way in which Marx wants to envision the state shifts progressively toward a state more like Schiller's ideal and the ancient Greek state.

Up to this point we have examined Marx's labor ideal and his ideal of the state separately. If we now focus upon the relationship between the two, between the governing and the economic institutions of socialist society, we see them in a different light. We find, despite *major* differences, that Marx has come closer, if only in general outline, to the model of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right.* In the society of Stage 1, exchange has not been eliminated; instead, the undesirable and destructive elements of exchange are transformed and controlled by the governing element. Objectification is much closer to the sort of objectification found, for example, in Hegel's discussion of property. Society (not, of course, the individual) objectifies its will in nature, controls it, and develops itself. Reconciliation now occurs through scientific knowledge and rational control. It is not achieved through a return to unity with nature, nor does it directly involve aesthetic contemplation. The social relations that arise out of these conditions cannot be direct and immediate. The individual participates in a complex, rationally organized whole and finds his development therein.

His relation to others requires rational understanding, not simply direct self-confirming contact. We need not repeat the obvious differences (even within each of these similarities) between Hegel and Marx. But we must discuss one difference in the way these two ideals are related.

In the separate examinations of the labor and state ideals it appeared that both Hegel and Marx kept to the Greek model at the level of the state (Hegel, only partially) but not at the level of labor. In Hegel's case, this peculiar splitting up of the model led to the observation that there were two ideal periods of Greek culture. The ideal of labor was found in the Heroic age, the ideal of the state in the Athenian city-state period. These two ideals were incompatible even in the ancient world. Hegel simply dropped the former and tried to preserve something of the latter. As soon as we cease to consider the two ideals separately, we notice that Marx, too, makes a shift between two different Greek models, but in such a way that the labor ideal is not totally abandoned. The labor ideal of 1844 was found to be incompatible with complex material production. Instead, Marx introduced a separation between labor and leisure. It is at this point that his humanism, in contrast to the mature Hegel, becomes apparent. If one were to look for an ideal model involving the separation of labor and leisure, one could find it in the Greek city state, where the man of leisure—the citizen, at least on Aristotle's model[1]—pursues higher intellectual and political activity (of course, Marx's goal is to provide leisure for all). On this model, in the leisure time of socialist society, the individual develops himself, educates himself in the arts and sciences, and, just as the Athenian citizen did, takes part in political and social affairs.[2] The whole purpose of production and labor time, no longer resembling the model of the Heroic Age but now the

1. See *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), *Politics*, pp. 1183, 1279, 1288–89; *Metaphysics*, p. 690; *Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 1104–5.

2. In an article concerning the International Working Men's Association, Marx says that one of the demands of the worker's movement is for more free time to take part in political and social activities (*MEW*, 16: 192). In socialist society individuals would also have to be quite active in local communes that would work out the voting instructions to be given to delegates (*Civil War*, p. 74; *MEW*, 17: 340). They would also be involved in deciding affairs, hiring managers, and perhaps even voting in the work place (see above, Chap. 4, Sec. 1).

model of the city-state period, is to provide the means for each and all to take part in the important activities of life, leisure activities, which are ends in themselves. In the *Grundrisse* Marx writes,

> Do we ever find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed property etc. is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth? Wealth does not appear as the aim of production. . . . The question is always which mode of property creates the best citizens. . . . Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth the aim of production. . . . This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for.[3]

The ideal of labor and its connection to the Greek model is not dropped as it was for Hegel. Marx tries to find a place for labor within a model resembling that of the city-state period.[4] Labor is not man's highest end, but it nevertheless plays a fundamental role in producing the means for the individual's development and for the enriching of his leisure activities. Man becomes the aim of production. The labor ideal is subsumed under and unified with the city-state ideal. Only in this way can something of it be preserved.

In *Capital*, Marx considered the view of Aristotle to be a dream contradicted by capitalist society, but a dream that, we can now see, finally comes true in socialist society. "If . . . every tool, when summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work, if the weavers' shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there would be

3. *G*, pp. 487–88; *GKPO*, pp. 387–88. In another passage Marx describes the highest form of social development as "free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth" (*G*, p. 158; *GKPO*, pp. 75–76).

4. Marx has moved closer to the model abandoned by the mature Hegel, the model found in the *Positivity of the Christian Religion*, where labor and state ideals were integrated (see above, Chap. 2, Sec. 1 and n. 158). In this respect Marx reverses the shift that Hegel made. Of course, Marx was not familiar with this text.

no need either of apprentices for the master, or of slaves for the lord."[5]

In the Introduction I cited a spectrum of views concerning the unity of Marx's thought. They ranged from claiming an essential unity to claiming a *coupure epistémologique*. I have sought to show that none of these positions finally holds up.

There are many reasons for not accepting the essential-unity view. The concept of species-being, fundamental in the early writings, is abandoned. With the new doctrine of historical materialism the notion of consciously realizing one's essence is dropped. Marx also changes his mind concerning the role human activity can play in the production process. He ceases to expect that labor will become an end in itself or that it will give rise to an aesthetic relation to the object. He adopts a model in which labor and leisure remain separate. He alters his view of the way in which alienation in exchange can be overcome. He changes his understanding of reconciliation and objectification and thus of the possibility of unity with nature. Finally, his position on the socialist stage goes through a complex series of shifts.

But, on the other hand, neither can we accept the notion of a *coupure epistémologique*. True, with the abandonment of the concept of alienation from the species Marx's notion of alienation is fundamentally changed. Nevertheless, alienation from the product, in the process of production, and of the political state retain the core of their earlier

5. *Capital*, 1: 408; *MEW*, 23: 430. See also *Aristotle's Politics*, p. 1131. Engels comes very close to describing the very model I am suggesting: "Without slavery, no Greek state, no Greek art and science; without slavery, no Roman Empire. . . . We may add at this point that all historical antagonisms between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes to this very day find explanation in this same relatively undeveloped productivity of human labor. So long as the really working population was so much occupied in their necessary labour that they had no time left for looking after the common affairs of society—the direction of labour, affairs of state, legal matters, art, science, etc.—so long was it always necessary that there should exist a special class, freed from actual labour, to manage these affairs; and this special class never failed to impose a greater and greater burden of labour, for its own advantage, on the working masses. Only the immense increase of the productive forces attained through large scale industry made it possible to distribute labour among all members of society without exception, and thereby to limit the labour time of each individual member to such an extent that all have free time left to take part in the general—both theoretical and practical—affairs of society" (*Anti-Dühring*, pp. 200–201; *MEW*, 20: 169–70).

meaning. It is just that they are no longer understood to produce alienation from the species. Further, the concept of alienation in exchange is fundamentally the same in the "Comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*" as in the section on the fetishism of commodities in *Capital*, despite the fact that Marx has changed his mind concerning the way in which this alienation can be overcome, and though this change was in part made possible by abandoning the concept of alienation from the species.

Nor is it possible to hold that there is a clean break into two neat periods. The development of the doctrine of historical materialism and the abandonment of the concept of species-being do occur in the *German Ideology*. But the shift in the ideal of labor begins in the *Grundrisse*. Other shifts come at very different times. The shift concerning alienation in exchange comes in *Capital*. The view that the political state must be overcome first occurs in 1843, and the complex set of shifts concerning the socialist stage are strung out between the *Manifesto* and the *Gotha Program*. The last three shifts will not even fit within a middle transitional period—a variant of the two-period theory; it sees a gradual shift occurring between the *German Ideology* and the *Grundrisse*.

There are fundamental shifts, they do not amount to a *coupure epistémologique*, and they do not occur either at one point or within a middle transitional period.

In the Introduction I also cited the views of some scholars who felt it necessary to defend the essential unity of Marx's thought in order to demonstrate its humanistic character as a whole. But despite the shifts we have discussed, we have found that Marx is a humanist throughout his writings. The humanism of his later writings is an outgrowth of, yet different from, the humanism of his early writings.

In 1844, it was human activity that created alienation, private property, capital, and so on, and found itself subordinate to its own creation. Emancipation was achieved by altering the character and organization of this activity. Human activity had to become conscious and purposive so that the object was collectively controlled for the benefit of the species. This made possible freedom, self-development, and the realization of essence. The result was an aesthetic relationship to the object. Human activity not only created the object, but was able to contemplate itself, its essence, in it. There seemed to be no realm of means as opposed to a realm of ends. All activity was to be an end in itself.

Early and late, the humanization of man is seen as the end of human history, of social interaction, and of production. But in the early writings the human activity leading to this realization as its end was itself a part of that end. Conscious human activity, species life, played a fundamentally important role; it was intimately wrapped up with nature, production, and society as part and parcel of the cause of this realization and as its end.

Beginning in the *German Ideology* and continuing through the *Grundrisse* to the *Theories of Surplus Value* and *Capital*, human activity is displaced in a specific way; it no longer plays such a fundamental and underlying role. Instead, the material conditions of the socioeconomic realm within which activity takes place become more fundamental. This realm now retains a certain independence. Certainly human activity and technological-industrial factors are no longer equal and codetermining, as they were in 1844. Conscious activity, at least in one sense, plays a secondary role in the production process; it cannot be part of an end in itself in this realm. Production and material conditions can ultimately be controlled by consciousness, from outside (or by the side of) production, to produce a humanized condition in leisure, but not enough to produce this same type of condition in the factory. If rationally controlled and guided by a collective plan, social production can be made to give rise to humanized man as the goal of this social organization. Production and social organization, if rationally and collectively regulated, can be turned into a means for the creation of a humanized life. But insofar as the individual is active within the realm of production, his activity is a means toward his development and fulfillment in leisure.

In this way, the scientific, technological, and determinist strains that have often been thought to predominate in Marx's later writings are not to be opposed to humanism; given collective rational control, they in fact give rise to humanism, though to a different sort of humanism than in 1844.

Based upon the issues we have considered in this study, the most accurate description of Marx's development would be the following. He was always concerned with a certain kind of ideal, which can also be found in Schiller, Hegel, and other writers—an overcoming of alienation and estrangement that would allow a condition characterized by the Greek-aesthetic model. At first this appeared as a philosophical ideal. As Marx began to investigate this possibility in more

concrete detail, he was forced to modify his philosophical views and then his concrete expectations for historical development, political reality, conditions of production, and the market. He never abandoned his humanistic aspirations for the Greek-aesthetic condition, but he was forced to modify his hopes. He dropped what he was forced to drop. He transformed what could be transformed. And he preserved what could be preserved. Ultimately he retained a certain continuity behind a series of fundamental discontinuities.

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